언어학 총서 1

Abstract Syntax and Korean with Reference to English

Lee Chung-Min

Thaehaksa

Abstract Syntax and Korean with Reference to English
Lee Chung-Min
Thaehaksa

Abstract Syntax and Korean with Reference to English

Lee Chung-Min

Thaehaksa

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Fred W. Householder, my dissertation director, for his unfailing encouragement and understanding assistance throughout my studies at Indiana University. His insights and perception always helped me to find a sound direction concerning my research. His comments and criticism on my dissertation were invaluable. My thanks are due to Professor Frank Banta for his thorough reading of my dissertation and helpful comments on it, and also to Professors Owen Thomas and Tim Shopen for their helpful comments and encouragement.

I also benefited from my talk with Professor Andreas Koutsoudas, who always emphasized 'argument'. My talk with Professor Charles Bird on aspects of reflexivization was also helpful. I cannot forget my earlier teachers, Professors Gunter Schaarshmidt and Robert Terry.

I cherish the friendship shown by both American and Korean friends and the cooperation of those who answered my constant questions, "Does this make sense?" followed by queer sentences to see grammaticality. My Bloomington life has been enjoyable with rich musical events and valuable friends such as Mr. Taik Sup Auh, my high school alumnus.

I was always encouraged by those who taught me in Korea, including Professor Ki-Moon Lee, an Altaic linguist, and the faculty members of English, friends and my family. Also, Professor Suk-Jin Chang's friendship is unforgettable.

I want to express my thanks to those concerned for the fellowships and grants for my studies and research in the United States, including the Indiana University Cross-Cultural Fellowship (for Doctoral Candidates and Faculty) awarded by its Committee consisting of a Vice-President and Dean and four chairmen of language departments.

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my father, who passed away during my stay in the United States.

April, 1973

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER II: REFLEXIVIZATION

CHAPTER Ⅲ: CAUSATIVE-PASSIVE-INCHOATIVE

INTRODUCTION

1. Scope of the Study

This study aims at a theoretical defense of abstract analysis in syntax by characterizing semantic-syntactic structures of Korean with reference to comparable structures in English, with universal implications in mind.

In Chapter Ⅰ: *Illocution - Modality - Implicature*, the Gricean pragmatic definition of meaning is compared to pragmatic presuppositions inherent in illocutionary acts. This study finds the deference condition to be a dominating factor determining different sentential expressions of the same illocution. Similarly, the honorific system is a reflex of the speaker-hearer interaction with varying degrees of deference in speech act situations. A non-symmetry condition on authority in the pragmatic presuppositional structure is reflected in the possible English embedded performatives, and a non-reflexivity condition on deference is reflected in Korean. Force and sense condition certain transformations, and indirect illocutions are based on inherent assumptions about illocutions much as implicatures are based on maxims of conversation and the logical structure of utterances.

In Chapter Ⅱ: *Reflexivization*, the requirement of the Subject or Topic antecedent and command conditions together with some subsidiary constraints is demonstrated in various simplex and complex constructions in Korean. The relatedness of Topicalization and Relativization is demonstrated in terms of the identical Reflexive behavior in both constructions. Perlmutter's Pronoun Drop solution to the violation of island (Complex NP) constraints in a definable set of Korean (or Japanese) data is shown to be inadequate. Some seemingly semantic constraints on reflexivization are shown to be resolved into abstract syntactic treatments.

Chapter Ⅲ: *Causative - Passive - Inchoative* provides conceptual ground and syntactic evidence for complex propositional analysis of causative and its universal implications. Structural similarity between passive and causative and the regularity of 'irregular' passive are demonstrated. This study detects the psychological-potentiality (passive) construction and gives a generative semantic treatment with modal predicate. The required underlying association of the inchoative predicate with the causative predicate resolves the ambiguity of the [... CAUSE NP Adj] construction in English, making possible to see whether the existence of the Object is presupposed or not at the time of change.

2. Abbreviations and Notations

Abbreviations

Top = Topic Marker
SM = Subject Marker
OM = Object Marker
Dec = Declarative Sentential Ending
Q = Interrogative Sentential Ending
Imp = Imperative Sentential Ending
Propos = Propositive Sentential Ending
Sgt = Suggestive Modal Marker
Rel = Relational Marker(Relativizing/Complementizing)
Nom = Nominal
CompN = Complementizer Noun
Defer = Deferential Marker
Honor = Honorific Marker
Pres = Present Tense Marker
Pl = Plural Number Marker
Cmp = Complementizer
Fut = Future
Volit = Volitional

Notations

The following phonetic values have been put in the respective alphabetic notations for typographical reasons:

[ŋ] ng
[ə] ə
[æ] ay
[j] is a glide.

CHAPTER I

ILLOCUTION – MODALITY – IMPLICATURE

What are the relations between sentential types and illocutionary forces of sentences? How are underlying semantic relations and pragmatic presuppositions for speech acts responsible for various surface realizations and the distinction between possible and impossible utterances as certain illocutionary acts? What is the ultimate state of mind on the part of the speaker in making a choice from among different sentential types of the same illocution in the speech act situation of the speaker-hearer interactions?

These and other questions will be considered in relation with some recent suggestions and findings by philosophers and linguists, elaborating and furthering insightful points hinted and correcting gross points made, to make another step forward in this area.

1. Speech Acts

1.1. What They Are

Linguistics is a study of the sound-meaning relation. If the theory of speech acts treats the relation between what the speaker means to do in or by saying and what he says, as well as the speaker-hearer interaction in linguistic communication, we can reasonably suppose that this line of investigation should be incorporated into the proper domain of linguistic theory.

The study of speech acts pays due attention to the situation of speech the act, where the speaker performs some act in saying something. A performative utterance is characteristically distinguished from a 'constative' utterance by the former's impossibility of being assigned a truth value. Indeed, a constative or a statement in the sense of what is stated or asserted can be said to be either 'ture' or 'false', depending on the factuality of the state of affairs it describes.[1] When it is viewed as a speech act with the higher predicate of "I SAY to you (P)", a truth value is still assigned, but to the P, not to the higher performative predicate. Performatives (e.g., of a

1. If we follow Strawson's notion of truth rather than theories of correspondence family.

promise) other than a statement cannot be assigned a truth value.

Speech acts can be looked at from different angles, and Austin (1962) made distinctions among a locutionary act, which is a bare act *of* saying something, an illocutionary act performed *in* saying something, and a perlocutionary act performed *by* saying something. The illocutionary act, such as ordering, warning, promising, etc., has a certain conventional force, whereas the perlocutionary act does not. The perlocutionary act is bringing about or achieving certain consequences or effects, no matter whether intended or not, such as convincing, surprising, alarming, etc. Therefore, the most characteristic feature of this act is that it can be analyzed into the underlying elements *CAUSE GET Psych Adjective*. If the Agent of a perlocutionary act is the subject of the verb, the sentence necessarily contains the *by* clause. For example:

(1) John *surprised* Mary by saying that he passed the exam.

This is not necessarily the case with the illocutionary act when it is performed with an explicit performative, since saying the performative already constitutes an illocutionary act. Consider:

(2) I *warn* you that you will lose your travel grant unless you leave immediately.

Verbs representing perlocutionary acts cannot be used performatively as (2).

Nonverbal illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are possible through facial expression, gesture, etc. But illocutionary ones are still conventional and the perlocutionary ones are not. And a verbal perlocutionary act, which alone has linguistic relevance, brings about its effects only through the recognition of the content of the utterance, not through just the sound. For instance, in (1), it is not John's sudden voice that surprised Mary, in order for *surprising* to be a verbal perlocutionary act. We can encounter a case of performative, of which the homophonous verb is used for a perlocutionary consequence. Consider the following:

(3) I hereby inform you that your husband has deceased.

The verb *inform* can be used for a perlocutionary act of informing. Since the illocutionary *inform* intends the addressee to get informed, if the effect is not realized the illocutionary act cannot be said to be totally felicitous. However, the psychological or cognitive effect of the addressee's becoming informed is not within the speaker's control, and disparity between the illocution and the perlocution is a possible situation.

Typically, a sentential utterance can be analyzed to consist of some illocutionary force indicating device and some propositional content. The former may be either an explicit performative verb or some marker, intonation, sentential types, or combination of some such. The latter consists of a subject as reference and a predicate. I do not see such categorization or proposition-forming ability as a separate speech act, i.e., a 'propositional act' as named by Searle (1970), since we cannot perform a propositional act physically, with no reliance on illocution. It must be part of linguistic competence.

There is a wide range of implicit or inferred illocutionary utterances as opposed to explicit performatives. For instance, the following can serve as a question:

(4) I wonder if she has arrived.

Then, there must be some features and conditions on questions that make the above utterance a potential question. It is not the case that arbitrary utterances can have the same illocutionary force. However, the above sentence is not used as a test question. Why not? Let us consider conditions necessary for illocutionary acts.

1.2. Felicity Conditions

What conditions are necessary for the 'happy' functioning of a performative? Austin distinguishes two basic categories. One, for a certain conventional effect of an illocutionary act, the procedure can be invoked by the right persons in the right circumstances. Let us tentatively call this contextual conditions. Most of these form pragmatic presuppositions of an illocutionary act. Two, for the happy inauguration of certain consequential conduct, the participants must have certain thoughts, feelings, and intentions which the act inherently possesses. Let us call these inherent conditions. The relation between the act concerned and the speaker-oriented inherent condition is that of entailment.

The category of contextual conditions is analogous to referential presupposition in non-pragmatic presupposition. If someone who is not a judge utters, 'I sentence you to death', the first person used here does not refer to the right person which the performative verb or act indicates, and consequently the performative is unhappy. Analogously, if someone says, "The present king of France is bald", the reference to 'The present king of France' is void in the real world of 1972, and the whole sentence is false(to Russell) or neither true nor false(to Strawson). However, these sentences can receive certain forced interpretations. The first sentence might be

uttered as a joke or under the pretense that the speaker is a judge. Of course, this is not a normal use of language. The second sentence could be uttered by someone who is ignorant of the French political system and means the head of the government (the President actually) by 'the present king'. Then the speaker made a mistake in presupposition due to lack of knowledge of a political system, but not lack of knowledge of a grammatical system. Therefore, if we narrow down the domain of our interest in linguistics to the strict or narrow sense of grammaticality, we will certainly lose the vast area of pragmatic presuppositions and inherent conditions for speech acts and the non-pragmatic presuppositions(referential and logical) for propositional expression, which must be linguistically significant and revealingly interesting. Pragmatic and inherent suppositions for speech acts are to felicity conditions what presuppositions for propositional expression are to truth conditions, as hinted by Austin (1962, p.20).

1.3. The Gricean Pragmatic Notion of Meaning

Illocutionary acts are acts of meaning in the sense that the Agent=speaker of an illocutionary act means to do something when he performs the act. In this connection, Grice's pragmatic definition of meaning lays a good basis for analyzing suppositions for speech acts. Grice (1968) gives the following definition: (*ψ=dummy, specific mood-indicator corresponding to the propositional attitude ψ-ing, e.g., $\vdash$ corresponding to believing, ! corresponding to intending). By (when) uttering x U(=utterer) meant that *ψP′=df′($\exists$A)(U uttered x M(=meaning)-intending (i) A (=hearer, audience) should think U to ψ that P and (in some cases only, depending on the identification of *ψP′)(ii) that A should, via the fulfillment of (i), himself ψ that P). This definition covers both indicative and imperative-type utterances; for the indicative M-effect, the hearer should think that the speaker believes something ('exhibitive') and, via this, the hearer should have a corresponding belief ('protreptic'). For the imperative M-effect, the hearer should intend to do something through the reception of the speaker's intention to this effect.

Searle (1970) added another condition to the above definition, i.e., the conveyance of meaning must be done through rules of a language used for the speech act, not through a possible non-conventional perlocutionary by-product or 'pass-word' like means. I regard Searle's complementary proposal as reasonable because of its linguistic relevance.

Austin's conditions on the participants' thoughts, feelings, and intentions can be conceived within Grice's model of pragmatic meaning. The former is a subset of the conditions involved in the latter. It is our concern to further elaborate specific

suppositions for specific illocutionary acts, and their relations to different sentential expressions.

2. The Deference Condition and Coorientation

A speech act is an interaction between speaker and hearer. If a speaker's expression of a certain illocutionary force is too abrupt, it can offend the hearer, and if an expression is too deferential, it even fails to constitute an attempted illocutionary act such as a command. On the other hand, it is not only the speaker's side that should show an appropriate degree of deference; the speaker has a certain assumption that the hearer should also show at least the cooperation of listening to the speaker's statement, of answering his question, or a certain expectation that the hearer would comply to his request. In other words, the speaker expects and must have some ground to expect his partner's relevant response. Otherwise, a conversation cannot be carried out. There is a relation of dynamics (or perhaps field interaction) between speaker and hearer, and the speaker is vigilant to coorientate the conversational situation, movilizing his judgment about the relation between his intended illocutionary act and the nature of the hearer and circumstances in relation to his own position. Without a proper coorientation, the speech act cannot be felicitous. And if not felicitous, the speaker must reorientate the whole situation.

The speaker has a repertoire of different types of utterances for certain illocutionary force and the choice of a particular utterance from among a storage of utterance types largely depends on the speaker's chosen appropriate degree of deference toward the hearer, or how he considers the hearer in relation to himself in performing a certain speech act. This point is analogous to the choice of different speech levels of the honorific system in Korean.

Different degrees of imperative force in different imperative verbs depend on corresponding different degrees of deference on the part of the speaker to the hearer. In an unhappy conversational situation such as quarreling, the normal display of deference sharply decreases. It will become clear that modal expressions of necessity, prudence, hesitancy, etc., which are used with performative verbs are based on this deference condition.

The deference relation is not limited to the speaker-hearer relation, but it also exists between the speaker and some person mentioned, particularly in languages where the honorific system is distinct. The speaker in this case must consider the hearer's relation to the person mentioned. All these complex relationships are reflected in the honorific system, but they have not been properly treated in terms

of the speech act situation.

3. Illocutions: Explicit, Indirect, and Inferential

Let us examine preliminarily what sentential types can represent or imply what illocutionary forces, and then explore what illocutionary acts, based on what conditions of felicity or deference, take what sentential forms.

3.1.1. *Declarative Type*

a. Statement or assertion

(5) The astronaut landed safely.

(6) God exists.[2)]

The speaker simply makes a statement or assertion for the proleptic or exhibitive purpose. The higher performative verb must be *state* or something like that.

b. Accusation

(7) You are staying in the States illegally.

It is the case that the speaker accuses the addressee by claiming that the addressee is staying in the States illegally, if and only if the speaker thinks that the addressee's staying in the States illegally is *bad* and furthermore the speaker intends to get the addressee to feel *jeopardized.* In a context in which these conditions of accusation are satisfied, a declarative sentence is equivalent to the explicit form of

(8) I *accuse* you (of staying in the States illegally).

In other words, if and only if the speaker has the judgment that the addressee's act is bad and the intention of getting the addressee to feel jeopardized, a declarative sentence such as (7) is derived from an explicit performative such as(8). It is an indirect illocutionary act of accusation.

2. Even though some logical positivists argue that a moral or theological assertion does not even constitute a proposition and is therefore meaningless, this is not a linguist's concern.

c. Warning

(9) There is a school ahead.

Under certain circumstances, when the speaker sits beside a fastdriving friend, for instance, the above utterance is an implied warning. Strictly speaking, the propositional content of a warning must be a future event, and (9) is a statement of a fact that has a certain causal relation to some future event which the speaker believes is not in the addressee's best interest.

d. Order

(10) The garbage can is full.

Under the right circumstances, this is an inferred order. Human beings are rational beings, and they base their behavior on reasonableness. For illocutionary acts, they can provide reasons they feel are necessary. If the speaker has the authority, what (10) can mean is:

(11) I order you to empty the garbage can because the garbage can is full.

However, the reason for ordering is not a necessary condition for an order, thus constituting only an inferential, not an indirect, order.

e. Request for explanation

(12) i. You're dressed up
ii. Because I'm going to party.

The speaker, by making comment on an unusual event or state (pertaining the hearer), can express his curiosity and expect some explanation from the hearer. This is an inferred request.

On the other hand, modal-involved declarative forms represent various illocutionary acts ('You must go' as an order, 'I will buy you a bouquet' as promise, etc.), but I will treat them separately (in modality), since such modals are closely bound to illocutionary forces.

3.1.2. *Imperative Type*

(1) a. Command
(13) Form ranks!
b. Order
(14) Go home!

c. Request
(15) Please open the window!
d. Advice
(16) Complete your dissertation as soon as possible.
e. Warning
(17) Slow down the speed. (A school is ahead)
f. Entreaty
(18) Please save my life!

(2) Permission
(19) Leave, if you want to.

(3) Hortative
(20) Let us go home.

(4) Hypothetical
(21) i. Heat water to 100℃ and it will boil.
≒If you heat water to 100℃, it will boil.
≒Water boils at 100℃.
ii. If you want to visit the quietest spot in Bloomington, visit Weatherley Hall.
≒The quietest spot in Bloomington is Weatherly Hall.
iii. If you want to be killed, hit me!
≒Hit me, and I will kill you.
≒If you hit me, I will kill you.

(5) Prayer
(22) Forgive our sins!

3.1.3. *Interrogative Type*

(1) Asking (request for information, or test)
(23) a. Was he involved in the Watergate incident?
b. When did the burglary take place?

(2) Request
(24) Can/Will you pass the salt?

(3) Suggestion
(25) Why not stop here?

(4) Offer
(26) May I help you?

(5) Rhetorical negative assertion (with some challenge)

(27) a. Does anyone give a damn about linguistic theory?

b. Who gives a damn about linguistic theory?

≒c. No one gives a damn about linguistic theory.

And more illocutionary acts can be expressed by the interrogative type. Let us now consider the nature of each illocutionary act in relation to its grammatical manifestation.

3.2.1. *Assertion*

3.2.1.1. *The speaker-oriented expressions*

The inherent condition of a statement is that the speaker believes the propositional content of the statement. If a speaker makes a statement, it is a declaration of his commitment to the belief of the proposition represented by the statement. At the moment of performing the illocutionary act of statement, the speaker's belief is *entailed* in the statement. Therefore, if a government spokesman states the following sentence:

(28) The economic situation in the U.S. has rapidly improved, *but I don't believe it*. (in a sudden low voice, or winking)

the ultimate speakers of the connected two sentences are distinct, otherwise it is semantically odd or even anomalous. When this speaker-oriented inherent condition is asserted, it comes to have the force of assertion of the propositional content in a proper context. Consider the following:

(29) I believe that the economic situation in the U.S. has rapidly improved.

The above statement can have the same force as the first clause of (28) in a context where the speaker bases his belief on warranted evidence as a direct statement. Indeed, (29) has a weaker force than the first sentence of (28) under most natural contexts. Because of its subjective impression, it can be used in a concessive manner for assertion. When the speaker does not have a conviction, he may use some other kind of cogitatives like 'suppose' as follows:

(30) I suppose that the economic situation in the U.S. has rapidly improved.

Then, it can be paraphrased, with a modal, as something like:

(31) The economic situation in the U.S. may have rapidly improved.

In this sense, even the explicit verbs indicating an assertion such as *declare, state,*

say, tell, assert, have different degrees of force. We simply take a term to cover all the situations of a statement.

3.2.1.2. *The goal-oriented expressions*

The effect of this illocutionary act is, as Grice suggests, to get the hearer to think that the speaker believes the proposition concerned, and sometimes, via this, to get the hearer to have a corresponding belief. Therefore, if the speaker's desire for the perlocutionary goal is stated it will have the force of assertion. Consider the following:

(32) I want you to know that I believe that the war in Vietnam has ended. (exhibitive)

(33) I want you to believe that the war in Vietnam has ended. (protreptic)

(34) Believe it or not/Believe me, the war in Vietnam has ended.

The illocutionary act of assertion is indispensibly associated with the perlocutionary act of convincing (causing to believe) through the notion of belief. Another possible perlocutionary goal of statement is informing (causing to get informed) through the notion of knowledge. The explicit performative of:

(35) I (regret to) *inform* you that your husband was killed in the war.

entails 'I know that your husband was killed in the war', since we cannot inform anything we do not know. The factivity of the proposional content, which forms the object of the entailed 'know', is almost taken for granted. Therefore, its negation, 'I didn't inform you that your husband was killed in the war', still takes for granted the factivity of the object proposition (in one interpretation of the scope of the negation). The point of raising this question is that the perlocutionary goal of informing can be attained by way of a simple statement:

(36) Your husband was killed in the war.

and in this case the factivity of the proposition seems to leave no room for doubt to the speaker. Consider the following syntactic facts correlated to our semantic analysis:

(37) a. I hereby *inform* you of the fact
b. I hereby *declare* the fact
c. I hereby *state* 〃
d. I hereby ?*assert* 〃
e. I hereby **tell* 〃

} that the Nobel Prize has been awarded to John Searle.

f. I hereby *say "
g. I know "
h. I *believe "

Now, let us consider the addressee's possible response with "Is that true?". To (37a), it is very bad; to (37b), it is a little bad; to (37c), it is all right. The degree of badness is again correlated with the degree of factivity involved. Expectedly, the same response to:

(38) I regret that he didn't get the Nobel Prize.

is almost impossible, since the truth of the proposition in this case is presupposed, and it is hardly debatable.

3.2.1.3. *Act-oriented expressions*

Other cases of assertion are related to forceless deference expressions such as 'May I...?' or 'Let me...', etc. For example:

(39) May I *state* that human life is limited?

Illocutionary acts are volitional acts in the sense that the acts concerned involve the human will, and most of them can be used with expressions showing the speaker's favorable willingness or desires for the acts, or sometimes necessity for the acts.

(40) a. I would like to *say* that you are my sunshine.
b. I want to *say* that I enjoyed the trip with you very much.
c. I cannot but *say* that she acted improperly.

3.2.2. *Order, Request, Permission, Suggestion*

The speaker's meaning-intention for an imperative illocutionary act is to get the addressee to recognize that the speaker intends by the utterance that the addressee will do some act represented by the propositional content. The addressee's recognition, of course, is based on his knowledge that for the speaker the feature of the utterance is a linguistic mode of correlation with the speaker's propositional attitude. Furthermore, through this recognition, the hearer is intended by the speaker to come to intend the propositional content. This notion of Grice's (1967) and Searle's (1970) preparatory conditions on the act will serve as the basis to account for different indirect and inferential sentential expressions of the same illocutionary act.

3.2.2.1. *The speaker-oriented expressions*

A simple statement of the speaker's volition or desire for the propositional content counts as a request.

(41) I want you to bring a beer.

The speaker intends that the addressee will recognize the speaker's state of mind desiring the addressee's future act through the utterance and that the addressee, in deferential compliance, will come to form the intention of bringing him a beer just as in the case of an explicit request in recognition of the speaker's intention to this effect. The speaker's desire is tied up with or entailed in the illocutionary act of request. Therefore, this necessary condition of the speaker's desiring the addressee's future act can be asserted to constitute an indirect request. Even if we apply Grice's notion of relevance as a conventional maxim, the expression of wanting is indirectly relevant even though not *directly*. The speaker assumes this point and he assumes that the hearer will recognize this point. In this sense, Lakoff's (1973) characterization of the phenomenon as a mutually exclusive situation seems to be too strong; he argues that if the speaker assumes 'wanting Q' is not relevant and states that he wants Q, then it is a request directed to the addressee. Consider his following formalism:

(42) ASSUME (x, NOT RELEVANT (WANT(x, Q))) & SAY (x, y, WANT (x, Q)) $\supset$ REQUEST(x, y, Q)

His following example can be a request, but it is more indirect than (41) because it lacks the specification of the addressee's act.

(43) I want a beer.

This utterance, coming from (I want (I have a beer)), can be a request in a context where the pragmatic conditions for a request are satisfied. For instance, in a conversational situation, the speaker assumes the hearer is able and willing to bring a beer when requested even indirectly. Here, what is irrelevant in the speaker's assumption is not the speaker's psychological state of 'wanting Q' (see (42)), but the mere assertion force expressing the state. For the speaker to want Q is a member condition from among a set of conditions for a request. Therefore, when the rest of the set together with the above condition are satisfied and thus intended by the speaker, it constitutes a request. Otherwise, it is simply an expression of desire. Rather consider:

(44) Cf. REQUEST(x, y, Q) $\supset$ WANT(x, Q) & PRESUME(x, ABLE(y, Q) & FUT(DO(y, A))

WILLING (y, Q) & (-REQUEST (x, y, Q) ⊃ -Q))

Even if formalism (42) is successful in representing the two-way ambiguous situation in the particular case, expressions of the speaker psychological state for other illocutionary acts do not show the same kind of two-ways ambiguous situation. For instance, even if the act of a promise entails the speaker's intending, the exclusion of the literal irrelevant reading of the expression of intending does not necessarily lead to the reading of a promise. It could be a threat, an offer, or some other illocutionary act. Rather, once the force of a promise is chosen or intended, the subsequent structure should lose its literal force. Sentence (43) can be a request for the hearer to bring a beer after a chain reaction of reasoning based on various assumptions.

In Korean, a request is associated with a benefactive auxiliary verb *cu*, showing that the speaker makes the request for his favor. This phenomenon is reasonable because the speaker's desire is directly related to his benefit or favor. For instance,

(45) a. mun (com) jəl · ə *cu* -si -o
door a little open give Hon Imp
'Open the door for me.'
'Please open the door.'

b. mun jəl-(ə)la
door open Imp
'Open the door.'

A child's expression of desire is unmistakably a request. For example:

(46) əmma, na kwaca mək-ko siph · ə
mommy I candy eat want
'Mommy, I want to eat candy.'

However, an adult's expression of desire has far more limited contexts to be a request either in English or in Korean. Rather, a modest expression of hope or wish for the addressee's act constitutes a good case of request. Consider:

(47) I would like it if you would bring me some beer.

(48) maykcu com kac-ta cu-əss-imjən co-kess · ə
beer a little bring Past if good would

3.2.2.2. *The hearer-oriented expressions*

3.2.2.2.1. *By questioning the hearer-willingness*

(49) a. Will/Would you (please) bring me an envelope?
b. Won't you (please) bring me a beer?
c. Are you willing to bring me the projector?

The requestor presumes that the requestee will be willing to comply to the request. However, the requestor respects the hearer's will and expresses his idea in the form of giving the choice to the requestee by asking the requestee's volition. Indeed, there is no definite assumption on the part of the requestor that the requestee would be particularly desirous of the request. That is why the following is marginal rather than ungrammatical (Cf. Ross 1973).

(50) ?Eat this, though I know you don't want to.

On the other hand, the form of asserting the requestee's volition for the act has a stronger imperative force, with a stress assigned to *will*. Consider:

(51) You will bring me a beer.

Here the stress assignment is conditioned by the presence of the imperative force underlying in a higher predicate.

The ungrammaticality of the following, which Ross (1973) projected, can be accounted for if we consider the basic conditions for a request and the character or modals used here:

(52) a. *Must you please carry this bag?
b. *Are you to please come to the party?
c. *Are you going to please open the door?
d.?*Are you likely to please bring me a cigar?

The utterance 'Must you carry this bag?' cannot be a request; the modal 'must' means 'be obliged to' and it is in a question form, excluding the possibility of the first person being the imposing Agent. No speaker asks the addressee whether the speaker himself is doing a volitional act. What it means is 'Are you obliged by someone to carry this bag?', constituting a genuine information-seeking question or an expression of sympathy. Therefore, it is ungrammatical with the request-marker 'please'. Similarly, (b) is ungrammatical, and the reason why (c) and (d) cannot be requests is that (c) without 'please' implies the speaker asks whether the hearer is going to carry the bag of the hearer's own accord in the normal course of events. A request is made when the speaker assumes that the hearer's future act will not be automatically carried out without being asked. If a sentence constitutes a genuine question and does in no way satisfy any condition for a request, then, it cannot but remain as a question. What we can conclusively state is that even if the propositional contents are the same, if the modals are different the illocutionary forces are entirely different and this explains why "similar" sentences sometimes convey a request and

sometimes not. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) raised the question of why sentences " Similar" to request-conveying sentences cannot convey a request, and Heringer (19 72) assumed the same problem.[3]

3.2.2.2.2. *By questioning the hearer-ability*

(53) a. Can/Could you (please) carry this bag?
b.*?Are you able to please carry this bag?
c. ? Would you be able to please carry this bag?

The speaker presumes the hearer's ability to carry out the requested act as a hearer-oriented condition for a request. However, taking the pose of giving an option to the hearer by asking the hearer's current issue is: Why (53a) is a request and (53b) is not, if they are synonymous? My answer is this: In the underlying representation we have only one kind of ability-representing verbal, let us say, ABLE. At the same time, we have a higher predicate of force-representing verbal such as REQUEST, possibly with some deference expression. If the latter occurs, then the rule of fossilization (conventionalization as a (deferential) request form) applies to change ABLE to 'can' or 'could'(a hypothetical form—more deferential because of its impression of impractical aloofness and detachment). Otherwise, the rule applies optionally. This way, we can show that the sentence has the sense of asking about ability but the force of request. When 'be able to' is embedded in an explicit higher *deference* auxiliary as in (53c) ('*Would* you be able to please···'), it can convey a request far better than the form without the deference auiliary as in (53b) ('*Are* you able to please···'). The above analysis can explain exactly why this difference occurs. Since the underlying force of REQUEST is related to the *fossilization* rule, it explains why

(54) Could you see the clock?

does not convey a request. REQUEST co-occurs with a controllable act verb in its lower sentence and 'see' is a perception verb. The sentence does not have a higher REQUEST. Therefore, it can be only a question asking whether the addressee could see the clock in the past. This argument naturally leads to our conclusion that

(55) Can you see the clock?

is not in itself a request, just as the following S is not:

(56) Can you hear the music?

---

3. Citing David Stampe's analogy, i.e., the above phenomenon is unexplainable just as we cannot explain why "NaCl is salt" does not convey a request.

(55) can have an eventual force of a request in a restricted, immediate, specific context, only through inference. Let me call this "inferential illocutionary force." One major character of this type of illocutionary force is that there are infinitely many possible interpretations for one utterance. For instance, even if (55) is put as

(57) Please, can you see the clock?

it can mean

(58) Please help me find my lost clock.

or various other things, not only

(59) Please tell me what time it is.

All these interpretations are possible through association of contextual or spatial contiguity, rather than through the semantic structure of the utterance. A purely context-bound force interpretation cannot be represented in the underlying structure of the utterance. Thus, the underlying representation of

(60) Can you look at the clock?

cannot be

(61) I REQUEST you to TELL me WHAT TIME IT IS.

(60) basically means

(62) I REQUEST you to look at the clock.

From this the implication of (61) can follow through the contiguity (or chain reaction) inference and the relevance maxim [if (62) itself is not immediately but only indirectly relevant], as a possible next conjoined step. Let us suppose the speaker wants the addressee to see a beautiful Christmas decoration on the clock. Then, (60) means what (62) means. If this line of my analysis is correct, then we do not and must not need Lakoff's constraint on identity of *propositional* content, namely,

> "When questioned, *could* can convey a request only if the proposiional context of the literal meaning of the could question is identical to the propositional content of the request. The lexical item *can* has no such constraint (Lakoff 1973)."[4)]

4. G. Lakoff (1973) "Pragmatics in Natural Logic", clearly warns, "First draft—Do not quote under pain of death and/or dismemberment." The issue raised seems, however, so important that it invites such a violation of the warning. I apologize for my haste and possibly insufficient understanding of the material which is subject to change.

Likewise,

(63) It's cold in here.

is not in itself a request just as

(64) It was cold in here.

is not. Both can serve only as "inferential" requests in narrow contexts. (63) is more likely to convey a request because 'here' and 'now' of the speech act situation easily match the peremptory nature of a request. (64) can convey a request for repairing the heating system when uttered to the maintenance personnel who came in the freezing condition of the previous night.

In connection with the hearer-ability condition, it is possible to ask more indirectly in order to convey a veiled request by asking about the hearer's possession as follows:

(65) Do you have a light?

3.2.2.2.3. *Negative imperative*

Gordon and Lakoff(1971) pointed out that "Don't take out the garbage" is not used with "will you" or "won't you" and wondered why. An awkward "Will you not take out the garbage?" is unclear as to whether it is meant to be negative or positive. And "won't you not take out the garbage?" is just as inteligible. "Are you willing not to take out the garbage?" is still awkward. A question already is a negative condition and there must be a conversational constraint on multiple negatives, i.e.,

> When the propositional content of a request is negative in form, avoid using a question form, which is a negative condition, in the higher predicate, asking the addressee's volition or ability.

The above constraint must be universal. In Korean, (66) cannot convey (67):

(66) a. ssɨleki nayka -ci(=ki) ani ha -kess-ni?
garbage take out Nom not do will Q
'Will you not take out the garbage?'

b. ssɨleki ani nayka -kess-ni?
garbage not take out will Q
'Won't you take out the garbage?'

(67) ssɨleki nayka -ci mal-(ə)la
garbage take out Nom Neg Imp
'Don't take out the garbage.'

(66) can convey only a positive request 'take out the garbage.' A double negative question does not sound right. Consider:

(68) ?*ssileki ani nayka -ci ani ha-kess-ni?
garbage not take out Nom not do will Q
'Won't you not take out the garbage?'

Let us consider the negative imperative element *mal* included. The following (69) is impossible, though (70) is marginally possible with strain:

(69) *ssileki nayka -ci mal -kess-ni?
garbage take out Nom NegImp will Q
'Will you not take out the garbage?'

(70) ssileki nayka -ci mal -ci ani ha-kess-ni?
garbage take out Nom NegImp Nom not do will Q
'Won't you not take out the garbage?'

The utterance "Can you not be noisy?" is awkward in conveying "Don't be noisy." The situation is almost same but a little more flexible in Korean in this respect. Consider:[5)]

(71) a.?sikkiləp-ke ani ha -ci mos -ha-(kess)-ni?
noisily not do Nom unable do will Q
b.?sikkiləp-ke ha-ci ani ha-ci mos -ha-(kess)-ni?
noisily do Nom not do Nom unable do will Q
'Can't you not be noisy?' (a and b)
c. sikkiləp-ke ani ha-il su əps-ni?
noisily not do Rel way not Q
have
d. sikkiləp-ke ha-ci ani ha-il su əps-ni?
noisily do Nom not do Rel way not Q
have
'Is it possible with you not to be noisy?' (c and d)

The above is equivalent to saying

(72) sikkiləp-ke ha -jaman ha -(kess)-ni?
noisily do only if do will Q
'Must you be noisy?'

---

5. With nominalized predicates, a negative conflict is more acceptable. In Korean, a request conveyed by asking the addressee's ability is far less frequent than in English.

which is perfectly grammatical. Likewise, there are ways of evading the constraint. For instance, the main verb can be replaced as follows:

(73) Will/Won't you *leave* the garbage?

3.2.2.2.4. *Exclusion of empty order*

The 'performative antinomies' (Lakoff, 1972) treat a case like

(74) Don't obey this order.

The higher performative predicate is "I order you" and the propositional content must be "you do not obey this order." Then there is no possible world in which P is ture; in any conceivable world in which P is ture, it is false at the same time, constituting a paradox. This is a logical impossibility, which is separate from empirical impossiblity. So, it is reasonable to exclude this kind of situation from possible performative acts. Then it is an automatic consequence that a report of such a situation as the following is also excluded:

(75) Mary ordered John not to obey the order she was then giving.

The same holds with other performatives such as advice, a statement, a promise, etc. In any case, even pragmatically, the speaker cannot presume that the hearer will be able to comply to the order, advice, belief, not that the speaker can keep this kind of promise. It is impossible and unhappy from the beginning. No reasonable person in the world would come to the idea of associating the demonstrative in that kind of empty order or other empty performatives with the higher performative predicate, no matter whether the higher performative predicate is a performative use or a non-performative use, without a purposeful indication for the sake of argument. If someone says to one "Don't obey this order," one simply tries to find the content from the anaphoric or following context. It is because the demonstrative is constrained from referring to the performative itself. There must be a separate proposition referred to. If one does not find it, one's response will be "Which order?" And no one, in normal contexts, would intend to use the self-referring performative. Its exclusion should cause at most a loss of mental play.[6)]

6. According to Rescher (1966), however, *absurd* commands of the following types are still commands:

(1) A command based on a false factual presupposition ('Mary, bring your cat!' where Mary does not have a cat), or

(2) The content is impossible so that no one can meet. ('John, divide 2 into 113 without a remainder!').

3.2.2.3. *Act-oriented expressions*

Deference expressions taking the form of asking permission like "May I *ask* you to ···?" or "Let me advise you to···" are used with certain types of imperative performatives (Cf. Embedded Performatives). Or the speaker-oriented expressions of internal frame of mind in or toward performing the act concerned are used. For example, "I would like to *suggest*···", "I want to *ask* you to···", or "I must (am obligted to) *warn* you not to···".

3.2.2.4. *Permission: Why it is not assertion*

Heringer(1972) made an interesting claim that granting of permission is an assertion, arguing as follows:

> Since... indirect illocutionary acts are performed by asserting or questioning that intrinsic conditions on those acts hold, we would expect only literal assertions or questions to be used to perform indirect illocutionary acts. If grants of permission are assertions, we can explain how these grants of permission can be used to perform indirect acts.

Now, I will show that granting of permission is not an assertion, and that it is rather an imperative-like performative act. Heringer claims that:

(76) You may leave.

is an assertion just as the following is:

(77) You are able to leave.

However, the addressee can respond with the following utterance to (77) but not to (76):[7]

(78) That is true.

just as we cannot utter sentence (78) as a response to any of the following performatives:

(79) a. I *permit* you to leave.
b. I *order* you to leave.
c. I *promise* to marry you.

---

7. The following S which contains a different 'may' can be followed by (78) as a response, since it is an assertion:
You *may* die tomorrow (=It is possible that you will die tomorrow).

(76) and (79a) are synonymous. The semantic content of (79a) underlied (76). (78) cannot serve as a response to (79a).[8] In (77) the source of the permission is not simply realized on the surface as in an order: 'Go!' Let me give some reasons why it must be viewed as an imperative type of performative. First of all, selectionally the verb associated with the goal of permission (the addressee) is a volitional (controllable) act verb as with any imperative higher verb (Cf. C.-M. Lee, 1973b). Thus, "You *may* jump" is a permission, whereas "You may fall" means only "It is possible that you will fall" as a conjecture. Secondly, the source of permission is pragmatically presupposed to have the same kind of authority or entitlement as in an order: A negative permission is a requirement just like an order (Cf. Embedded Performatives). Thirdly, the consequence of permission is, by removing a pre-existing constraint, to get the addressee to act in the future if he wants to. In this respect, it is a conditional, not a peremptory, order. Therefore, the most natural way of giving a permission in Korean is:

(80) ka-ko siph- mjən ka-po-a!
go to want if go try
'If you want to go, try and go!'

It must be noted that the consequence of a promise is committing the promissor himself to a future act. This is the line between a permission, which is an imperative act, and a promise.

Heringer's error arises from his confusion of a resultative state of an act with the act itself. When the speaker starts out with 'May I Vperf···' to perform an illocutionary act, he does not assert that the addressee will permit him to perform the act concerned. Let us suppose that 'May I···' has its literal meaning and force. Then, the addressee will say perhaps, 'Yes, you may···', granting a permission. With this permission, the original speaker will perform the act of V. Now, when the speaker performs an illocutionary act, with a higher 'May I···' construcion, he assumes all the above steps taken:

(1) 'You will permit me to Vperf···' (2) (after the answer) 'You have permitted me to Vperf···'

Therefore, the ultimate assumption the speaker holds is '*I have been permitted by you* to Vperf···', the higher predicate being just a modifying structure equivalent to 'Under your permission, I Vperf···' The speaker's pragmatic assumptions or beliefs

8. Not a single case of permission utterances can be followed by (78) as a response. Example:

(1) I grant you a permission to go to Europe for a vacation.

(2) It is okay.

take propositional content, but they are not assertions, much as logical presuppositions are not. With this possibility or assumption on the part of the speaker, the embedded performative verb comes to have an illocutionary force and 'May I' loses all the original force except the sense which leaves pragmatic presuppositions by the speaker, i.e., the addressee's authority, etc. If my analysis of permission as an imperative act is correct, then we do not need a separate condition on the volitional acts involved in illocutionary acts, set up by Heringer (1972). As a matter of fact, all the illocutionary acts are volitional acts and except certain categories of performative verbs (of subject-authority, etc. See Embedded Performatives) logically the 'May I Vperf···' construction can be used with any performative verb. Since it is a form of asking permission it is not limited to an interrogative type but a similar expression is realized as an imperative type like "*Let me* point out that Heringer did a fine work!"

3.2.2.5. *Suggestion*

Order-type imperatives such as *order*, *command*, have the pragmatic presupposition of subject-authority, whereas other im-like request (a deferential version of order), and suggestion-type imperatives like *suggest, advise, propose, warn,* etc., do not. This category of suggestion-type illocutionary acts does not necessarily try, with any intense necessity, to get the addressee to do something. The speaker gives the impression of leaving the decision largely to the addressee.

3.2.2.5.1. *Advise*

The speaker-oriented inherent conditions is that the speaker believes the addressee's act will be to the addressee's best interest. The following indirect advice is based on this:

(81) It would be
I think it is
It's my opinion that it is } in your best interest to get married right now.

Because of the inherent entailed belief condition, the following sound odd, even if they are not exactly logically contradicting assertions:

(82) I advise you to get married right now, but I don't believe it will benefit you.

In Korean the following form is commonly used:

(83) nə tangcang kjəlhon-ha-nin kəs -ka co -kess -ta
you right now marry (do) Rel CompN SM good would Dec
'It would be good for you to get married right now.'

3.2.2.5.2. *Suggest*

The illocutionary act of suggesting takes a wide variety of sentential expressions, with a wide variety of nuances. It is a very mild type of imperative, hinting at the hearer's (sometimes the hearer's and the speaker's) future act. Because of its mild imperative force and persuading manner, a suggestion is often made by an interrogative type of sentence, e.g., asking the reason for not doing or doing something. A representative type is 'Why not V X?' It's pre-transformtional form 'Why don't you V X?' was treated as ambiguous in C.M. Lee (1973b) because of its force structure. I suggested a higher force-indicating performative predicate to be postulated on the left side of the interrogative sentence, with the selectional restriction argument. Consider the following in Korean:

(84) ka-*ci*, way an ka?
go Sgt why not go
'I suggest you go, why not go.'[9]

However, an explicit formulation of the derivational relation is still a major issue begging further investigation.

Another common expression of suggestion is as follows:

(85) col -ci mal-ko, ilccik ca-*ljəmuna*
drowse Nom Neg and early sleep Sgt

'Don't drowse; you'd rather sleep early.'

---

9. English imperative tag questions show a similar order of sentences:
Please open the window, could you?
A nice analysis of *ci* and *ca* themselves is found in Chang (1972). On the other hand, this *ci* can be reasonably suspected to come from the nominalizer *ki*, into which a negative element is copied, possibly with *ani ha-na* (not do) interrogation following it. However, this idea seems to be shattered by the following imperative conjunction dichotomy:

a.*?col -ci mal -ko ca -ci ani ha-na?
drowse Nom NegImp and sleep Nom not do Q
'Don't drowse and don't you sleep?'

b. col-ci mal -ko ca -ci
drowse NegImpand sleep Sgt
'I suggest that you do not drowse but sleep.'

c.* col -ci mal -ko ca -ni?
drowse Nom NegImp and sleep Q
'Don't drowse and do you sleep?'

The *ci* suggestion form can be used with the second person and the first person singular and plural subject for a volitional act, but the *ljəmuna* occurs only with the second person subject because of its sense of advice or leaving the decision and responsibility to the addressee (the speaker being detached).

Suggest is primarily directed to the addressee's choice of his act, and even though the speaker does not express or hold the belief that the act will be in the addressee's best interest explicitly as in *advise* as a necessary condition, there seems to be at least a mild assumption that the suggested act would not be bad. Therefore, a possible inferential suggestion is made by using a hypothetical form as follows:

(86) If I were you, I wouldn't do that.

What it means is 'I suggest that you'd better not do that.'

3.2.2.5.3. *Propose*

For a propositive illocutionary act, the speaker's inherent belief condition is that he assumes the act he is proposing to be undertaken under common responsibility with the addressee. A controllable, intentional act accompanies responsibility. When the speaker makes a proposal to the addressee, he not only intends to do the future act represented by the propositional content, but he also desires the addressee to intend the same act. The propositive ending is different from the imperative ending. Because of the common responsibility condition, when the speaker intends to participate in the act (with the comitative case), the act can be proposed to the addressee but not ordered. Observe the following:

(87) a. na-hako nol -ca
I with play Propose

d.* col -ci mal -ko ca -nin -ta
drowse Nom NegImp and sleep Pres Dec
'Don't drowse and you sleep.'

However, *ci* can occur with any person, any verb, any tense, in its epistemic, presumptive sense. Just like other modals, there is certain generality between its intentive or mild imperative sense (leaving room for opinion and decision to the addressee) and the epistemic presumptive sense. When it is used with an interrogative intonation, its function is exactly same as the English tag question. Consider:

ki-ka cuk-əss -ci?
he SM die Past Sgt
'He died, didn't he?'
'I assume that he died and I ask you to tell me if it is true.'

In any case, the speaker has a certain presumption and at the same time leaves room for opinion to the addressee.

'I propose that you play with me.'

b. ki ai -hako nol-(ə) la
the child with play lmp
'Play with the child.'

c. *na-hako nol-(ə)la (observed by Chang, 1972)
'Play with me.'

Therefore, the higher PROPOSE in Korean which is realized as *ca* on the surface is assigned this constraint. As will be shown later, the propositive cannot be addressed to anyone who is in the speaker's highest level of deference such as father and teacher.

(88) *apəci! cə-hako cumu -*sip-si*-ta
father I with sleep Propose (polite form)
'Father! I propose you sleep with me.'

It is due to the speaker's conflict in pragmatic presuppositions; on one hand, in using the propositive the speaker must assume (as an inherent condition) that he has a *common* ground (of responsibility) and on the other hand, the speaker must assume that he and the addressee can not be on the *common* ground or level of speech act in deference levels. It can be rendered only in the suggestive or deferential request form.

An interesting contrast in the propositive sentence is that an English 'let's…' sentence can have an explicit 'you' as the subject of the act without the speaker's intention of participation whereas it cannot be used in the situation where only the speaker intends to do the act with no expectation of the addressee's participation; in Korean, the opposite holds, namely, the propositive sentence can be used to show the speaker's intention to do an act with no expectation of the addressee's participation, which conveys the meaning of asking permission. On the other hand, with an explicit second person representation, the propositive sentence is not well acceptable, the speaker not intending to participate. Consider:

(89) Let's you and him fight.[10]

(90) na-ka nə tampay com phiu - *ca*
I SM your cigarette a little smoke Propose
'Let me smoke your cigarette.'

(91) *?nə -ka ne ton - ilo sul - lil sa - *ca*
you SM you money with drink OM buy Propose
'I propose you buy a drink with your money.'

10. Frank G. Banta gave me this example as a "colloquial (and consciously humorous) sentence."

The use of (90) has become so prevalent that its meaning can be considered to be lexically incorporated.

3.2.2.5.4. *Warn*

In warning, the speaker's belief is that a future event he foresees is not in the addressee's best interest. The speaker leaves the decision of taking an evasive action to the addressee but he normally suggests it. There are, then, three possible sources on which a warning can be based. The speaker belief, the future event, and the evasive action.

i) The speaker-oriented expressions:

(92) It wouldn't be / I don't think it is | in your best inerest | to violate the speed limit. / not to slow down. [11]

ii) The event-oriented expressions:

(93) a. I'm afraid you are violating the speed.
b. A police car is following us.
c. There is a school ahead.

iii) The hearer-oriented expressions:

(94) a. You'd better slow down, since / otherwise there is a school ahead. / you might violate the speed.
b. If you don't slow down, you might violate the speed.
c. Slow down. Don't keep this speed.
d. Look ahead! or Watch out!

Warning is frequently hypothetical like the above. (93c) and (94c) are inferential warnings since they are only contiguously related to the content of the warning, not forming necessary conditions of the act. An important fact is that the propositonal content of the explicit warn can be any of the above. The performative verb *warn* can be embedded in 'May I···', 'Let me···', or 'I must···', etc.

3.2.3. *Promise, Threat*

The inherent condition related to the speaker belief on the illocutionary act of promising is that the speaker intends to do the future act represented by the prop-

11. A positive question constitutes a negative assertion as follows:
Would it be in your best interest not to slow down?

ositional content of the promise. The speaker's meaning intention in promising is to produce in the addressee the recognition that the utterance is to count as obligating the speaker to do the future act. This recognition is intended to be produced in recognition of the speaker's intention through the addressee's recognition of the features of the utterance. As the addressee-oriented condition on promising, the speaker assumes the addressee would want the speaker's future act done. As a speaker-oriented utterance, the expression of the speaker's intention can constitute a promise in a context where the pragmatic presuppositions for promising are satisfied.

(95) I will/intend to buy you a watch on your birthday.

The speaker must have evidence for believing that the hearer wants it done. Since the speaker's declaration of binding himself to his own future act (imposition) is based on this assumption, asking the addressee whether or not he would like to see it done, or asking whether or not the speaker is allowed to do the future act does not constitute a promise. Consider the following, which are not promises:

(96) a. Do you want me to buy a watch?
b. Would you like to get a watch?
c. Would you like me to buy you a watch?

(97) a. May I buy you a watch?
b. Shall I buy you a watch?
c. Would you mind my buying you a watch?

An assertion of the hearer-oriented pragmatic presupposition or the speaker ability to do the future act does not constitute a promise.

(98) a. You want me to buy a watch.
b. I believe that you would like me to buy a watch.
c. I can buy you a watch.

(96), (97), and (98) can be at most offers, suggestions, or proposals, otherwise, questions. They do not place the speaker under the obligtion to carry out the future act. In this sense, there is a sharp distinction between a promise and an offer.

Threatening has a certain similarity to promising in the sense that both express the speaker intention. However, there are major distinctions: in threatening (1) the speaker believes that the hearer does not want, rather fears, the speaker's future act and (2) the speaker's performing a threat does not obligate him to do the future act. In other words, it is not a mutual contractual act. Threatening is not used as an explicit performative except in an embedded clause (in a round-about, aloof way of performing the act) like, 'I wish I wouldn't have to *threaten* you…'[12] A conceivable

12. R. Lakoff's observation (indirect communication).

reason is that it is not a formal act but an emotional outrage and thus straightforward words of intention are uttered. And the verb does not give a pleasant impression when uttered.

The expression of intention can be interpreted in either way between a promise and a threat. For example:

(99) I'll give you a good grade this time.

This is a promise in a normal situation. However, if the student concerned does not actually want a good grade but desperately tries to stay on campus as long as possible by flunking in this particular course, the above utterance could be a threat to him. If this is the case and the speaker intended otherwise, he made a mistake in his assumption about the hearer and it is not a pragmatically happy promise. The illocutionally intended promise didn't count and gave a perlocutionary effect of a threat.

Sadock (1973) has failed to make a proper distinction between warning and threatening. To him, the only distinction in that threatening takes a controllable act verb. But the difference is more than that. Warning indicates a certain foreseen event or state affording a chance to avoid it. It is hearer-oriented act. On the other hand, threatening is speaker-oriented, expressing the speaker's ill intention of causing fear to the addressee.

3.2.4. *Question*

It has been fairly well accepted that a question is a request. ASK (x, y, whP) should be REQUEST (x, y, TELL (y, x, whP))[13]. If a question is a request, then all the indirect illocutionary acts for requests that we have observed must be applicable to questions. Thus, "Will you tell me when America was discovered?" is a question, and all other indirect expressions for requests can be used for questions in the same way. The only difficulty of the analysis seems to be that we respond with "yes" or "no" to a surface yes/no question but we do not show exactly the same response of "yes" or "no" to "I ask you to tell me whether Tom came." Therefore, there must be some device to elicit the "yes" or "no" answer.

There are two types of questions: (1) real questions, (2) exam questions. In real questions, the speaker-inherent condition is that the speaker wants to know whP. Therefore, the speaker wants the addressee to tell whP. Let us consider possible expressions which indirectly represent the illocutionary force of the question.

---

13. WhP means a wh- word from a proposition, or wh (either) P (or) not P.
*As observed by Searle (1970).

3.2.4.1. *The speaker-oriented expressions*

A. As an indirect request

(i) a. I want you to tell me whether Lincoln was a lawyer.
b. I would like you to tell me whether Lincoln was a lawyer.
c. (Please) tell me whether Lincoln was a lawyer.

(ii) a. I want you to let me know
b. I would like you to let me know
c. (Please) let me know
} whether he was involved in the incident.

B. Expression of desire (with no mentioning of the addressee)

a. I want to know who lives next door.
b. I'd like to know who lives next door.
c. I wonder who lives next door.

3.2.4.2. *The hearer-oriented expressions*

A. a. Will/Would you (please) tell me how he won the prize?
b. Are you willing to tell me how he won the prize?
c. Can/Could you (please) tell me how he won the prize?

B. a. Will
b. Can
you
c. Are you willing to
} let me know how he won the prize?

3.2.4.3. *The act-oriented expressions*

{I'd like to / I want to / Let me / May I} ask you to {a. tell me / b. let me know} whether Lincoln was a lawyer.

Since the above utterances can constitute illocutinary acts of questioning, the response is normally directed to the most deeply embedded interrogative proposition. The logical content of the nonexhibitive informing sense of TELL, applying Grice's notion of meaning, is as follows:[14]

A. TELL(x, y, whP) ⊃ INTEND (x CAUSE (x COME ABOUT (KNOW y, whP))) The presuppositional structure for change verbs on the right side of the horseshoe tells us:

14. Cf. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) for their initial formalism in this direction.

PRESUPPOSE (x, ~ KNOW (y, whP))

Thus, if the speaker asks a question, he is pragmatically presupposed (by the hearer) not to know whP.[15] On the other hand, the exhibitive sense of TELL does not necessarily assume the questioner's ignorance of the propositional content of TELL, since it is to show that the TELLer believes or knows something. This distinction in the act of statement is exactly reflected in the logical structure of the question. What this analysis implies is that all the indirect expressions of the question above using the verb "tell" can be either one of the two cases, i.e., (1) a request for information (the speaker being presumed not to know whP), and (2) a request for providing an answer on whether the hearer knows (or believes) whP = a test question (the speaker not being presummed not to know whP). One important constraint is that if the embedded wh- clause contains a predicate (sometimes higher) of "you [psych verb (such as *like*, *think*)]", it cannot be a test question but it is a straight opinion question. The reason is simply because the speaker in this case can hardly be assumed to know the internal state of the hearer and be asking the question to know whether the hearer knows his own psychological state. A straightforward interrogative sentence without an explicit or implicit performative predicate, then, can be used for both purposes (e.g., "Was Lincoln a lawyer?"). However, questions asking the hearer's internal state or opinion are not included in the category of the test question, e.g., "Did you like the story?", since it contains TELL in its logical structure.

An important point to note is that simply expressions of desire for information on the part of the speaker such as in (3.2.4.1Aii), (1B), (2B), and (3B) can not be used as test questions (except in a highly disguised manner directed to small children). It is because the speaker's desire or intention in asking a test question is different. A possible test question based on the condition of the speaker's desire must be rather: "I want to know if you know/remember whether Lincoln was a lawyer." In a test question, what the speaker wants to know is not whP itself but whether the addressee knows whP. Therefore, if "tell" is used for a test question, what it indicates is the exhibitive sense of the term implying:

B. TELL (x, y whP) ⊃ INTEND (x CAUSE (x COME ABOUT (KNOW (y, wh KNOW (x, whP)))))

We can see that *wh* is underlyingly associated with the verb know.

---

15. Therefore, to the question, "Who broke the window?", an answer, "Someone broke the window," is funny and trivial because the question sentence already presupposes someone broke the window and thus the answer is not informative. About this aspect of question, see Keenan (1973).

In Korean, some expressions like the following are used for questions showing a high degree of deferentiality:

(100) jənse-ka mjəts -i -si -nɨn-ki malssɨm -ha · ə
age SM how many be Honor Rel CompN tell (Honor) do
cu - si {-kess (would) / -ɨl su iss} -ɨpni -kka?
give Hon Rel way have Defer Q
'{Would / Could} you tell me how old you are?'

(101) canjə -ka mjəts - i - na
children SM how amount many
tɸ -si -nɨn -ki jəccu · ə po · ə · to
to Honor SM Rel CompNask (Honor) give try even if
sillje-ka ani tɸ -kess -ɨpni -kka?
impoliteness not become would Defer Q
SM
'Wouldn't it be impolite of me to (even to) ask how many children you have?'

(102) hankuk-jəca -thim -ka əttəh-ke sekje thakku
Korea woman team SM how world table tennis
sənsukwon-lɨl ət -ke tɸ -əss -nɨn-ki malssɨm-ha · ə
championsip OM winto become Past Rel CompN tell (Honor) do
cu -si -əss -(i)mjən coh -kess -ɨpni -ta
give Honor Past if good would Defer Dec
'I would like it if you would tell us how the Korean women team came to win the World Table Tennis Championship.'

A simple expression of the speaker's desire to know has a very weak force as a question. If the sentential ending is an opinion-begging open ending, the force increases. Consider:

(103) apəci -ka ənce tol · ə o -si -ɨl -ki kungkɨmha · ə-jo
father SM when back come Honor Rel CompN wonder colloq Defer
'I wonder when Father will be back?'

(104) apəci -ka ənce tol · ə o -si -ɨl -ki kungkɨmha-n-te-jo?
father SM when back come Honor Rel CompN wonder Connective colloq Defer
'I wonder when Father will be back?'

As a colloquial test question, the suggestive question ending *ci* is frequently used rather than the question ending *ninja* as follows:

(105) hankuk cəncayng-ka ənce il · ə na -əss *-ci*?
Korea war SM when take place Past Sgt
'I suggest you tell me when the Korean War occurred.'

3.3. *Remarks: Illocutionary acts as positive acts*

Inherent assumptions and conditions for illocutionary acts with the aid of the concept of pragmatic meaning-intention serve as the basis for explaining indirect illocutionary acts. One major character of all the illocutionary acts is that they are inherently positive. If a performative verb is negated, it does not constitute a performative act represented by the verb. Consider the following:

(106) a. I do not order you to leave the country.
b. I order you not to leave the country.
c. Don't leave the country.

(106a) is not synonymous with (106b) or (106c). It is not an order in any sense, but a statement; whereas (106b) and (106c), which are synonymous, are orders. Since negation is a logical concept, its scope is limited to some embedded propositional content.

It seems reasonable that all the performative predicates are non-negative and, further, non-interrogative; an interrogative is a negative condition and if an interrogative sentence is used for some indirect illocutionary act it is the case that the interrogative sentence used does not have a clear illocutionary force of requesting information. Its negative nature is weakened or disappears in order for the indirect illocutionary act concerned to have the intended force. This is how the indirect expressions of request by way of asking the hearer's will or ability to do the act represented by the propositional content can have the internal 'please', e.g., 'Will you *please* open the door?'

All the conditional expressions qualifying illocutionary acts have a character similar to the above interrogative sentences used for indirect illocutionary acts; (1) they are based mostly on the speaker's assumptions of the hearer's state or reaction concerning the illocutionary act, or on the act-oriented or speaker-oriented inherent conditions, (2) they do not cancel the conditions (their negative possibility is suppressed) but simply leave the impression of reservation showing the speaker's prudence or consideration of the addressee. To take an example, the conditional part of

(107) Open the door, if you please.

is based on the speaker's expectation that the hearer will be cooperative enough to comply to his request of opening the door. Because of the conditional *if*, what(107) logically implies is

(108) If you don't please, you don't have to open the door.

But this negative possibility is highly suppressed in the illocutionary act of request, and naturally 'please', which comes from the conditional expression, alone becomes an explicit request marker, showing the formality of deference. The reason why the *pragmatic if* under our consideration is different from the *logical if* is exactly because in using the *pragmatic if* the speaker has already a certain assumption in the positive direction so that the intended illocutionary act can be happily performed; illocutionary acts are intentional acts, and if the intention is not positive ultimately (with whatever hesitation or prudence it is accompanied), it cannot lead to an act. In a *logical if* sentence, there exists a mechanical logical relation between the antecedent led by the *if* clause and the consequent clause. Consider the following:

(109) If you don't mind my saying so, (I would say) the U.S. lost in Vietnam.

The speaker has already asserted that the U.S. lost in Vietnam. It is not the case that if the addressee minds it then the speaker is not saying (or is not going to say) it. Consider a related expression.

(110) You might mind my saying so, but the U.S. lost in Vietnam.

In Korean, a similar expression is found,

(111) ilәh-ke malssɨm-tɨli-mjәn isangha-ke
this way tell(Honor) if strange Advlzr

tɨl-li-ɨl-ci moli- ciman mikuk-nɨn
sound whether not know even though U.S. Top

wolnam-esә ci -әss -ɨpni -ta
Vietnam in lose Past Defer Dec

'If I say so, it may sound strange to you, but the U.S. lost in Vietnam.'

The *if* or other preceding clause is related to the deleted performative predicate of saying just above the surface main clause. Other types of illocutionary acts take conditional expressions based on assumptions about the illocutionary acts just like indirect illocutionary acts using interrogative sentences. Consider the following expressions:

(112) jәccu · ә po · ә-to coh-ɨl- ci moli-kess -ɨpni -ta -man,
ask try though good whether not know Defer Dec but
would

səngham -ka əttəh-ke tϕ -si -pni -kka?
name(Honor) SM how become Honor Defer Q
'I would not know if I may ask, but (=if I may ask) what is your name?'

The above is not far from a 'May I ask your name?'(=sengham -lil
name OM
jəccu · ə po · ə-to kwaynchanh-kess -ipni -kka?)
ask try even if all right would Defer Q

When interrogative sentences are perlocution-oriented, the consequence is that they carry emotional or sarcastic overtones and become distant from the speaker's simple illocutionary act related to the proposition. Consider the following:

(113) a. Would you believe that John had a date with Mary?
b. Can you believe that John fell in love with her?

The above are not simple assertions of the embedded propositional content, but rather indirect expressions of the speaker's emotional attitude to the propositional content.

If the speaker's belief (in an assertion), intention (in a promise), desire (in a request), etc., which are entailed or inherent in the respective illocutionary acts, are put in the interrogative acts concerned; (1) illocutionary acts are the speaker's volitional or intentional acts and such internal or psychological states of the speaker must be positive to indicate the acts concerned, not negative or doubtful. Thus, expressions of these states constitute the illocutionary acts indirectly, but interrogation of these states does not. The latter situation can hardly constitute even a dyad (they are more likely to appear in a stream-of-consciousness novel or monologue). If the speaker does not know his own internal state, he cannot expect the other person to know it and show a relevant response.

(114) a. Do I believe that Mary is pretty? (not an assertion)
b. Do I intend to buy a bouquet for you? (not a promise)
c. Do I want to open the door for you? (not a request)

The speaker cannot perform an illocutionary act by taking the form of asking permission for the psychological state entailed in the act as follows:

(115) a. May I want you to take out the garbage? (not a request)
b. (or Let me) believe that John loves Mary? (not a statement)
c. intend to marry you? (not a promise)
d. want to know whether logic is interesting? (not a question)

These internal states of the speaker inherent in illocutionary acts cannot be used as conditional expressions, either, as we can easily predict, e.g., *'Mary is pretty, if I (can) believe it.'

What can be interrogated to constitute indirect illocutionary acts are, then, the hearer-oriented conditions on illocutionary acts, i.e., the speaker's assumptions or, more correctly, expectations regarding the addressee's response to the speaker's intention, e.g., the addressee's favorable feeling, will, or ability, to cope with what the speaker expects. Conditional expressions for illocutions have a parallel condition. On the other hand, act-oriented illocutions take the form of asking permission for the act from the addressee with the speaker's assumption or expectation that the addressee would not object to the speaker's frame of mind in performing the act. Because these illocutions have explicit performative verbs embedded, they form a separate category from other indirect illocutionary acts, and will be treated in the next section.

After all, all the indirect sentential expressions of illocutions are a reflection of underlying inherent conditions or assumptions about illocutionary acts, ultimately based on the speaker's meaning-intention in utterance, as co-orientational efforts to carry out communication happily.

4. Embedded Performatives

Verbs representing the illocutionary force of a sentence are sometimes embedded in modal constructions of which the function is auxiliary to the central illocutionary act. I hope this paper will serve as an answer to reasonable questions regarding 'embedded performatives' Godon and Lakoff (1971) raised. Examples are as follows:

(116) a. May I *suggest* that you run for the Presidency this time?
b. Let me *point out* that John made a mistake in not attending the meeting.

(117) a. I must *warn* you that unless you leave the country immediately, you will lose yur travel grant.
b. I regret that I must *inform* you that you are *dismissed.*

The most prevalent factor in determining different sentential types of the same illocutionary force is the deference condition in speech acts. In verbal interaction, people mobilize direct or indirect, implicit or exlicit expressions showing different degrees and shades of deference or consideration of the other party. A request is indirectly made by asking about the addressee's willingness, or it is inferentially made by describing a situation which calls for some action. This way, the speaker tries to avoid a possible impression of imposition or confrontation in an otherwise happy situation of communication.

The modal constructions such as "May I…" and "Let me…" are frequently used to ask for a permission from the addressee who is supposed to have the relevant

authority. Thus,

(118) May I leave?

must have an underlying representation similar to

(119) I REQUEST you to TELL me whether you PERMIT me to leave or not···.

And the response must be either yes or no. The basic force of the sentence with the non-performative verb 'leave' is asking for permission. On the other hand, when the same construction is used with an embedded performative verb, the situation changes; the central force of the utterance is expressed by the embedded performative as in (116a), and the modal auxiliary 'May I···' simply functions as a sign of deference. Therefore, a response to this type of utterance is most likely to be directly concerned with the embedded performative. A response to 'May I congratulate you on your victory!' is likely to be 'Thank you' rather than 'yes' or 'no'. Even if the answer to (116a) is 'no', it is concerning the suggestion and it is refusing of the already suggested propositional content (e.g., 'I won't run for the Presidency') rather than refusing of giving a permission to suggest. Therefore, when the embedded SUGGEST has the illocutionary force, the structure of "I ASK you to TELL me whether you PERMIT me" does not have the force and just obligatorily undergoes transformations to get the output "May I". What is important here is that even if this "May I" does not have the force the speaker is supposed to have all the pragmatic presuppositions relevant to the illocutionary act of asking for permission, including the addressee's authority to permit. The way this modal construction is used to show deference is exactly this mode of deferring the authority for the option of permission to the addressee (Cf. 116a). When this construction is followed by an embedded performative which pragmatically presupposes the authority of the speaker himself, there arises a conflict in the speaker's pragmatic presupposition between the addressee-authority and the speaker-authority and consequently the utterance cannot constitute the intended illocutionary act.

Consider the following:

(120) a. May I *convict* you of robbery? (not a conviction)
b. May I *accuse* you of treating Mother badly? (not an accusation)
c. May I *sentence* you to death? (not a sentence)

Examples of performatives assuming the Agent-authority are verdictives (in Austin's sense) such as *acquit*, *convict*, *find*, etc. (mostly judicial), or exercitives such as *sentence*, *accuse*, *pronounce* (man and wife), *excommunicate*, *adjourn*, etc. (institutional). These are not compatible with 'May I···' or 'Let me···'

An illocutionary act with no explicit performative verb such as an umpire's 'You

are out' would not be used with 'May I'(e.g., 'May I declare to you that you are out?' or 'May I call you out?' as opposed to 'May I tell you that I love you?') since the umpire's declarative act assumes the speaker's authority. In the case of accusation, the accuser is presumed to have at least moral authority. Therefore, a son might say to his father,

(121) I *accuse* you of treating Mother badly. (Cf. 120b)

The effect of this explicit performative of accusation must be making his father feel at least morally guilty, even if not imposing legal jeopardy.

We will see that deference-expression and imposition do not go togother very happily. Another class of verbs which resist being embedded in deference-constructions like 'May I…' or 'Let me…' are order-type imperatives such as order, *command, permit, forbid, tell,* etc. Observe:

(122) a. May I *order* you to leave? (not an order)
b. May I *tell* you to raise your hand? (not telling)
c. May I *permit* you to join the party? (not a permission)
c′. Would you permit me to *permit* you to join the party?[16] (not a permission)

These are impossible performatives. The permittor (the underlying 'you') is assumed by the speaker to have an authority not to grant a permission, which is analogous to an authority to order in consequence.

Consider the following relations.

(123) a. You may not leave.
b. You must stay.
c. I order you to stay.

This is why the performative verb *permit* must be included in the category of order-type imperatives in terms of authority, and Leech's (1970) subcategorization of authority into AUT 1 for permission verbs and AUT 2 for obligation verbs is simply unmotivated. Authority is a single entity. It is not the case that one needs a weaker authority for giving permission and a stronger authority for imposing obligation. On the other hand, suggestion-type imperatives like *suggest, warn, advise, propose,*

16. If one takes the interpretive position of observing the surface distribution of the subject of *Mary*, as Lyle Jenkins does, one cannot significantly generalize and explain the related impossibility, between (122c) and (122c′). In 'May I *please*…' *please* is possible because the speaker is requesting the addressee to permit the speaker to do something like, 'Would you please *permit* me to…' Even in this sense, Heringer (1972) is not quite correct in treating the act of granting permission as an assertion type of illocution.

etc. do not have the pragmatic presupposition of Agent-authority. That is why they can be used with the deference constructions. We can call all the Agent-authority presupposing performatives '*authoritatives*'. Now, let us turn to another class of verbs which resist 'May I···' or 'Let me···' constructions. Consider the following examples:

(124) a. May I *promise* to marry you? (not a promise)
b. May I *bet* a nickel that you won't find the book? (not a bet)
c. May I *swear* that she won't come? (not an oath)

This class of verbs belongs to Austin's commissives, of which the characteristics is to 'commit the speaker to a certain course of action' (Austin, 1962). Since they express the speaker's definite internal binding (self-imposition), it is reasonable that the illocutionary Agent (=the speaker) would not leave much room for adressee's option of permission. Normally, the Agent assumes the addressee's interest or involvement in the Agent's commissive act. In a nonperformative sense, the above verbs can be used with 'May I···?'

(125) a. May I promise Mary to marry her?
b. May I bet $100 that you won't find the book?
(asking about the amount or whether the addressee is going to undertake it)

Behabitives such as congratulate, apologize, etc., which are for inherently deferential acts, go well together with the deference constructions.

We have analyzed the relation between performatives and the concessive way of showing deference by taking the mode of deferring the option of permission to the addressee. There is another way of showing the performative actor's consideration of the addressee, i.e., by expressing his feeling, frame of mind, attitude, or circumstances (see (117) and a case like 'I am pleased to *inform* you that your paper has been accepted for publication.') in performing the illocutionary act concerned. The speaker's own internal feeling is not something to ask of the addressee and all such constructions take a declarative sentential type with the speaker as subject. As (117a) shows, 'must', when used with some performative about which the speaker is assumed to have some pragmatic presupposition of the addressee's possible disliking, expresses necessity coming from duty or unavoidable circumstances, frequently exhibiting the speaker's prudence. However, the illocutionary objective is not these auxiliary, adverbializable modal expressions. Therefore, (117a) can be paraphrased as 'because of necessity, I *warn* you···' and (117b) as 'regretfully, because of necessity, I *inform* you that you are dismissed.' (117b), however, has the same effect as 'You are *dismissed*', uttered in presence of the addressee, the speaker dismissing the addressee. In this case, *inform* might be called a 'means-performative' and *dismiss* a 'goal-performative.' (Consider the possibility of saying, 'I regret to *inform* you that

I must *dismiss* you.' The obligatory passivization of 'dismiss' for a locution as in (117b) has the effect of obscuring the presence of the performative actor of dismissing.) The modal auxiliary 'must' is compatible with the imperative type, although it is not the case with the commissives. For example,

(126) I must *bet* ten dollars that it won't rain tomorrow. (not a bet)

When 'must' is used in a question form, with a performative verb, the sentence does not constitute the performative act represented by the performative verb but a question, e.g.,

(127) Must I *offer* you a job?
=Am I obliged (by you or someone) to offer you a job?

The implication is that the speaker is not very favorably inclined to do the act of offering because of the nature of imposition and is asking whether the speaker is indeed obliged (by the addressee) to offer a job. A performative act is a positive act. Another auxiliary construction 'would like to', which shows the speaker's favorable willingness or wish, is not compatible with verdictives, official exercitives, or order-type imperatives, as we can expect, and it is compatible with most of performatives which do not require imposition.

We have seen largely two classes of modal deference-expressions used with performative verbs, i.e., one taking the form of asking for permission form the addressee (addressee-oriented), and the other taking the form of expressing the speaker's frame of mind (urge, mecessity, favor) (speaker-oriented) in performing the act concerned. Even though these auxiliary constructions which must come from the higher predicates above the performative predicate do not have any illocutionary force as such, they can occur with performative verbs in certain restricted ways, as we have observed and attempted to explain because of their associated senses and pragmatic presuppositions. As soon as facts are conceptually accountable, formalism should not be a problem.[17] In the speaker's pragmatic presuppositional structure, there is a non-symmetricity constraint on authority. In other words, [AUT (x, y) and AUT (y, x)] is impossible.

17. In the pragmatic structure, which governs the higher predicates above the performative predicate, there must be a predicate similar to DEFER (x, y), which is related to the fossilization operation of a '*May* I··· construction, etc., which superordinates a performative predicate.

5. Honorifics in the Speech Act

The Korean (and Japanese) honorific system(s) have so far been described rather superficially in the framework of transformational grammar. This study attempts to give an underlying account of the system in Korean in terms of the speech act situation which bears certain universal implications. I include both the so-called speech (or politeness) levels and the so-called honorific in the same honorific system for reasons that are hinted in the course of development.

5.1. *Previous Treatments*

The previous transformational analyses of the subject both in Korean and Japanese can be largely classified as follows:

(1) Inserting honorific (and politeness) elements transformationally as an optional rule in the transformational component with nothing in the base, viewing their occurrence as a purely surface phenomenon.
(2) Positing ad hoc category symbols such as SL_1 and SL_2 for different speech levels as subcategories of VP, converting them to sound representation by morphophonemic rules following the *Syntactic Structures* model (as in Song (1967)).
(3) Postulating arbitrarily divided binary features such as (+Polite), (−Elevated), etc., in correlation with the first and non-first person features, as selectional subcategorical features of the lexical head feature (+N), copying them out for their reflexes in the verbal part following the *Aspects* model (as in Prideaux (1970)).
(4) Assigning such features as (+Humble), (+Respect) to the speaker NP and the addressee NP respectively a procedure which became available due to the inception of the Performative Analysis and (+Honorif) to a person subject to get correlated surface forms (as in H.B. Lee (1970)).

These different treatments, in one way or another, reflect the historical development and, presumably, consequent improvement of linguistic theory. My study is concerned less with pointing out inadequacies due to different models, than with conceptualizing and representing the phenomena more revealingly than other analyses. It will avoid any detailed taxonomy of honorific and speech level forms and simply project a possibly explanatory principle underlying the apparently complicated phenomena.

5.2. *Honorifics as Two-place Predicates*

5.2.1 Let us begin with the so-called speech(politeness) levels. Consider the following:

(128) a. ai-ka wus -əss -ta
child SM smile Past Dec
'(I say) the child smiled.'

b. ai-ka wus -əss -ɨpni -ta
child SM smile Past DeferDec
'(Deferentially I say to you) the child smiled.'

c. ai -ka wus -əss -nɨnja?
child SM smile Past Q
'Did the child smile?'

d. ai-ka wus -əss -ɨpni -kka?
child SM smile Past Defer Q
'Did the child smile (Deferentially asking)?'

(128a) and (128c) do not show the speaker's deference to the addressee, whereas (128b) and (128d) do, with the form, *'ɨpni'*, inserted. If the speaker is deferential to the addressee in performing the speech act of making a statement, asking a question, etc., the deferential form, *ɨpni*, occurs just before the mood-indicator of a declarative sentence (*ta*), interrogative sentence (*kka*), etc.[18] Such deferential interaction of the speaker with the addressee is determined by the speaker's perception of his relation to the addressee in terms of a set of background information such as age, status, closeness, etc., (which deserves a close sociolinguistic investigation). This deference element strongly suggests the presence of the addressee in the conversational speech act. (A sentence in a monologue addressed to oneself does not take a deference form.) In an embedded indirect report of illocutionary acts of statement, question, command, etc., only sentences without the deference form are used. The deference form, *ɨpni*, is indeed associated only with sentence-final mood-markers, which are reflexes of higher performative predicates. Since the speaker NP and the addressee NP are present in the underlying structure as arguments of performative predicates according to the generative semantic approach, it is easier to conceive of various deferential interactions between the speaker, the subject of the performative verb, and the addressee, the indirect object of the performative verb.

Such an act of deference accompanying an illocutionary act, thus viewed, cannot be adequately represented by semantic features of the personal noun category. A

18. Here *kka* is a deferential form of *nɨnja*. The changes occur automatically because of the deferential speech level form *ɨpni* through a process similar to agreement.

noun cannot have an inherent feature of, say, [+Honorific] because the same person may become [−Honorific] as soon as he is spoken to, or of, by some other speaker, which is counterintuitive. If a feature is adjuncted to a noun transformationally, then the claim is that it does not contribute to meaning, which is incorrect. For example, 'I state that the child cried' and 'Respecting you, I state that the child cried' must be sentences with different meanings. Even if some semantic features like [+Humble] for the speaker NP and [+Honorific] for other NP are posited, the attitudinal or relational mobile notion is not captured because they are in independent nouns.

My claim is that the deferential marker, *ipni*, is a reflex of a higher abstract transitive predicate superordinating the performative predicate. In other words, a sentence such as (128b) must be underlyingly represented as something like

(129) DEFER (x, y (STATE (x, y (P)))).

In the above postulate, DEFER must be an abstract verb meaning 'be deferential to', 'respect', or some such, P standing for the propositional content 'the child smiled'. [19] This hypothesis correctly represents the interpersonal relation between the speaker and the hearer. The performative verb STATE is responsible for the surface occurrence of the declarative marker *ta* at the end of the sentence and the deference verb DEFER is responsible for the occurrence of the deference marker *ipni* before the declarative marker. The speaker NP(=x) and the addressee NP(=y) in the deference predicate undergo Equi−NP deletion in a tree derivation. The occurrence of the lowered form for the first person (*ce*) and the elevated form for the second person (*tangsin*, etc.) in the whole embedded sentences under the performative predicate is an automatic surface consequence of the presence of the higher deference predicate. This is because the relation between the speaker and the addressee is relative just as in a seesaw game. Therefore, there must be a grammatical agreement between the lowered form of the first person and the presence of the deference marker. Consider the following:

(130) a. *ce* -ka wus -əss -ipni -ta[20]
'lowered' I SM smile Past Defer Dec
'(Deferentially I say to you) I smiled.'

19. Therefore, what the whole utterance means must be something like "I am deferential to you in stating that P." Remember how G. Lakoff's instrumental adverbial derives from an underlying higher predicate.

20. Sometimes we can recently hear 'na -ka wus -əss -ipni -ta
'non-lowered' I SM smile Past Defer Dec
which violates agreement, from among the younger generation, using the non-lowered first person form *na* constantly.

b. * *ce* -ka wus -əss -ta
'lowered' I SM smile Past Dec

If DEFER occurs in a higher sentence, the elevated form for the second person is required. For instance,

(131) * *ce* -ka nə -lil cohaha -ipni -ta
'lowered' I SM you 'non-elevated' OM like Defer Dec
'I like you.'

The higher deference predicate ultimately modifies the immediately lower performative predicate, like an auxiliary. Because the form is associated with the performative act of the speaker, it is sometimes understood as showing the speaker's humbleness or politeness. However, DEFER is transitive or is a two-place predicate, and it is different from such manner adverbials as 'silently,' 'violenly', 'carefully', which come from a one-place predicate. It simply does not make sense to do something 'deferentially' or 'respectfully', all alone with no one around or in mind directed to. In previous treatments, this point has not been captured.

5.2.2. Let us now turn to the occurrence of the traditionally called 'honorific' form *si*. This honorific is an element that reflects the speaker's deferential attitude to a non-first (i.e., second or third) person mentioned as a subject, being associated with the verb of which that person is subject, not with the performative predicate of the speaker. Thus, it gives the impression of honoring the person mentioned. It is inserted immediately after the verbal stem and before the tense marker which precedes a mood-marker. Observe the following:

(132) a. əməni -ka o -*si* -əss -ta
mother SM come Defer Past Dec
'Mother came (with the speaker's deference to mother).'
b. əməni -ka o -*si* -əss -ipni -ta
mother SM come Defer Past Defer Dec
'Mother came (with the speaker's deference to the addressee and mother).'

(132a) shows that the speaker has deference to his mother but not to the addressee in performing the act of making a statement about her. (132b), however, shows his deference both to the addressee (by *ipni*) and to his mother (by *si*).

Therefore, we can view this honorific element as a reflex of an underlying predicate similar to DEFER (x, z). If one wants to distinguish it from the speech (politeness) level, one may posit a different verb like HONOR.[21] Here, z is a non-first

21. And the hierarchy of different speech levels, *nai* (extremely deferential), *opni* (very deferential), *ipni*(deferential), etc., may be represented by the same verb DEFER only with different degree features.

person, being possible to be equal to y or the addressee. For example,

(133) tangsin -ka nolayha -*si* -kess -ɨpni -kka?
you SM sing Def Fut Def Q
'Would you sing?'

Here, *si*, coming from a deference predicate with x and z = y as arguments, is associated with the propositional expression 'you sing' and *ipni*, coming from another deference predicate with x and y, is associated with the interrogative marker, which is a reflex of a higher performative predicate of asking. Because of the essentially identical deference predicates (objects are the same second person) for the performative predicate and the propositional expression embedded in it, the occurrence of reflexes must show a consistent agreement. Consider the following ungrammaticality:

(134) a. *tangsin -ka nolayha -*si* -kess -nɨnja?
'elevated you' SM sing Def Fut Q
'Would you sing?'

b. *ne -ka nolayha -kess -ɨpni -kka?[22]
you SM 'non-elevated' sing Fut Def Q
'Would you sing?'

Now the question arises as to where to put the underlying deference predicate which is realized as *si* on surface. One possiblity is to have it as a predicate superordinating the performative predicate, being conjoined to the other deference predicate which determines the speech (or politeness) level, if it is present already. This appears to be a reasonable hypothesis, since the speaker NP (=x) is available at or above the performative level. Another possibility to consider is positing it as a predicate immediately higher than the proposition in which a non-first person (= z, the object of DEFER) is the subject. This approach appears to be suitable to account for some cases where the subject of a proposition is deferential to an indirect or direct object person and the verb stem undergoes a suppletion into a deferential form. For example, the following sentence.

(135) əməni -ka halməni -kke kkoch -lɨl tɨli -si -əss -ta
mother SM grandmother to flower OM 'Defer' Defer Past Dec
give
(non-deferential form of *tɨli=cu*)
'Mother deferentially gave Gramdmother a flower.'

is assumed to be superordinated by a predicate like DEFER (əməni, halmeni) in

22. Occasionally we hear 'nolayha-kess-ɨpni-kka?' with no *si* inserted. The speaker in this case must be assuming that he has expressed his deference by *ipni* alone.

the speaker's assumption to transform the non-deferential form of the verb *cu* to its deferential form *tili*. At the same time, another deference predicate with x, the speaker, and *əməni*, the subject of the proposition, as its arguments is responsible for the occurrence of *si*. The deferential form (*tili*) of the verb stem itself (*cu*=give) occurs only when the subject is in a position to show deference to the Goal person. Therefore, the speaker's deference to the Goal NP is not reflected. Consider the following:

(136) halməni -ka əməni -eke kkoch -lil cu -si -əss -ta
gramdmother SM mother to flower OM give Defer Past Dec
'Grandmother gave mother a flower.'

The form *si* is always associated with only the subject of a proposition. When the subject of a proposition is the first person, *si* cannot occur in that sentence simply because a speaker does not express his deference to himself in the speech act. In other words, an important constraint in (DEFER x, z) for a non-performative predicate is z≠x, though z=y is possible. Because of this reasonable non-reflexiveness condition on deference, this defrence predicate does not occur when a proposition has the first person as its subject.

The difficulty of the second alternative, i.e., having the deference predicate immediately above the proposition in which the associated non-first person is the subject is that the deference expression is not a content proposition of the illocutionary act. For instance, when the higher performative predicate is STATE (x, y), its associated deference predicate DEFER (x, z) is not exactly asserted by x. The propositional expression of the content proposition of the illocutionary act is done 'with x's deference to z.' In such respects, the first alternative is preferable.

5.3. *Conversational Constraints*

There are certain social and consequent linguistic constraints on the use of the honorific elements. First of all, we have already stated the non-reflexivity of deference expression for the first person in the speech act situation. Secondly, the propositive, even in the polite form, cannot be used to anyone the speaker should be deferential to because of status difference, such as elder family members such as father or his teacher. The following is extremely unhappy:

(137) apəci! ka *-si* *-psita*[23]
father go polite form of propositive
'Father, let's go.'

Similarly, the NP conjunction of a person low in status with anyone of the above

category creates unhappiness. However, case expressions are possible, which suggests certain slight semantic difference between the phrasal conjunction and case expressions, thus inviting a re-examination of Lakoff and Peters (1969), deriving the comitative case from the NP phrasal conjunction, and Fillmore (1968), deriving the NP conjunction from the comitative case, the other way around. Consider the following:

(138) a. apəci -wa na -ka ka -(si) -əss -ta
father and I SM go Defer Past Dec
'Father and I went.'

b.*na -wa apəci -ka ka -(si) -əss - ta
I and father SM
'I and Father went.'

c. apəci -ka na -wa ka -si -əss -ta
father SM I with go Defer Past Dec
'Father went with me.'

d. na -ka apəci -wa ka -əss -ta
I SM father with go Past Dec
'I went with Father.'

e. na -ka tongsayng -wa ka -əss -ta
I SM brother with go Past Dec
'I went with younger brother.'

f. əməni -wa halməni -ka ka -*si* -əss -ta
mother and grandmother SM go Past Dec
'Mother and grandmother went.'

For (138a) and (138b), the subject of the sentence must be a higher NP which dominates the two conjoined NPs, whereas for (138c) and (138d), the subjects are single NPs, and the higher verb DEFER cannot have as its object both someone the speaker should show deference to and someone he should not express deference to (in this case the speaker himself).

The conversational constraint on the direct act of proposing shown by (137) has a tendency of being lifted when the illocution is embedded in a report as follows:

---

23. Only a suggestive form like cə-wa ka-si-*ci*-jo
I with go Defer
(I suggest that you go with me) or a request form, cə-wa ka si-psi-o
I with go Defer Imp(Defer form)
=request
(Please go with me or I request you to go with me) can be used. *Si-psita* is used when the speaker is rather in equal but not close terms with the addressee, being formal and polite.

(139) na -ka apəci -kke ka -si -ca - ko malssimtili
I SM father to go Propos Que- 'Defer' tell
tative
(or ceijha) -əss -ta
Past Dec
'I proposed to Father that Father go with me.'

Then the embedded S must be like the following before the Equi-NP deletion:

(140) [apəci -ka na -wa ka -si -ca]$_S$
father SM I with go Defer Propos

my deference to father, the subject of the embedded S, being responsible for the occurrence of *si*.

If the subject of a non-factive (report) verb is in a reverse deference relation to the subject of its embedded sentence and the speaker is in a deference relation to the latter, then *si* is usually expected to occur in the embedded S because of the speaker's re-orientation to the subject of the embedded S. However, the whole S is somewhat acceptable without *si*. Consider the following:

(141) a. halməni -nin əməni -ka calmosha -(si) -əss -ta
grandmother Top mother SM do wrong Defer Past Dec
-ko { malssimha / tell / saysngkakha / think / miti / believe } -si -əss -ta
Quot Defer Past Dec

However, if the higher verb is factive *si* must occur.

b. halməni -nin əməni -ka calmosha -si -əss -ta
grandmother Top mother SM do wrong Defer Past Dec
-nin kəs -lil ici -si -əss -ta
CompN OM { forget / muksalha / ignore / moli / not know / cungtaysiha / take seriously } Past Dec

The speaker presupposes the factivity of the embedded proposition in such cases and takes responsibility for it, with a complete speaker-centered re-orientation of deference relations. This seems to be a point where logical presupposition and pragmatic presupposition meet. In other types of embedding such as relative clauses,

the latter situation holds. For instance,

(142) halməni -nɨn calmosha -*si*-əss -nɨn əməni -ɨl
Past Rel mother OM
jonghsəha -si -əss -ta
'Grandmother forgave mother who did wrong.'

5.4. *Implications*

The abstract analysis of the Korean honorifics as underlying two-term predicates higher than the performative predicate has a striking bearing on English embedded performatives. Just as the deference relation between the speaker and the other, represented here as a two-term predicate, governs the occurrence of the honorifics (speech level forms and *si*) in Korean, higher predicates superordinating the performative predicate in English are related to the speaker's deference to the hearer in one way or another. No matter whether the higher predicates are in a mode of deferring authority to the addressee (e.g., May I *suggest* that you run for the Presidency?) or expressing the speaker's frame of mind in performing the illocutionary act (e.g., I am pleased to *inform* you that your paper was accepted.), they are essentially determined by the speaker's deference to, or consideration of, the addressee or someone mentioned.[24] They could be on surface adjectival predicates, modal auxiliaries, main verbs (as 'regret') or the so-called 'style disjuncts' (Cf., Greenbaum (1969)) such as 'truthfully,' 'confidentially,' which are also underlyingly higher predicates superordinating the performative predicate. Such analysis can explain first of all why selectionally human (or divine) subjects only can have honorific reflexes in Korean, namely because they are objects of some higher abstract deference verb, and secondly why embedded performatives still function as performatives in English, and thirdly, why negated 'style disjuncts' are impossible.[25]

---

24. Consider cases where the mentioned subject is honored as follows: His Honor, the Mayor, is coming in.

25. *Not $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{truthfully}\\ \text{confidentially}\\ \text{honestly}\end{array}\right\}$ $\left.\begin{array}{l}\text{Sam rejected the analysis.}\\ \text{, did Sam reject the analysis?}\end{array}\right.$

These are impossible just as 'I am not truthful in *stating* that Sam rejected the analysis,' etc., are impossible as the intended performative of *statement*, etc., since the speaker is supposed to have the inherent pragmatic presupposition of 'the speaker being sincere' in performing the act concerned and at the same time he is denying it explicitly. Cf. Schreiber (1972) for his observation of negated 'style disjuncts' as impossible cases.

If the above line of thinking is correct, then it is clear that the performative sentence is not the topmost sentence in the underlying structure when deference-showing auxiliary structures occur, thus weakening Ross's (1970) claim and revealing certain universal character of deference expressions in the speech act.

6. Modality

This section considers the interrelation between modal expressions of speech act participants and the illocutionary forces of sentences with particular attention to the modality of thinking and the modality of volition, which are essential in the realization of different types of illocutionary acts.[26]

As we have already observed, the statement type of illocutionary act basically subsumes the modality of believing (or thinking). Whereas the speaker has warranted evidence in mind when he utters an implicit declarative S, he does not have such warranty when he uses cogitative verbs or modals. Consider the following:

(143) a. na -nin Seoul-e pi ka o -əss -(kess) -ta -ko
I SM at rain SM come Past Presume Dec

cimcakha -nin -ta
guess Pres Dec
'I guess that it has rained in Seoul.'

b. Seoul-e pi -ka o -əss -kess -ta
at rain SM come Past Presume Dec
'I guess that it has rained in Seoul.'

c. cimcakha -kəntay, Seoul -e pi -ka o -əss -(kess) -ta
presume when atrain SMcome Past Presume Dec
'Presumably, it has rained in Seoul.'

All the above sentences are synonymous, and we can suspect the possibility of deriving them from a single source, i.e., something like the complex S, (143a), which represents the meaning explicitly. The *kəntay* S-adverbial construction (Cf., 143c) is possible only with a natural class of non-explicit performatives of presumption, imagination, and thinking, which are related to certain factual judgment such as *chuchikha* 'infer', *hφkoha* 'recall', *sangsangha* 'imagine', or a class of hortative verbs such as *pala* 'hope', *wənha* 'wish'. The construction is impossible with any other verbs, such as *salangha* 'love', which cannot take a complement S. Consider the following:

26. Cf. H.P. Grice (1973) for the elaboration of the two essential modal states in speech acts.

(144) a. *salangha-kəntay, ki chənjə-ka jeppi (kess) ta
love the girl SM pretty Presume Dec
*'When I love, the girl would be pretty.'

b. *na-nin ki chənjə-ka jeppi -(kess) -ta -ko salangha-nin -ta
I Topthe girl SMpretty Presume Dec Quot love Pres Dec
*'I love that the girl is pretty.

(145) a. sangsangha-kəntay, ki tosi-ka alimtap -kess -ta
imagine tl.e city SM beautiful Presume Dec
'When I imagine (In my imagination), the city would be beautiful.'

b. na-nin ki tosi-ka alimtap -kess -ta-ko sansang-ha-nin -ta
I Topthe city SMbeautiful Presume imagine Pres Dec
Dec Quot
'I imagine that the city would be beautiful.'

The *kəntay* S-adverbial construction involves the deletion of the speaker NP (and verbs of thinking must take the object complement proposition in the underlying structure), and cannot occur with other types of illocutionary acts than a statement.

(146) a. *cimcakha-kəntay Seoul-e pi -ka o -əss -ni?
guess at rain SM come Past Q
*'Presumably, has it rained in Seoul?'

b. *cimcakhakəntay, ka-la!
guess go Imp
*'Presumably, go!'

The English counterpart is also anomalous. The anomaly arises because the proposition is underlyingly superordinated by a construction of the speaker modality of factual judgment, no matter whether certain or not, foreseeing or recalling. This modality is incompatible with any other illocution types involving the hearer modality of belief as in a question (146a) or the hearer modality of volition as in an imperative (146b) etc., than a declarative type.

The modal auxiliary element *kess* is used to represent volition (1) if it occurs with the first person subject and an active verb in the declarative sentence or (2) if it occurs with the second person subject and an active verb in the interrogative sentence, e.g.,

(147) a. na-ka ka-kess -ta
I SM go Volit Dec
'I will go.'

b. nə -ka ka-kess -ni?
you SM go Volit Q
'Will you go?'

In (147a), the speaker is in a position to know and tell his own intention to act, and in (147b), the hearer is in a position to know his own intention and tell the speaker and, therefore, the underlying meaning is 'I REQUEST you to TELL me whether you INTEND to go.' In other words, if the predicate of TELL superordinates the action predicate with the subject identical to the subject of TELL, *kess* represents volition. This is the predominant reading of *kess* in the above linguistic environments, just as will has the same tendency in English. When the speaker represents his future controllable act, it is bound to be associated with his intention, and this is a universal fact. On the other hand, (147a) may obtain a very marginal reading of conjecture, not intention, in some particular contexts. And if we say

(148) na-ka salam-lil cuk-i -kess -ta
I SM man OM die Caus Volit Dec
Presume
'I would kill a man.'

in a presumptive sense, it is synonymous with

(149) na-ka salam-lil cuk-i -ke tϕ -kess -ta
I SM man OM die Caus Comp become Presum Dec
'It would come about that I kill a person.'

With the third person subject, *kess* represents conjecture constantly with no regards to the kinds of verbs or tenses associated. If the presumptive modal *kess* is associated with a non-past non-stative verb, it is naturally future-directed. However, a little more aloof and detached futurity is represented by the following construction:

(150) a. sam-wəl-ka o -miən cintallay-ka phi -il kəs - i -ta[27]
March SM come if azalea bloom Rel CompN Cop Dec
(Fut)
'If March comes, azaleas are to bloom.'
b. kot cintallay-ka phi -kess -ta
soon azalea SM bloom Presume Dec
'I conjecture that azaleas will bloom soon.'

An informal contracted form of (150a), however, has a strong internal conjectural sense. Observe:

27. At some deeper stage of the derivation, the whole string before the complementizer noun must be the complement of the copula (possibly with a dummy subject), the subject of the embedded complement S must be promoted to become the surface subject, and the verb phrase must be rearranged. The prenominal form *il* must come from *kess-nin* ultimately. This nominalization future construction is triggered when the speaker believes the future event will certainly occur.

(151) kot cintallay-ka phi -il kkəja
soon azalea SM bloom Rel
(Fut)
'I guess azaleas will bloom.'

An interesting case of contraction which is sensitive to meaning and syntactic environment is the construction of *-ljəko ha* 'be about to, try to, intend to'. Consider the following:

(152) a. na-nin ttəna *-ljəko ha*-nin(⇒n/Vowel-)-ta
I Top leave intend Pres Dec
'I intend to leave.'

b. na-ka ilpulə nəməci-*ljəko ha*-n -ta
I SM on purpose fall down Pres Dec
'I am about to fall down.'
'I intend to fall down on purpose.'

c. ai -ka ca-*ljəko ha*-n -ta
child SM sleep Pres Dec
'The child is about (tries) to sleep.'

d. namu-ka ssiləci-*ljəko ha*-n -ta
tree SM fall down Pres Dec
'The tree is about to fall.'

If the subject is non-animate, the meaning is automatically limited to 'be about to'. If the subject is the first person, it may mean either intention or 'be about to' depending on whether the associated verb represents a controllable act or not. There occurs contraction in which *ko* deletes optionally (ljəko+ha⇒ljə+ha), and further *ha* deletes, *ljə+ha-n* becoming *ljə-n*. A remarkable phenomenon about this is that the last operation, i.e., *ljə-ha-n=ljə-n*, is conditioned by the meaning of the construction and the subject person. The construction applies only when its meaning is intention and the subject is the speaker of the construction. Therefore,

(153) a. na-nin ttəna-*ljə-n*-ta
I Top leave Dec
'I intend to leave.'

b.*? na-ka ujənhi nəməci-*ljə-n*-ta
I SM by accident fall down Dec
'I intend to fall down by accident.'

c. nuna -ka [ca-*ljə-n*-ta] -ko malha-əss -ta
sister SM sleep Dec Quot say Past Dec
'Sister said she intended to sleep.'

d. *ai -ka ca-*ljə-n*-ta
child SM sleep Dec

e. *namu-ka ssiləci-*ljə-n*-ta
tree SM fall down Dec
f. *nə -ka ka-*ljə-n*-ta
you SM go Dec
'You intend to go.'

In a question form, if the subject is the second person, the contracted form may be used as follows:

(154) a. *nə -ka cip -e ka-*ljə-n*-(i)?
you SM home to go Q
'Do you intend to go home?'
b. *ki -ka cip -e o-*ljə-n*-i?
he SM home to come Q
'Does he intend to come home?'

the subject of INTEND and the subject of TELL are the identical 'you' in the underlying structure for (154a). The contraction must refer to an earlier semantic representation and syntactic environment in the derivation as a gobal phenomenon. To make this possible, we must have some abstract semantic representation which will distinguish different meanings of the construction in the underlying structure. The contracted form and the full form are different only in stylistic senses and are identical in cognitive meaning. Because of the stylistic difference, one might think of idiomatized lexicalization for the contracted form. However, *ha* deletion is independently motivated in the grammar. (Cf., ka-ljə *ha*-nin(Rel) salam=ka-ljə-nin salam 'the man who is going to go.') There is no point in treating the case exceptionally, causing the loss of generality of the contraction and the identical meaning. This particular contraction is restricted to the environment before the present tense form *nin*, possibly to avoid a hiatus arising in the past tense contraction. Therefore, the following forms are impossible:

(155) a. *na-ka ka-ljə-əss -ta
I SM go Past Dec
Cf. na-ka ka-ljə *ha*-əss-ta 'I intended to go.'
b. *ka-ljə-əss -nin salam
go Past Rel man
Cf. ka-liə ha-əss -nin salam
go Past Rel man
'The man who tried to go.'

Some informal colloquial endings of sentences expressing the speaker's modality of intention are used only in contexts where a promise is made. Consider:

(156) a. na-ka tasi o-*il-kke*[28]
I SM again come
'I will come back (for you).'
'I promise to come back.'
b. na-ka phjənci ssi-ma(usu. elders speaking to children)
'I will write to you'
'I promise to write to you'

These endings are used only when the speaker assumes his future act is in the hearer's interest and, therefore, they normally do not occur with verb stems meaning malicious acts like 'kill,' 'beat.' The above utterances can best to reported with the explicit performative verb *jaksokha* 'to promise', and it is reasonable to suppose that a higher performative verb of the sort underlies these endings. The neutral declarative performative does not convey the speaker's assumptions in uttering the above sentences of promising. Furthermore, (156a) cannot be embedded in any reported speech act predicate because of the nature of the (contracted) colloquial ending which lacks an explicit S-final mood marker. Therefore, the closest way of reporting (156a) is something like

(157) ki -ka [ϕ tasi o -kess -ta] -ko *jaksokha*-əss -ta
he SM again come Volit Dec Quot promise Past Dec
'He promised that he would come again.'

Korean has a volitive interrogative ending, *-il-kka*, asking about the volition, associated with the verb of a controllable act.
Consider:

(158) na-ka ka-il -kka?
I SM go Volit Q
'Shall I go?'

Because the hearer is in a position to tell whether the speaker will go or not, as the sentence assumes, (158) means something like, 'Is it your will (or desire, opinion) for me to go?' or 'Do you intend me to go?' If we take the speaker's later formation of volition into account the ultimate modal structure must be 'Do you intend me to go?' When it is directed to the speaker himself, it becomes reflective, showing the speaker's indecision and hesitancy, 'Do I intend (myself to intend) to go?' The form used to show the speaker's respect for the hearer's will, when addressed to the hearer. So it is frequently used in asking permission or making an offer. Observe:

---

28. This form seems to come form -il-kəs-i-ə
CompN Cop

(159) ce-ka tow · a tili *-il* *-kka*-jo?
I SM help give Volit Q colloq
lowered Defer
'Shall I help you?'
Cf. *ce-ka tow · a tili -kess-ə-jo?[29]
I SM help give Volit colloq
Defer
'Will I help you?'

Sentence (159) suggests the speaker's willingness to help. The same form is used for making a proposal with the first person plural.
Observe:

(160) uli-ka hankuk-munce -lil thoijha-*il* *-kka*?
we SM Korea matter OM discuss Volit Q
'Shall we discuss the Korean matter?'

In this case, the act concerned is joint. This volitive interrogative ending, thus observed, is primarily used for the first person (singular or plural) to ask the hearer's opinion. However, its use is extended to the case of making a suggestion to the hearer. Observe:

(161) cha ti -si *-il* *-kka*-jo?
tea have Defer Volit Q colloq
Defer
'Would you have some tea?'

This functions better as a kind offer than the following straightforward question:

(162) cha ti -si -kess-ə-jo?
tea have Honor Volit colloq
Defer
'Will you have some tea?'

The difference arises just because the use of the *il-kka* form for the second person subject is still associated with its logical structure requiring the first person subject. Therefore, (161) gives the impression of the first speaker's willingness for co-operation or participation, and it is close to something like.

(163) ce-ka [ϕ cha ti -si] -tolok ha-ə tili-*il-kka*-jo?
I SM tea have Honor so that do give colloq
Defer

29. This sentence is all right only if it is meant to be a rhetorical question meaning, 'Do you think I would help you?', 'I would not help you.'

'Shall I { help you / get you to } have some tea?'

In normal contexts, its use for the second person subject is indeed unacceptable. Consider:

(164) ??ne -ka ka-*il* -*kka*?
you SM Volit Q
'Shall you go?'

Similarly, one may never say *"Shall *you* go?" in English. However, contextually the following can be uttered to suggest that the hearer go without the speaker's intention to participate:

(165) nic -əss -ini ilənа-po -*il* -*kka*?
late Past because rise try Volit Q
'Because it is late, how about rising?'

Then is the contextually implied meaning to be resolved by the Gricean conversational inferences or is it to be incorporated into the lexical or logical meaning of the form? The decision depends on the degree of fossilization. The unnaturalness of the form, with the explicit second person subject in (164), indicates its less warranted fossilization, and the situation can better be treated by referring to the logical structure of the form and Gricean conversational principles.

In English 'please' occurs in a request associated with the second person potential Agent. Its exceptional occurrence with the first person in 'May *I please* examine you, Dr. Jenkins?' is exactly because it is semantically a request for permission. In other words, 'please' is associated with an underlying 'you', the permittor. Jenkins' deep structure association of 'please' with the first person in this case is simply ad hoc, and loses generalization and explanation (Cf., Jenkins 1972).

The *il-kka* form represents the epistemic sense with first and second person stative or nonactive process verbs and with third person verbs of any kind. Observe:

(166) *ki* -ka o -*il* *kka*?
he SM come Presum Q
'Would he come?'

This conjectural form is more internal in the speaker than the *kess* form that asks the hearer's conjecture more explicitly. If the *il* form and *kess* are not preceded by the past tense form (*əss*), the act, event, or state represented by the main verb is of futurity. There is no independent future tense. From this we can see that tense is determined by the performative predicate (and possibly its associated structure). Time adverbials are simply subcategories of each tense.

In a conditional clause, verb stem plus conditional conjunctive represents future. Observe:

(167) a. nayil pi -ka o *-mjən*, cip -e iss-ca
tomorrow rain SM come condit home at be Propos
'If it rains tomorrow, let us be home.'

b. ne -ka o -mjən, na-nɨn ka-kess-ta
you SM come if I Top go will Dec
'If you come, I will go.'

Compare the above with the following which contain *kess*:

(168) a. nayil pi -ka o *-kess* -ɨmjən, tangcang usan -lɨl
tomorrow rain SM come presumif immediately umbrella OM
sa -la
buy Imp
'If you conjecture that it will rain tomorrow, buy an umbrella immediately.'

b. nayil nə -ka o *-kess* -ɨmjən, onɨl sui-(ə)la
tomorrow you SM come Volit if today rest Imp
'If you intend to come tomorrow, take a rest today.'

In (167), the conditional clauses represent future and the time of main clauses is subsequent to the time of the conditional clauses. However, if we have *kess* before the conjunctive as in (168), it is associated with the hearer's conjecture (or intention) at the time of speech but not with the future time of the event represented by the verb stem. The speech-act-participant condition on intentionality of the modal penetrates even into the relative clause. Observe:

(169) uli cip -e o -kess *-nin*(⇒ɨl) salam -nɨn son tɨl-(ə)la
our house to come Volit Rel person Top hand raise Imp
'Anyone who will (intends to) come to our house, raise your hand'
Cf. kɨ-ka uli cip -e o -kess -nɨn salam-i -ta
he SM our house to come Presum Rel man Cop Dec
'He is the man who *will* come to our house.'

In this respect, the interrogative, the conditional, and the unspecified person relativization associated with the second person in the underlying structure all function in the same way because of the state of the speaker's 'not knowing', and if the addressee is in a position to 'know' and/or to 'tell' because of its association with his own controllable act, it turns out to be his intentionality. This must be a universal phenomenon about modality.

7. Implicature

Let us imagine the following dialogue:

A: Who is taller, Cindy or Mary?
B: Mary is taller than Sue and Sue is taller than Cindy.

Did B answer A's question? Certainly B did not assert that Mary was taller than Cindy. However, to A, B was *co-operative* in making a certain response and there is no reason why B should make an *irrelevant* response, and therefore the facts he stated, although not a direct comparison between Cindy and Mary, which B wanted to avoid should lead to the answer. By the way the P, 'Mary is taller than Cindy,' is a logical consequence of the two conjoined assertions. B knows that A knows it. Thus, B implicated P as an answer. B has the proposition P in his mind and he intended it to be conveyed to A. However, A might not understand B's implicature because he either did not know the transitivity implicational relation or it did not occur to him, but not because he did not know the language. In this respect, the above sort of inferential competence is not necessarily part of linguistic competence in its narrow sense, although a large part of linguistic communication is carried out through the vehicle of systematic implicature.

Grice distinguishes between what is said and what is implicated. The latter is again divided into what is conventionally implicated and what is non-conventionally implicated. However, those who correctly know the meanings of these words are supposed to know their logical implicational relations, and if what is said is not necessarily limited to what is asserted, all the entailment relations and presuppositions which must be accounted for in semantic structure can safely be argued to belong to what is said. Logical entailments and presuppositions might have to be accounted for in the system of implicature when they are used in place of some illocutionary force. For instance, if a speaker who knows that the hearer does not know that John failed the exam and wants to let the hearer know the fact, says 'I regret that John failed the exam,' then the hearer will get informed through the presupposed proposition of the utterance, perhaps perlocutionarily. But to the speaker, what is important is the intended informative complement part which should first be done in an independent assertion normally, and the preceding part which is to show his feeling is less important. The hearer might respond with "Did he?" or "He did!?" in a surprise. 'Conventional implicatures' are strictly dependent on the logical structure of language.

Grice's system of non-conventional 'conversational implicatures' is significant in the sense that it affords some revealing clues to the resolution of subtlties in the

discourse level of linguistic communication. What an utterance can mean is far more than a single proposition can mean in the discourse level. Utterances are indispensibly related to the speaker's assumptions and intentions. What we must account for is constraints on possible occurrence of, and combination of, pragmatic presuppositions, violation of which is reflected in anomalies of utterances and misfired illocutions. The constraints can be divided into two categories: one is those working within the scope of an illocution, and the other is those in operation among utterances. At least part of my attention has been directed to this sort of goal.

The implicational use of language cannot be termed pejoratively as 'parasitic use of language' (Austin 1962). In more cases, it is an elevated use of language, intellectually stimulating, as in aesthetic metaphor, humour, etc.

CHAPTER II

REFLEXIVIZATION

Reflexivization is a general phenomenon, though its manifestation may vary from language, awaiting a principled way of accounting. The purpose of this chapter is to explore some interesting Korean reflexive behavior in various constructions and to see what factors, syntactic or semantic, govern the process.

As a guide for factual exploration, the first approximation in determining coreferentiality between *caki*, the Korean reflexive pronoun, and its antecedent may be put simply as:

> *caki* is coreferential with the Subject or Topic NP of any dominating sentence. In other words, when the Subject or Topic NP of a sentence is in command with *caki*, the latter is coreferential with the former.

This immediately suggests the important funcition of the subject position and dominance relation in this language.

To observe how this statement obtains in various conceivable constructions, simplex and complex, let us start with a simplified base showing order of constituents relevant to our discussion:

1. S ⟶ (Top) NP (PP) VP
2. S ⟶ $(S)^n$
3. VP ⟶ (PP) ($\left\{\begin{matrix}NP\\S\end{matrix}\right\}$) V
4. PP ⟶ $\left\{\begin{matrix}NP\\S\end{matrix}\right\}$ P
5. Np ⟶ $\left\{\begin{matrix}S\ \left\{\begin{matrix}NP\\N\end{matrix}\right\}\\(D)N\end{matrix}\right\}$

1. In Simplex and Some Other Constructions

1.1. *In Simplex Construction*

The process is rather simple in simple sentences: whatever oblique case it may take *caki* refers to the subject NP of the sentence.

(1) a. *Sue*$_i$-ka əməni$_i$-eke *caki*$_i$-lil calangha- əss -ta
SM mother to self OM pride Past Dec

'Sue boasted about herself to mother.'

əməni ⟨-coref⟩ caki (əməni is non-coreferential with *caki*).



If a third person non-subject noun is morphologically identical with the subject, they cannot be coreferential. See:

a′. **Sue*$_i$-ka əməni-eke Sue$_i$-lil calangha-əss-ta

b. *Sue*$_i$-ka əməni -aph -esə *caki*$_i$-eke ki mal -lil
SM mother front at to the word OM
t ϕ phuliha-əss -ta
repeat Past Dec
'Sue, before mother, repeated the words to herself.'
əməni ⟨-coref⟩ *caki*

c. Sue-ka Jay-eke *caki* chayk-lil cu -əss -ta
SM to book OM give Past Dec
'Sue gave Jay her own book.'
Jay ⟨-coref⟩ caki



d. *Jay*$_i$-ka John-eke *caki*$_i$-e kwanha-ə ijakiha-əss -ta[1)]
SM to about talk Past Dec

1. This can be posited as a sentence in DS, like English *concerning*.

'Jay talked to John about self (=Jay).'
John ⟨-coref⟩ caki

This is different from the English reflexive sentence "Jay talked to John about himself", where *himself* may be coreferential with either Jay or John. Sentences (1 a) and (1b) are less natural with the object and dative *caki*'s than sentence (1c) with the possessive *caki*. It is the case that structurally the possessive is one nominal node lower than the object or the dative. In other words, the object and the dative are peer nodes of the subject whereas the possessive is not, and coreferentiality is optimal when the antecedent subject and *caki* are not peers in a simple sentence.

As we can observe, *caki* does not show any gender distinction. However, it can show the number distinction with the plural morpheme attached for a plural reflexive. The reflexive *caki* is limited to the third person human noun, and for the first and second persons reflexivization if marked by the same first and second pronouns or optionally by the following ways:

(2) na_1-ka { na_1 / *na-casin*$_1$ / $casin_1$ } -lil kkocip-əss -ta
I SM OM pinch Past Dec
'I pinched myself.'

(3) $nə_1$ -ka $nə_1$ -lil moli -nin -ta
You SM *nə-casin*$_1$ Om not know Pres Dec
$casin_1$
'You don't know yourself.'

The reflexive particle *casin* is attached to the first or second person pronoun optionally, or *casin* can stand alone to be coreferential with the subject.[2] The present discussion will focus on *caki*, which is so prevalent in representing coreferentiality in the third person.

A sentence-initially introduced *caki* cannot meet the condition of our hypothesis and cannot be interpreted as reflexive in a sentence where movement is not involved. A sentence of which the subject is *caki*, however, may be interpreted as a deictic non-first person.

(4) a. **caki*$_1$-ka *Jay*$_1$-lil po -əss -ta
SM OM see Past Dec
'He saw Jay.'
b. *caki*-ka ka-əss -ci?
SM go Past Q

2. The postcedent noun or pronoun in the third person also can have the particle *casin* attached in a simplex sentence.

i) 'He went, didn't he?'
ii) 'You went, didn't you?'[3]

caki in this case can occur even in object position.

c. ki munce -ka *caki* -lil kφlop -hi -əss -ta
the problem SM self OM bother Past Dec
'The problem bothered him.'

1.2. *In Coordinate Construction*

When the subject of the second conjunct sentence is empty, it is obligatorily filled by the subject of the preceding sentence. When the subject of the second S is *caki*, it cannot refer back to the preceding subject. This fits our hypothesis; the preceding subject does not command *caki*.

(5) *ai_i -ka malu-lil ssil -ko $caki_i$-ka pap-lil
boy SM floor OM sweep and SM rice OM
ci -əss -ta[4]
boil Past Dec



3. Once in a while *caki* is used even for the deictic second person in conversation. But this use seems to come through the third person deictic use. That is why we feel a certain distance from the second person when we use *caki* for it.

4. When the actions of the verbs are in close causal relation (this property is not clearly definable at the moment), *caki* of the second S can refer to the preceding subject, adding the sense of emphasis to the subject:

Ray-ka Jim-lil chi -ko caki-ka nəməci-əss -ta
SM OM hit and SM fall Past Dec
'Ray hit Jim and he himself (Ray) fell.'
Jim 〈+coref〉 caki

'The boy swept the floor and he (not the boy) cooked rice.'
ai ⟨-coref⟩ *caki*

This non-coreferentiality becomes clearer, when the subjects are contrasted.

(6) *ai_i -nin malu -lil ssil -ko $caki_i$-nin pap-lil ci -əss-ta
child Top floor OM sweep and Top rice OM boil Past Dec
'The boy swept the floor and he (not the boy) cooked rice.'
ai ⟨-coref⟩ *caki*

However, when the second S has a deleted subject which is identical to the subject of the first S, the object *caki* can refer to the subject of the first S:

(7) Ray_i-ka Jim-lil chi-ko $caki_i$-lil tolpo -əss -ta
SM OM hit and OM take care of Past Dec
'Ray hit Jim and took care of himself.'

This is possible by a derived VP conjunction through S-pruning of the second conjunct. If the subject of the second sentence is different from the first one, then no following non-subject *caki* can refer to the first conjunct S subject.

(8) Joe-ka Jay-lil chi-ko $Mary_i$-ka $caki_i$-lil tolpo -əss -ta
SM OM hit and SM OM take care of Past Dec
Joe ⟨-coref⟩ *caki*
'Joe hit Jay and Mary took care of herself.'



In the phrasal-conjunction, *caki* in the second conjunct NP of the subject NP cannot naturally be coreferential with the first conjunct NP. However, in its logically synonymous prepositional phrase sentence, *caki* in the PP may be readily coreferential with the subject.

(9) a. ?$John_i$-kwa $caki_i$-ka cohaha-nin jəca -ka kyəlhonha-əss -ta
and like Rel woman SM married Past Dec
'John and a woman self likes married.'
b. $John_i$-ka $caki_i$-ka cohaha-nin jəca -kwa kyəlhonha-əss -ta
SM SM love Rel woman with married Past Dec

'John$_i$ married a woman he$_i$ likes.'



In sentence (9a), John alone is not the subject of the top S, which dominates *caki*.

1.3. *In Subordinate Conjunctive Construction*

Caki in the subordinate S becomes coreferential with the subject of the matrix sentence.

(10) *sonjə -til* -ka Mary-ka *caki-til*-lil ssis -tolok
girl Pl SM SM Pl OM wash so that
takao -əss -ta
approach Past Dec
'Girls approached so that Mary could wash them.'

Caki-til (selves) here cannot refer to Mary because of disagreement in number, otherwise meeting the condition of our hypothesis. It refers to the subject of the matrix S which commands it. Compare this with the following coordinate structure in which the same coreferentiality does not hold because of lack of command relation:



(11) **sonjə-til*$_i$-ka takao -ko Mary-ka *caki-til*$_i$-lil
Pl SM approach and SM Pl OM
ssis -əss -ta
wash Past Dec



(12) Joe$_i$-nin *Ray*-ka *caki*$_i$-lil piphanha-ca əlitungcəlha -əss -ta
Top SM OM criticize as be at a loss Past Dec
'Joe was at a loss, as Ray criticized { him / himself }.'



In this sentence, *caki* can refer either to the clause-mate subject Jay or matrix subject Joe ambiguously.

The subject of the embedded clause in subordinate conjunction is normally deleted on identity with the matrix subject. The pronominal form *ki* [+N, +Pro, +III, −Fem, −Pl] does not take place in this case. If *ki* takes the place of the deleted subject, then it refers to someone else than the matrix subject, implying the obligatoriness of the identity deletion, if the structure does not meet the condition of reflexivization. Pronominal forms are not well developed in Korean. Rather, definitization of the coreferential NP must be registered. When *caki* takes its place, it refers back to the matrix subject, adding emphasis to the latter:

(13) Joe-ka [{ ∅ / caki-ka } iki]$_S$- camaca nolay-lil pul -əss -ta
SM win as soon as song OM sing Past Dec
'As soon as { he / he himself } won, Joe sang.'



2. In Complement Construction

In complement construction, the behavior of the reflexive *caki* is governed by the same principle. And it can be reasonably considered in interaction with the missing subject of the complement sentence. Let us consider the object complement S and its deleted subject. The selection of the filling (controller) NP depends on the class of complement verbs when the verb of the matrix sentence is a verb of 'saying' which is neutral to involvement of the speaker or the hearer (of that 'saying') in the action or state represented by the complement verb, such as *malha* 'say', *solichi* 'shout', *sənənha* 'declare', *soksaki* 'whisper', *ijakiha* 'talk', *cungəlkəli* 'mumble'. Let us observe how the deleted complement subject is filled in different situations.

(14) ai-ka *Sue*$_i$-eke [ϕ_i nalssinha-ta]$_S$ -ko malha-əss -ta
SM slim Dec Compl say Past Dec
'The child told Sue that she was slim.'



The complement subject is filled by the oblique object Sue, who is spoken to. This comes from the fact that the adjectival verb *nalssinha* 'slim' is normally uttered after observing someone other than the speaker himself and in this case the observed and the addressee happen to be coreferential. It is possible only when some modifying sentence intervenes that the deleted subject optionally refers to someone else than

the addressee Sue. There are no morphological or cultural cues in *nalssinha*, etc., to distinguish between Sue and *ai* as possible subjects in the complement sentence. Likewise, whenever the complement verb is a [+V, +Adj] which describes attributive observed features or judged quality of a person, its deleted subject is filled by the higher *eke* NP. Examples of these verbs are:

[+V, +Adj, +Attrib] Observed features: *jeppi* 'pretty', *khi* 'tall', *ttungttungha* 'bulky'

Judged quality: *pucilənha* 'diligent', *cəngcikha* 'honest', *əlisək* 'foolish'…

On the other hand, the adjectival verbs of emotion and sensation behave differently; the deleted subject, experiencer of the psychological verb in the embedded complement S, is the matrix subject, speaker, obligatorily:

(15) Joe-ka Sue-eke [ϕ collip-ta]-ko cungəlkəli-əss -ta
SM to drowsy Comp mumble Past Dec
'Joe mumbled to Sue that he was drowsy.'

Examples:

[+V, +Adj, +pshych] *silphi* 'sad', *əciləp* 'dizzy', *ϕ lop* 'lonely', *cilkəp* 'pleasant', *mokmali* 'thirsty'…

We can summarize the above discussion in the following rules:

Complement Subject (1):

SD:	NP	NP_1 - eke	$[[NP_i]_{NP}$	V]s [+Adj +Attrib]	V]s [+Comm +Dec]	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
SC:	1	2	3	ϕ	5	6

Complement Subject(2):

SD:	NP_1	X	$[[NP_i]_{NP}$	V]s [+psych]	V]s [+Comm +Dec]
	1	2	3	4	5
SC:	1	2	ϕ	4	5

In the second rule, the variable X can be ϕ; in other words, the rule can apply even if there is no NP- *eke* after the subject. These rules give some support to the assumption that a declarative S has a higher S which has the first person subject as the speaker and the second person as the addressee and a declarative performative verb, which can eliminate the first person condition on psychological verbs. If someone utters, "silphi-ta", the understood subject is the speaker.
sad Dec

Let us consider what happens when we have *caki* in the subject position of the complement sentence with an attributive adjective. Then, it refers back to the subject of the dominating sentence, the speaker in this case. Example:

(16) *Sue*$_i$-ka ai -eke [*caki*$_i$-ka jeppi -ta]$_S$ -ko
SM child to SM pretty Dec Compl
malha-əss -ta
say Past Dec
'Sue told the child that she was pretty.'



Caki does not refer to *ai*, the oblique object, but it refers to Sue, the subject of the higher sentence, again conforming to our approximation. In the second structure with the psychological adjectives, on the other hand, *caki*, in the complement subject position, still refers to the higher subject. Since the deleted subject in the second rule is obligatorily coreferential with the higher subject, the occurrence of *caki* in that position is purely for the function of emphasis and exclusiveness:

(17) *Joe*$_i$-ka Sue-eke [*caki*$_i$-ka collip -ta]$_S$ -ko
SM to SM drowsy Dec Compl
soksaki-əss -ta
whisper Past Dec
'Joe whispered to Sue that he himself was drowsy.'

When the complement verb represents an action that is done normally under the speaker's consciousness, it tends to select the main clause subject, the speaker, as its subject:

(18) *Sue*$_i$-ka (Joe-eke) ϕ_1 pap-lil məkɾ-əss -ta]$_S$- ko solichi-əss-ta
SM to rice OMeat koiss Dec Compl shout Past Dec
kess

[+Past
+Prog
+Vol]

'Sue shouted to Joe that she [ate / was eating / would eat] rice.'

In Korean, when a simple or matrix sentence with the category of verbs that represent some conscious or controllable act (e.g., *tty* 'run', *kongpuha* 'study', *ppallayha* 'wash') has a deleted subject (the so-called and subjectless sentence), it may refer to the speaker if there is no preceding context that invites other interpretation.

If the complement verb, however, represents an action which is done normally unconsciously by the agent (and the subject of the matrix verb assumes or pretends to assume that his hearer (agent) is unconscious of the action, or he wants to bring his hearer's attention to the matter, or possibly he just wants to make a comment), the deleted subject refers to the hearer which is the higher oblique object:

(19) [Sue-ka Joe-eke [ϕ col-ko iss -ta]$_S$ -ko malha-əss -ta]$_S$
SM to be drowsing Dec Compl say Past Dec
'Sue told Joe that he was drowsing.'

Consider the following ambiguity:

(20) Joe-ka Sue-eke [ϕ pal -lɨl palp-ko iss -ta] -ko
SM to foot OM step on Prog Dec Comp
malha-əss -ta
say Past Dec
'Joe told Sue that [she / he] was stepping on the foot.'

If the main clause subject supposes that his hearer was stopping on his foot unconsciously, ϕ is filled by Sue the hearer and indeed this is the predominant reading. However, the speaker Joe can be stepping on his hearer Sue's foot consciously and in this case ϕ can be filled by Joe. The same situation holds in the following example:

(21) Joe-ka Sue-eke [ϕ sonsukən -lɨl ttələttɨli -əss -ta]
SM to handkerchief OM drop Past Dec
ko malha-əss -ta
Comp say Past Dec
'Joe told Sue that [she / he] dropped a handkerchief.'

In sum,

Rule (A) SD: [NP NP - eke [NP (NP) V]$_S$ V]$_S$ [+Comm, +Dec]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SC: 1) 4= ϕ if 1=4, and 1 is conscious of 6
2) 4= ϕ if 2=4, and 1 supposes 4 is not conscious of 6
3) 5= ϕ if 1) applies, and 2=5 (Cf. later discussion)

Again, when the complement subject is replaced by *caki*, it always refers back to the higher subject, who is necessarily conscious of the action represented by the complement verb, eliminating ambiguity in an otherwise ambiguous sentence, and assuring coreferentiality in an optionally coreferential case. Thus, *caki* plays the role of a disambiguator:

cf.(21)



Verbs that take the [+Hum] object such as *salangha* 'love', *conkjəngha* 'respect', *samoha* 'adore', may have their object deleted in the same construction when it is coreferential with the *eke* NP in the main clause. In other words, the transitive action of the complement verb is directed to the addressee of the main clause location. The subject of the complement sentence undergoes rule (A.1), and the object coreference is taken care of by rule (A.3).

(22) Joe-ka Sue-eke [ϕ ϕ samoha-nin -ta] -ko soksaki -əss -ta
SM to adore Press Dec Comp whisper Past Dec
'Joe whispered to Sue that he adored her.'

This complement object coreference is not possible in English, where only the complement subject coreference mechanism exists.[5] This object coreference is better applicable when the complement verb is [+Pres] or [+Fut] in than when it is [+Past]. Now we can replace the complement subject by *caki* which refers back to the higher subject, and/or the complement object by *kinjə* [+Pro, +III, +Fem, −Pl]

5. Consider, however, the following English S: Joe spoke to Sue of love. One of the interpretations is 'his love for her.' "Joe spoke adoring words (words of adoration) to Sue." I owe this observation to Householder and Shopen.

or *ki jəca* 'the woman' which can better refer to the higher oblique object. This object pronominalization, however, is again optional, and a pronoun in that position can refer to someone out of the sentence. If the complement subject is, let us say, Mary, and the object is *caki*, *caki* can be either Joe or Mary, but not Sue.

So far we have handled the matrix verb of 'saying', which is neutral to involvement of the speaker or the hearer, in terms of assumptions, of that 'saying'. Let us consider cases where senses and inherent assumptions of the matrix verb determines the control. Taking the example of the verb *jaksokaha* 'promise':

(23) Joe-ka Sue-eke [ϕ ttəna-kess -ta]$_S$ -ko jaksokha-əss -ta
leave [+Vol] Dec [+Comp] promise Past Dec
'Joe promised Sue to leave.'

The controller NP must be the main clause subject; *jaksokha* 'promise' inherently represents some action which the promiser will do (for the promissee). This is a universal semantic fact. Rosenbaum's Principle of Minimal Distance does not work here (Cf. the English translation). And we have already observed here that many examples with *NP eke* do not conform to a minimal distance principle. It is not a matter of structure but of meanings of verbs and the speaker's assumptions involved. In this case the control is obligatory. *Pocangha* 'guarantee' is another verb with the same control but it is optional. In consequence, an objective *caki* in the complement S will refer to the higher agent only:

(24) *Joe*$_I$-ka Sue-eke *caki*$_I$ mom-lil hisayngsikhi-l kəs-lil
SM to body OM sacrifice Rel N OM
jaksokha-əss -ta
promise Past Dec
'Joe promised Sue to sacrifice his body (himself).'

Those verbs which have the imperative sense such as *mjəngliəngha* 'order', *jochəngha* 'request', *kangjoha* 'coerce', *puthakha* 'ask', *jokuha* 'call for' need the oblique object NP which controls the deleted subject of the complement S. (The complementizer can be either the quotative complementizer -ko with a sentence final imperative marker in the complement S, or the [+internal] *kəs* Complementation with the [+Prospective] Rel marker *il* with an infinite complement sentence form.)

(25) *Joe*$_I$-ka Sue$_{II}$-eke [ϕ caki$_{i,ii}$-lil tolpo- la] -ko
SM to OM [+Imp] Comp
-l kəs -lil
Rel Comp OM
mjəngliəngha-əss -ta
order Past Dec
'Joe ordered Sue to take care of him (or herself).'

The ambiguous coreferential possibility arises when the complement subject deletion rule applies after a cyclical application of reflexivization in the first cycle.



But the lexically filled higher subject has more prominence for coreferentiality with *caki* and it is a dominant reading. Ambiguity is removed when the complement verb is unreflexible:

(26) *ai*$_i$-ka hjəng-eke *caki*$_i$-lil ponay-l kəs -lil puthakha -əss -ta
SM brother OM send Rel Comp OM ask Past Dec
hjəng ⟨-coref⟩ *caki*
'The child asked his brother to send him.'

Verbs of permission like *həlakha* 'permit' take the oblique object, which obligatorily controls the subject of the complement S:

(27) *Sue* -ka ai -eke [ϕ_i caki$_i$ mom-lil ssisi -la]$_S$ ko
SM child to body OM wash [+Imp] Comp
−l kəs -lil
Rel CompN OM
həlakha-əss -ta
permit Past Dec
'Sue permitted the child to wash {her / his own} body.'
Sue ⟨-coref⟩ ϕ

As we can see in the above S, the embedded S can end in an imperative sentence final marker, which implies that permission can be considered as another form of imperative performative. In sum,

SD: [NP X [NP_i – eke]$_{PP}$ [NP_i Y]$_S$ Z V]$_S$
[+Comm
+Imp]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

SC: 1 2 3 4 ϕ 6 7 8

The majority of verbs, however, do not need an oblique object which serves as controller for the complement subject. The optative class of verbs like *pala* 'hope for', *wənha* 'want', *himangha* 'hope', *kitayha* 'expect', *kitali* 'wait', *pil* 'pray' take the subject controller, and the control is optional.

(28) Jay-ka [ϕ səngkongha-l kəs] -lil pil -əss -ta
SM succeed Rel N OM pray Past Dec
'Jay prayed that he succeed.'

For the verb that takes the optional subject control, *caki* in the complement subject node makes itself distinct from other possible subject entries, uniquely referring to the main clause subject with a slight emphasis added:

(29) Jay_i -nin[6] [$caki_i$-ka səngkongha-l kəs] -lil pil -əss -ta
Top SM succeed Rel CompN OM pray Past Dec
See (28) for translation.

The complement subject can be someone noncoreferential with the higher subject:

(30) Sue_I-nin [[Joe_{II}-ka $caki_{I,II}$-lil al -l kəs]$_{NP}$ -lil
Top SM OM know Rel CompN OM
pala -əss -ta
hope Past Dec



6. Normally, the main clause subject is topicalized: for Topicalization, Cf. later discussion. Because of Tense or Aux associated with the original matrix S node (which I do not handle here), the S node is not pruned by the Chomsky-adjunction of Topic.

The verb *top* 'to help' has a similar construction and does not involve raising as does in English, with cyclical reflexivization:

(31) Sue$_{I}$-nin [ai$_{II}$-ka *caki*$_{I,II}$-mom-lil ssis -nin kəs] -lil top -əss -ta
SM body OM wash Rel CompN OM help Past Dec
'Sue helped the child to wash {her / his} own body.'

The perception verbs that form the [Verb-Obj-Verb-ing] construction in English show the following complementation in Korean:

(32) Sue-nin [*caki*-ka ttwi-nin kəs] -lil po -əss -ta
Top SM run Pres CompN OMsee Past Dec

'Sue saw herself running,' for instance, in the mirror, with the present form of the complement verb. Verbs that take the obligatory subject controller and do not need an oblique object are: *sitoha* 'attempt', *kamhayngha* 'dare', *kjəlsimha* 'determine', *huh ϕ ha* 'regret'.

(33) ki-nin [ϕ ttəna-n kəs] -lil huh ϕ ha-əss -ta
he top leave Rel Comp OM regret Past Dec
[+Past]N
'He regretted having left.'

Having *caki* in place of ϕ by reflexivization has only the effect of emphasis and exclusiveness for these verbs which have the obligatory subject controller.

There are cases of apparent subject complement sentences. Since they are related to Topicalization, the discussion will be postponed till later.

3. In Relative Construction

In a relative clause, *caki* behaves much the same as in a complement sentence. For relative clause verbs which take the [+Hum] Object selection, the [+Hum] relative head noun can fill either the relative subject or object. However the main clause subject can fill predominantly the relative subject, but rarely the relative object. Consequently, the relative object is normally filled by the relative head noun.

(34) Sue-nin salangha-nin namca-lil manna-əss -ta
Top love Rel man OM meet Past Dec
[+Pres]
'Sue met the man she loves.' (Predominant)



The above sentence is assumed to start out like the given tree. The relative head noun obligatorily fills one of the lower deleted NP nodes, in this case, being predominantly understood as the object. Then, the matrix subject may fill the rest, predominantly the subject of the relative sentence. If we put all the conceivable combinations of the underlying structures for the relative clause in sentence (34):

1. [[Sue]$_{NP}$ [[namca]$_{NP}$ [salangha]$_{V}$]$_{VP}$]$_{S}$ 'Sue loves the man.'
2. [[namca]$_{NP}$ [[Sue]$_{NP}$ [salangha]$_{V}$]$_{VP}$]$_{S}$ 'The man loves Sue.'
3. [$\begin{bmatrix} +\text{Hum} \\ -\text{Def} \end{bmatrix}_{N\ NP}$ [[namca][salangha]$_{V}$]$_{VP}$]$_{S}$ 'Someone loves the man.'
4. [[[namca]$_{NP}$ [[$\begin{bmatrix} +\text{Hum} \\ -\text{Def} \end{bmatrix}_{N}$]$_{NP}$ [salangha]$_{V}$]$_{VP}$]$_{S}$ 'The man loves someone.'

When we bring *caki* into the picture, the above four-ways ambiguous readings are readily resolved; if the relative subject is *caki*, then the higher subject becomes its coreferential NP, in which case the relative object is filled by the head noun automatically.

(35) *Sue*$_{I}$-nin *caki*$_{I}$-ka salangha-nin namca-lil manna-əss -ta
Top SM love Rel OM meet Past Dec
'Sue met the man whom she loves.'

On the other hand, if *caki* is in the relative object NP position, *caki* can again refer to the main clause subject Sue dominantly, or ambiguously it may refer to the relative head noun.

(36) *Sue*$_{I}$-nin *caki*$_{I,II}$-lil salangha-nin namca$_{II}$-lil manna-əss-ta
Top OM love Dec
'Sue met the man who loves $\begin{bmatrix} \text{her} \\ \text{himself} \end{bmatrix}$.'



As we observed, coreferentiality of the deleted relative clause object with the main clause subject is far weaker than that of the deleted relative subject with the main clause subject. It is obvious, therefore, that the *caki* in the relative object position plays a far more distinctive function than the *caki* in the relative subject position. Particularly for relative verbs which are used to represent occupational or habitual action easily incorporating the human Theme such as *kanhoha* 'nurse', *annayha* ' guide', *kjənghoha* 'escort', the relative head noun is normally an agent and the possibility of the deleted object being coreferential with the main clause subject is extremely weak, and for that purpose mobilization of *caki* is compelling.

(37) Joe -nin kanhoha-nin jəca -lil po -əss -ta
Topnurse Rel woman OM see Past Dec
[+Pres]

The dominant reading is 'Joe saw a nursing woman' (a woman who nurses 'people'), whereas

(38) *Joe*$_{i}$-nin *caki*$_{i}$-lil kanhoha-nin jəca -lil po -əss -ta
Top OM nurse Rel woman OM see Past Dec
[+Pres]
'Joe saw the woman who was nursing him (or herself).'[7]

7. Alternatively, we can add a benefactive auxiliary verb-*cu*-(originally to give) to the relative verb stem (kanhoha-cu-nin jəca) to help make the empty object be coreferential with the main clause subject.



The relativized head noun in Korean does not show any case marker or postposition which it takes in the embedded sentence before deletion. This is a big difference from English relativization. The relational meaning must be predictable from the verb involved. This is the case in Korean, and with a few exceptions any NP in a PP can be relativized. Consider the following:

(39) *ki sinsa*$_{i}$ -nin *caki*$_{i}$-ka chumchu-n jəca -lil manna-əss -ta
the gentle- Top SM dance Rel woman OM meet Past Dec
man
'The gentleman met the woman with whom he himself danced.'

The verb *chumchu* 'dance' is an intransitive verb, and the relative sentence has the subject. Therefore, the relative head NP must come from a PP in the embedded S. The head is [+Hum] and a predictable element is the comitative relation which is represented by *kwa* 'with' as in the following tree, making semantic interpretation possible.[8] On the surface, however, it is assumed to be wiped out together with the associated NP without a lexical element being inserted. Since the verb is intransitive, if we say,

8. If we add such an adverb as *hamkke* 'together', the predictability of comitative relation increases.



(40) ki sinsa -nin chumchu-n jəca -lil manna-əss -ta
the gentleman Top dance Rel woman OM meet Past Dec

Jəca is the relative subject and PP does not show up, meaning, 'The gentleman saw the woman who danced.' If we say,

(41) *ki sinsa*$_i$ -nin *caki*$_i$-kwa chumchu-n jəca -lil
the gentleman Top with dance Rel woman OM
manna-əss -ta
meet Past Dec
'The gentleman met the woman who danced with him.'

Caki refers to the matrix subject, not to the head noun, and the relative subject must be the head noun.



In relative construction, the oblique object cannot be coreferential with any following *caki* and a preceding subject cannot be coreferential with a following *caki*, unless the subject commands the latter:

(42) *Joe*$_1$-nin Sue-ka conkjəngha-nin əməni -eke
Top SM respect Rel mother to
[*caki*$_1$-ka / *caki*$_1$-lil] cohaha-nin jəca -lil sokayha -əss -ta
Rec woman OM introduce Past Dec
'Joe introduced to the mother, whom Sue respects, the woman
[he liked / who liked him] (or herself).'
əməni ⟨-coref⟩ caki (əməni is an oblique obj)
Sue ⟨-coref⟩ caki (Sue does not command caki)



If the relative head noun is [−Hum], the deleted subject of the relative clause is readily filled by the main clause subject:

(43) ki ai -nin cohaha-nin imak -lil til -əss -ta
the child Top like Rel music OM listen Past Dec
'The child listened to the music he liked.'



The noun *imak* 'music' cannot be the subject of the relative sentence to 'like anything.' *Caki* instead of ϕ refers to the higher subject emphatically, emphatically in the sense of separating *caki* (=ki ai) from others from the speaker's point of view. Thus, it does not seem to have anything to do with the direct discourse in this case.

Let us turn to the subject relative clause. The relation between *caki* in the subject relative clause and an element clause cannot meet the conditions for our reflexive mechanism and no coreferentiality arises between them. Observe:

(44) **caki*$_i$-ka al -nin jəca -ka *ki* *namca*$_i$-lil cuki -əss -ta
know Rel woman SM the man OM kill Past Dec
'The woman he$_i$ knows hit the man$_i$.'(Intended)

(45) **caki*$_i$-lil cusiha-tən jəca -ka *ki* *namca*$_i$-lil ttayli-əss -ta
OM Rel woman SM the man OM hit Past Dec
'The woman who was watching him hit the man$_i$.'(Intended)



In English, unless an NP precedes and commands the antecedent NP, the latter may pronominalize the former. And this is what happened in the above translations.

(46) *$caki_i$-eke kkoch -lil cu -n jəca -ka *ki namca*$_i$-lil
to flower OM give Rel woman SM the man OM
kkocip-əss -ta
pinch Past Dec
'The woman who gave him$_i$ a flower pinched the man$_i$.'(Intended)

The initial *caki* in the subject relative sentences may have only the interpretation of deictic reference, or coreference with the relative head normally in case of an objective *caki* as in (45).

Even if we switch *caki* and *ki namca* 'the man' in the above sentences, their relation does not meet our reflexive conditions and they cannot be coreferential with each other as intended:

(47) **ki namca*$_i$-ka al -nin jəca -ka *caki*$_i$-lil ttayli-əss -ta
the man SM know Rel woman SM OM hit Past Dec
'The woman the man knows hit him.'(Intended)



Here *ki namca* is a preceding subject, but it does not command *caki* and fails to meet the reflexive condition.

(48) **ki namca*-lil po -n jəca -ka *caki*-lil cuki-əss -ta
OM see Rel woman SM OM kill Past Dec
'The woman who saw the man killed him.'(Intended)

(49) **ki namca*-eke kkoch -lil cu -n jəca -ka *caki*-lil kkocip -əss -ta
flower OMgive Rel woman SM OMpinch Past Dec
[+Past]

'The woman who gave the man a flower pinched him.'(Intended)

When the relative head is a [--Hum] noun, the same constraint holds:

(50) *$caki_1$-eke o -n sopho -ka Joe_1-eke tɨləo -əss -ta
come Rel parcel SM to come in Past Dec
[+Past]
'The parcel he sent reached Joe.'

(51) *$caki_1$-eke o -n sopho -ka Joe_1-eke tɨləo -əss -ta
come Rel parcel SM to come in Past Dec
[+Past]
'The parcel that came for him came in to Joe.'

(52)?*Joe_1-ka Sue-eke ponay -n sopho -ka $caki_1$-eke tɨləo -əss -ta
SM to send Rel parcel SM to come Past Dec
[+Past]
'The parcel Joe sent to Sue came in to him.'(Intended)

Caki can occur as a relative head noun, which is impossible in English:

(53) Joe-ka Sue -lɨl salangha-tən *caki-* lɨl h ø sangha-əss -ta
SM OM love Rel[+Past] OM recall Past Dec
'Joe recalled his self who had been in love with Sue.'



The original relative head noun Joe deletes the subject in the relative clause under identity and in the second cycle reflexivization occurs. This modified *caki*, therefore, cannot be in the main clause subject postition, in which case there would be no subject of a sentence which commands *caki*.

4. In Passive

(54) a. Sue-ka Joe-lil cha -əss -ta
SM OM kick Past Dec
'Sue kicked Joe.'

b. Joe-ka Sue-eke cha -i -əss -ta
SM by kick Pass Past Dec
'Joe was kicked by Sue.'

The above two sentences are related in such a way as they are synonymous except for presupposition and focus which, we assume, can be assigned after Passive in correlation with some underlying structure. This relation can be stated in the following rule:

Tpass SD: [NP X NP V]s
[-psych]
1 2 3 4
SC: 3 2 1-eke 4
[+Past]

The subject (agent) and the direct object are switched, the switched agent being marked by the agent marker -eke. The passive marker will be attached to a passive verb. Only non-psych verbs can undergo Passive.

Now let us consider how this operation is interwined with reflexivization.

(55) a. Sue$_i$-ka *caki*$_i$-lil kkocip -əss -ta
SM OM pinch Past Dec
'Sue pinched herself.'

b. **caki*$_i$-ka *Sue*$_i$-eke kkocip -I -əss -ta
SM Agt pinch Pass Past Dec
'Self$_i$ was pinched by Sue$_i$.'

c.?* *Sue*$_i$-ka *caki*$_i$- eke kkocip-I -əss -ta
SM Agt pinch Pass Past Dec
'Sue was pinched by herself.'

The ungrammaticality of sentence (55c) shows that some sort of Crossover Principle applies to the Passive movement in Korean. However, the following sentence suggests the inclusion of the Ross's 'Mention' condition in the Principle:

(56) *Sue*$_i$-ka *caki*$_i$- oppa -eke kkocip -I -əss -ta
SM self brother Agt pinch Pass Past Dec
'Sue$_i$ was prinched by her$_i$ brother.'

In other words, the original item of *caki* in the sentence is not a mentioned NP to move in the structural description of the Passive transformation. That is why there could be reflexivization after the Passive cross-over of the Clause Mate coreferential NPs.

The following data suggest that (1) the Cross-Over Principle is at work in Passive movement and (2) reflexivization is to apply after passivization.

(57) a. *Sue*$_{\text{I}}$-nin *Joe*$_{\text{II}}$-ka *caki*$_{\text{I}}$-lil kkocip-nin kəs -lil silhəha-əss -ta
Top SM OM pinch Rel Comp OM dislike Past Dec

b. *Sue*$_{\text{I}}$-nin *caki*$_{\text{I}}$-ka Joe-eke kkocip-I -nin kəs -lil silhəha-əss -ta
Top SM to pinch Pass Rel Comp N OM dislike Past Dec

'Sue disliked (her) being pinched by Joe.'



Because of the Cross-Over Principle the following ungrammaticality occurs:

(58) *Sue-nin *Joe*$_{\text{I}}$-ka *caki*$_{\text{I}}$-eke kkocip-I -nin kəs -lil silhəha-əss -ta
Top SM Agt pinch Pass Rel Comp OM dislike Past Des
'Sue disliked Joe's being pinched by himself.'

However, *caki* in the same sentence may refer to Sue with a better grammaticality. Consider:

(59) a. ?*Sue*$_{\text{I}}$-nin Joe-ka *caki*$_{\text{I}}$-eke kkocip-I -nin kəs -lil silhəha-əss -ta
Top SM Agt pinch Pass Rel Comp OM dislike Past Dec
'Sue disliked Joe's being pinched by her.'

Consider this with the following which has the active embedded sentence.

b. *Sue*$_{\text{I}}$-nin (*caki*$_{\text{I}}$-ka) Joe-lil kkocip-nin kəs -lil silhəha-əss -ta
Top SM OM pinch Rel Comp OM dislike Past Dec
'Sue disliked (her) pinching Joe.'

c.?*Sue_i-nin $caki_i$-eke conkjəng pat -ko iss-nin sising -lil manna -əss -ta
Top Agt respect Pass Prog Rel teacher OMmeet Past Dec
'Sue met the teacher who is respected by her.'

The slight unnaturalness of sentence (59a) calls for something like the Passive constraint: 'in a complex sentence, the subject NP of a verb which commands a complement sentence or relative clause cannot be a coreferent of the passivized by-phrase.'[9] If *caki* in (59a) is replaced by a person noncoreferent to the higher subject, for instance, *nam* (other person), the sentence is perfectly grammatical. However, if the commanded passive clause has a clearer sense of being adversely affected, the unnaturalness proportionally decreases (Cf., the ungrammaticality of (59c), in which the passive has no sense of adverse affectedness). Particularly, when the embedded passive clause has the object of inalienable part of the passive subject, unnaturalness almost disappears. Consider:

(60) Sue_i-nin Joe-ka $caki_i$-eke palmok-lil cap -I -əss -ta -ko
Top SM ankle OM grab Pass Past Dec Quot
malha-əss -ta
say Past Dec
'Sue said that Joe got his ankle grabbed by her.'

What is clear from the above analysis is that *caki* in the embedded passive may or may not be coreferential with its commanding subject depending on whether the passive has the sense of adverse affectedness, and this distinction suggests that at least the last type of passive construction could derive from a complex underlying structure.

5. In Topicalization and Multiple Constructions

5.1. *In Topicalization*

The process of topicalization in Korean consists of moving a constituent out of a sentence to its initial position (Chomsky-adjunction involves here, which will be demonstrated later on) and attaching the Topic marker *nin* to the topicalized constituent. Our contention is that simple preposing and a topicalization movement are two different processes. First of all, a topicalized consituent shows its relation to

9. In John Grinder and paul M. Postal, 'Missing Antecedents', *Linguistic Inqiury* 3:2 (1972).

the whole sentence rather than to the associated verb alone. Secondly, there is a slight pause or suspension between a topicalized element and the rest of the sentence. Thirdly, a topicalized element is a topic that is known to or supposed by the speaker and the hearer.

Observe the following:

(61) a. *ki salam*$_{i}$-ka *caki*$_{i}$-lil mangchi-əss -ta
the man SM OM ruin Past Dec
'The man ruined himself.'

b. *ki salam*$_{i}$-nin *caki*$_{i}$-lil mangchi-əss -ta
the man Top OM ruin Past Dec
'As for the man, he ruined himself.'

In (61a) *ki salam*, followed simply by SM, is either a neutral unmarked description without supposition just as in an embedded sentence, or an emphatic information. In the latter case the predicate is the Topic.

(Cf., *caki*$_{i}$-lil mangchi-n salam-nin *ki salam*$_{i}$-i -ta
OM ruin Rel man Top the man be Dec
'The one who ruined oneself is the man.')

In (61b) the topicalized *ki salam* is the topic which the speaker is talking about under the supposition that it is known to the hearer, and the following part is the comment. Therefore, the condition for Topicalization must be, in the speaker's suppositional structure, something like, "There is some NP and I assume you know the existence of the NP and if I talk about that NP among other things..." And an NP which is coreferential with that definite NP must come out from the underlying proposition. Any hypothesis that maintains an underlying Topic node (whether it is a Topic or an NP (as suggested by Shopen)) is ultimately unnatural because it destroys the natural sentential form and fails to represent meaning any way. A generic expression is possible through topicalization of an NP without any demonstrative assoicated with the noun.[10]

salam-nin cəc-ppali-tongmul-i -ta
man Top mammal be Dec
'Man is a mammal.'

When topicalization is applied to the subject, movement does not change order of elements. The topic marker is mutually exclusive with SM and OM. Therefore, the surface SM and OM assignment rule must follow the Topic marker *nin* introduction rule. However, if the marker *nin* is attached to an element of a sentence and the element does not move to the front, it represents contrastive meaning:

10. Details on Topicalization, studied separately, cannot be put here.

(62) ki salam-ka caki-*nin* mangchi-əss -ta
the man SM Cont ruin Past Dec
'The man ruined himself (but not X).'

must be followed by '... But he did not ruin other (or X),' or something equivalent to it must be understood. Consider:

(63) **caki*-nin *ki salam*-ka mangchi-əss -ta
Topthe man SM ruin Past Dec
'As for himself, he ruined.'(Intended)

If the objective *caki* is topicalized, it cannot be coreferential with the subject any longer. It can be a deictic person in the non-linguistic or previous context.

(64) *caki*$_{i}$-lil *ki salam*$_{i}$-ka mangchi-əss -ta
OM the man SM ruin Past Dec
'Himself, he ruined.'

In a simple fronting of (64) *caki* can still be coreferential with *ki salam*, the OM still showing its association with the verb rather than with the whole sentence, violating the Cross-over Principle. Simple fronting accompanies some emphasis.

(65) ki jəca -nin ki salam-ka mangchi-əss -ta
the woman Topthe man SM ruin Past Dec
'As for the woman, the man ruined her.'

Cf. ki salam-ka ki jəca -lil mangchi-əss -ta
the man SM the woman OM ruin Past Dec
'The man ruined the woman.'

In Korean, there is no clear dislocation process which is found in English.[11] *Ki jəca* (the woman), topicalized from the object, shows its relation to the whole sentence. It is the Topic of the sentence, and the rest is the comment. Its relational meaning associated with the verb, therefore, must be interpreted in DS. The oblique object undergoes the same process:

(66) ki jəca -nin ki salam-ka kkoch -lil cu -əss -ta
the woman Topthe man SM flower OM give Past Dec
'As for the woman, the man gave her a flower.'

---

11. The subject person, however, shows slight tendency of dislocation:

ki ai -nin *caki*-ka ka -əss -ta
the child Top SM go Past Dec
'The child, he himself went.'

This use of *caki*, however, is marginal.

Cf. ki salam-ka ki jəca -eke kkoch -lil cu -əss -ta
theman SM the woman to flower OM give Past Dec
'The man gave a flower to the woman.'

A real Topic seems to have *nin* without other relational markers attached to it. Observe the difference between (66) and the following contrastive instance:

(67) ki salam-ka ki jəca -eke *-nin* kkoch -lil cu -ess -ta
the man SM thewoman to Cont flower OM give Past Dec
'The man gave a flower to her (but not to X).'

The *nin* here, with the relational formative *eke* still attached, has a purely contrastive meaning, while (66) does not have any contrastive sense. Therefore, when we topicalize any constituent with a relational formative, we must wipe out the formative first and later attach the Topic marker.[12]

Now observe further the effect of topicalization on coreferentiality:

(68) i. *ki salam*$_1$-nin *caki*$_1$-ka mangchi-əss -ta
the man Top SM ruin Past Dec
Cf. (61b)
'As for the man$_1$, self$_1$ ruined.'

ii. **ki salam*$_1$-lil caki$_1$-ka mangchi-əss -ta
the man OM SM ruin Past Dec
'The man, he ruined.'

In (68i), the topicalized *ki salam* came out of the object position and reflexivized the following subject. A simply fronted object with the OM does not reflexivize the subject as in (68 ii). If we give a similar example:

(69) i. *ki jəca*$_1$-nin *caki*$_1$-ka cuk-i-əss -ta
the woman Top SM kill Past Dec
'As for *the woman*$_1$, *self*$_1$ killed(her).'

---

12. This deletion can be avoided if we assume that in DS we have only NP's instead of PP's as major lexical categories and then markers or post-positions are attached or segmentalized as needed. In this case, rule ordering of (1) Topicalization and (2) Marker or Post-position attachment (or segmentalization) is necessary. Most Korean post-positions such as *e kwan-ha* (concerning) have complex sentential sources. English prepositions such as 'on' show not only a grammatical relation but also a spatial relation. However, this does not rule out the possiblility of treating them as features of nouns and segmentalizing them out. I indicated the contrastive sense of *nin* in the S internal position to Fillmore at the outset of his syntax class (1970).

ii. *ki jəca$_i$-lil caki$_i$ -ka cuk-i-əss -ta
the woman OM SM kill Past Dec
'The *woman*$_i$, *self*$_i$ killed.'

The non-coreferentiality in (63) and coreferentiality in (64), and the coreferentiality in (68 i), (69 i), and non-coreferentiality in (68 ii), (69 ii) come from the fact that topicalization and simple fronting are different structural changes. Thus, we assign the following derived tree structures to different operations, which correctly fit our reflexive mechanism:



From the same DS (61a), when we simply front the object *caki*-lil (OM) it can still be coreferential with the subject *ki salam*-ka (SM) (64), showing that there has not been change in domination condition. If the object *caki* is topicalized to *caki-nin* (Top), it cannot be coreferential with the subject NP any more (63). This difference is well accounted for by having Topicalization as an S node creation of Chomsky-adjunction which brings about change in sentential dominance relation between the Topicalized NP and the subject of the sentence. The subject cannot command the Topic any longer. On the other hand, in an unmoved order for (68 i) and (68 ii):

(68) iii *caki$_i$-ka ki salam$_i$-lil mangchi-əss -ta
SM the man OM ruin Past Dec

the subject *caki* and object NP's are not coreferential with each other. Therefore, an immediate consequence is that we have to wait for the operation of Topicalization, for which we have a Topicalization triggering suppositional structure in the underlying structure, before we can determine reflexive coreferentiality. Incidentally, in order to get a Topic with which a subject *caki* is coreferential, it is inevitable for

an NP to cross over a coreferential NP. The passive sentence in which the agent is a reflexive, however, is out, as we have already observed. So the power of the Cross-over constraint must be constrained to the Passive and other specific clearer cases.

Another construction that gives clear evidence to movement of coreferential elements is the focus construction. Observe the following:

(70) a. *caki*$_i$-lil mangchi-əss -nin kəs -nin *ki jəca*$_i$ -i -ta
OM ruin Past Rel Pro Top the woman Cop Dec
'It is the woman that ruined herself.'

b. *ki jəca*$_i$ -ka mangchi-əss -nin kəs -nin *caki*$_i$-i -ta
the woman ruin Past Rel Pro Top SM Cop Dec
'It is herself that the woman ruined.'

c. **caki*$_i$-ka mangchi-əss -nin kəs -nin *ki jəca*$_i$ -i -ta
SM Past Pro Top the woman Cop Dec

d.?? ki jəca$_i$ -lil mangcti-əss -nin kəs-nin caki$_i$-i -ta
the woman OM ruin Past Rel Pro Top Cop Dec

We can not get the above reflexives from the surface structure because the constituent structure of the coreferential NPs does not meet the reflexivization conditions. Reflexivization occurs before movement at the stage where the following sentence is in the underlying structure:

(71) *ki jəca*$_i$-ka *ki jəca*$_i$-lil mangchi-əss -ta
SM OM Past Dec

After reflexivization, if we move out the underlying subject to the focus position we get (70a) and if we move out the reflexivized object we get (70b). We cannot reflexivize the subject in (71) and the ungrammaticality of (70c) is self-evident. Schacter (1973) also gave a covincing argument for the necessity of movement in an analogous English construction.

Caki can be coreferential with a preceding Wh Q subject. However, a Wh Q word cannot be topicalized because it is not Definite and *caki* cannot refer to any such ungrammatical Topic. Observe the following:

(72) a. *nu*$_i$ -ka *caki*$_i$-lil mangchi-əss -ninja?
who SM OM ruin Past Q
'Who ruined himself?'

b. *nu*$_i$ -ka *caki*$_i$-ka ch ϕ ko-i -ta -ko sayngkakha-ninja?
who SM SM best be Dec Quot think Q
'Who$_i$ thinks that self$_i$ (he) is the best?

(73) a. **nuku*$_i$-nin *caki*$_i$-ka mangchi-əss -ninja?

who Top SM ruin Past Q
'Who$_i$ did self$_i$ (he) ruin?'

Cf.b. *ki*$_i$-nin caki$_i$-ka mangchi-əss -ta
he Top SM ruin Past Dec
'Him$_i$, self$_i$ ruined.'

5.2. *In Psychological Predicate Construction*

Let us move to another movement crucially relevant to coreferentiality. Consider coreferentiality in the following sentences.

SD: $[NP_i\ [[Np_iX]_S\ N]_{NP}\ Y\ \begin{Bmatrix}[+Concept]\\[+Potent]\end{Bmatrix}\ V\ ]_S$

1 2 3 4 5 6
SC: 1 ϕ 3 4 5 6

Therefore, if the above deleted subject is replaced by *caki* as the subject of an embedded S, it becomes emphatic or sometimes awkward, and if the object of the complement S is also *caki*, the following double reflexive situation arises:

Cf. (82) b. *Sue*$_i$-nin [*caki*$_i$-ka *caki*$_i$-lil tolpo -nin kəs] -ka
Top SM OM take careRel Comp SM
swip-əss -ta
easy Past Dec
'As for Sue, it was easy for her to take care of herself.'

Both cases of *caki* refer to the Topic of the sentence (asserted coreference), making the two *caki*'s coreferential with each other. The same situation holds in the flipped position for either the deleted subject or *caki*.

Cf. (82) a. [*caki*$_i$-ka *caki*$_i$-lil tolpo-nin kəs]-ka *Sue*$_i$-eke swip-əss-ta
'It was easy for Sue to take care of herself.'

The complement subject deletion or reflexivization rule, therefore, must precede the Flip by this hypothesis.

Let us state the Topicalization process:

Topic SD: # $_S$[Top X NP Z] Y
1 2 3 4 5 6
SC:(1) 1 ϕ 3 4 5 6
[+Top]

(2) 4 1 3 ϕ 5 6
[+Top]

(74) a. *caki*$_i$-ka *ki*$_i$-eke-nin wənmangsiləp -əss -ta
SM he to blamable Past Dec
'He himself$_i$ was blamable to him$_i$.'
'Self$_i$ was blamed by him$_i$.'

b. *ki*$_i$-nin *caki*$_i$-ka wənmangsiləp-əss -ta
he Top SM blamable Past Dec
'To him$_i$, self$_i$ was blamable.'
'As for him$_i$, self$_i$ was blamed by him$_i$.'

(75) *ki$_i$-ka *caki*$_i$-eke wənmangsiləp -əss -ta
he SM to blamable Past Dec
'He was blamable to himself.'

(76) **caki*$_i$-ka *ki*$_i$-eke cungəlkəli -əss -ta
SM he to mumble Past Dec
'Self$_i$ mumbled to him$_i$.'

(74b)



(74a)



Compare (76) with (74a). In (74a) *caki* and *ki* are coreferential, whereas in (76) they are not. From sentence (76) we cannot topicalize the *eke* NP to form a construction analogous to (74b) with grammaticality. The difference comes form the fact that in (71a) the verb is a psychological verb requiring an Experiencer (*ki*) whereas in (76) the verb is a non-psychlogical, action verb requiring an Agent (*caki*).[13] What

13. An analogous phenomenon in complex S in Japanese is said to have been independently noticed by Akatsuka in the same 1969 when my Korean Reflexivization was done. However, this phenomenon in Simple S does not occur in Japanese. Rather, an S initial reflexive in the same kind of Experiencer-requiring simple S only refers to the speaker.

is remarkable here is that (74a) does not conform to our reflexive approximation. The intended antecedent, which is *ki* here, of *caki*, does not appear to be a subject. And the non-coferentiality between the apparent subject and the PP (75) is clear evidence that this is not an underlying order. If we want to keep (74a) as an underlying order, we are forced to make an exception to the reflexive rule only for the psychological verbs, which is a loss of generalization. Therefore, we can tentatively have Experiencer—Theme as an underlying order and operation of Flip of the *eke* (Experiencer) NP, which is most common. By this hypothesis, Reflexivization is applied at the stage before Flip, where the Reflexive SD is met, without any need for exceptions.

Consider further examples in this line:

(77) i . *caki*$_i$-lil po -n namca-ka *Sue*$_i$-eke mip -əss -ta
OM see Rel man SM to [+Psych] Past Dec
detestable
'The man who saw her was detestable to Sue.'

ii . *Sue*$_i$-nin [[*caki*$_i$-lil po -n] namca] -ka mip -əss -ta
Top OM see Rel man SM detestable Past Dec
'As for Sue, the man who saw her was detestable to her.'

(78) i . **caki*$_i$-lil manna-n namca-ka *Sue*$_i$-lil chacaka-əss -ta
OM meet Rel man SM OM visit Past Dec
'The man who met her$_i$ visited Sue$_i$.'(Intended)

ii . *Sue*$_i$-nin *caki*$_i$-lil manna-n namca-ka chacaka-əss -ta
Top OM meet Rel man SM visit Past Dec
'As for Sue, the man who met her visited her.'



(79) i . *[[*caki*$_i$-lil po - n] namca] -ka *Sue*$_i$-eke tol -lil tənci -əss -ta
OMsee Rel man SM to stone OM throw Past Dec
'The man who saw her$_i$, threw a stone to Sue$_i$.'(Intended)

ii . **Sue*$_i$-eke [[*caki*$_i$-lil po -n] namca] -ka tol -lil tənci - əss - ta
to OM see Rel man SM stone OM throw Past Dec
'To Sue$_i$, the man who saw her$_i$, threw a stone.'(Inended)

iii. *Sue_i-nin [[$caki_i$-lil po - n] namca]-ka tol -lil tənci-əss -ta
Top OM see Rel man SM stone OM throw Past Dec
(From the verb *tənci*, *-eke* is not predictable and without it, the topicalized S (79iii) is not conceivable.)

As in the case of a simple sentence, *caki* in a relative clause whether it takes the subject case or the object case can be coreferential with the Topic of its main clause. However, in (77 i) *Sue-eke* in the predicate can be coreferential with *caki* in the relative clause (even though with some strain because of the human relative head noun) since the main clause verb is [+Psych], whereas *Sue-lil* and *Sue-eke* in (78 i) and (79 i) cannot be, since the main clause verb is [−Psych]. The latter cases can be coreferential when the antecedents are topicalized.

Let us examine the phenomenon in complement clauses. Observe:

(80) a. [Sue-ka $caki_i$-lil palapo-nin kəs] -ka Joe_i-eke cilkəp -əss -ta
SM OM look at Rel Comp SM pleasant Past Dec
Pres N
'Sue's looking at him was pleasing to Joe.'

(80a)



(80)b. *[Sue-ka Joe_i-lil palapo -nin kəs] -ka $caki_i$-eke cilkəp -əss -ta
SM OM look at Rel Comp SM to pleasant Past Dec
'Sue's looking at Joe_i was pleasing to $self_i$.'

c. Joe_i-nin [Sue-ka $caki_i$-lil palapo -nin kəs] -ka cilkəp -əss -ta
Top SM OM look at Rel Comp SM pleasant Past Dec
'As for Joe, he was pleasant about Sue's looking at him.'

(80c)



d. *Joe*$_i$-ka [Sue-ka *caki*$_i$-lil palapo -nin kəs] -ka cilkəp -əss -ta
SM SM OM look at SM pleasant Past Dec
'Joe was pleasant about Sue's looking at him.'

(81) a i . [Sue-ka *caki*$_i$-lil salangha-nin kəs] -ka *Joe*$_i$-eke punmjəngha-əss -ta
SM OM love Rel Comp SM to certain Past Dec
'That Sue loves him was certain for Joe.'

a ii . [*caki*$_i$-ka Sue-lil salangha-nin kəs] -ka Joe$_i$-eke punmjəngha-əss -ta
SM OM love Rel Comp SM to certain Past Dec
'That he loves Sue was certain for Joe.'

b i . *Joe*$_i$-nin [Sue-ka *caki*$_i$-lil salangha-nin kəs] -ka punmjəngha -əss -ta
Top SM OM love Rel Comp SM certain Past Dec
'As for joe, he was certain that Sue loves him.'

b ii . *Joe*$_i$-nin [*caki*$_i$-ka Sue-lil salangha-nin kəs]-ka punmjəngha-əss -ta
Top SM OM love Rel Comp certain Past Dec
'As for Joe, he was certain that he loves Sue.'

(82) a. *caki*$_i$-lil tolpo -nin kəs -ka Sue$_i$-eke swip-əss -ta
OM take care Rel Comp SM to easy Past Dec
'To take care of herself was easy for Sue.'

b. *Sue*$_i$-nin *caki*$_i$-lil tolpo -nin kəs -ka swip-əss -ta
Top OM take care Rel Comp SM easy Past Dec
'As for Sue, it was easy for her to take care of herself.'

If Top is chosen in the Base in correlation with the speaker's suppositional structure I have proposed, then it assigns the feature [+Top] to the element to be topicalized by (1) and then the Topic feature assigned element will be Chomsky-adjoined to its immediately dominanting S. A previous difficulty with this movement approach was the question of which NP is going to be topicalized. There must be some device

in the Base predetermining which element is to be topicalized, such as indexing, and this can be done by specifying coreference with the correlated NP in the suppositional structure (in this case we do not even need the device Topic in the rule) and simple identity deletion is a possible but less interesting solution. The process can be handled by movement. It is necessary to show the semantic notion of Topic and the syntactic behavior of movement properly. Only one NP is permitted to be topicalized in a sentence.

5.3. *In Moved Clauses*

We have already observed that simple fronting of a constituent does not affect any dominance relation relevant to our Reflexive mechanism. The constituent involved can be not only the non-sentential NP but also sentential elements like subordinate conjunction, object complement S and relative clause. Consider the following:

5.3.1. *From a subordinate conjunction*: Cf. (Ⅱ.1)

Ray-ka *caki*$_{i}$-lil piphanha-ca *Joe*$_{i}$-ka əlitungcəlha -əss -ta
SM OM criticize P SM embarrassed Past Dec
'As Ray criticized him, Joe was embarrassed.'

This coreferentiality is possible only with slight strain.



(83) a. *caki*$_{i}$-lil tolpo -l sayngkak -ka *Sue*$_{i}$-eke əps -əss - ta
OM take care Rel idea SM to not be Past Dec
'There was no idea of taking care of herself with Sue.'
'Sue had no idea of taking care of herself.'

b. *Sue*$_i$-nin *caki*$_i$-lil tolpo -l sayngkak-ka əps -əss -ta
Top OM take care Rel idea SM not Past Dec
'As for Sue, there was no idea of taking care of herself with her (in her mind).'

If we adopt the Flip hypothesis, the above psychological verbs must have the lexical specification of [Experiencer [Stimulus]...]. First, Adjectives of emotion like that of (80) can have the surface subject of the Experiencer like d, which is the case with groups (82) and (83) also, whereas group (81) cannot take the surface subject of the Experiencer. In the latter case, therefore, we need to operate either Flip or Topicalization. Examples: *kkəlimcikha* 'uneasy', *komap* 'thankful', *ənccanh* 'un-pleasant', *mianha* 'sorry', *aswip* 'desirous', *cilkəp* 'pleasant'... Second, Adjectives of factual claim: *punmjəngha* 'certain', *hwaksilha* 'sure', *thillim-əps* 'doubtless', *ppənha* 'obvious'... Third, Adjectives of Conception and Possessive Existence: *na* 'come out', 'occur' (idea, memory, etc.), *ttəoli* 'come to mind'... Fourth, Adjectives of Potentiality: *swip* 'easy', *əliəp* 'difficult', *t ϕ* 'become'... Incidentally, in groups (82), (83) the complement sentence subject is necessarily identical with the higher Experiencer NP. And it deletes. Interpretively speaking, these verbs take the obligatory subject control.

5.3.2. *From an object complement clause:* Cf. (Ⅱ.2)

(84) Sue-ka *caki*$_i$-lil cohaha-nin kəs -lil Jay$_i$-ka al -əss -ta
SM OM like Comp OM SM know Past Dec



5.3.3. *From a relative clause: Cf. (Ⅱ.3)*

(85) [*caki*$_i$-eke kkoch-lil cu -n namca] -lil *ki* *jəca*$_i$ -ka kil-esə manna
to flower OM give Rel man OM the woman SM meet



Now we can safely argue that Korean anaphoric reflexivization is applied before simple fronting of an element of the sentence and it could be a unidirectional forward process as Ross argued for English reflexivization. The commonly known reflexivization applies when the effect of some action returns to its agent, and in most cases, it is limited to the simplex sentence. It is an interesting fact that the Korean *caki* assumes the role of reflexivization and part of the role of pronominalization of the English counterparts. This suggests that pronominalization and reflexivization are closely interrelated and basically similar processes.

5.4. *Topicalization and Relativization: Their Relatedness*

In the following argument, we will demonstrate the ultimate similarity between Topicalization and Relativization through sharing constraints on reflexivization. Let us put (44) and (45) here:

(45) **caki*$_1$-ka al -nin jəca -ka *ki* *namca*$_1$ -lil cuki-əss -ta
SM know Rel woman SM the man OM kill Past Dec
'The woman he knows killed the man.'(Intended)

(86) a. **caki*$_1$-lil po -n jəca -ka *ki* *namca*$_1$-eke kkoch-lil - cu -əss-ta
OM see Rel woman SM the man to flower OM give Past Dec
'The woman who saw him gave him a flower.'

We have already observed non-coreferentiality in the above sentences. But once we relativize the main clause object *ki namca* (the man):

From (44): *caki*$_1$-ka al -nin jəca -ka cuki-n *ki* *namca*$_1$ (A)
SM know Rel woman SM kill Rel the man

'The man$_i$ whom the woman whom self$_i$ (=he) knows killed.'
(Intended)

From (45): *caki*-lil cusiha-tən jəca -ka ttayli -n *ki namca*
OM watch Rel woman SM hit Rel the man
'The man$_i$ whom the woman who watched self$_i$ (=him) hit.'
(Intended)

Caki in the original relative clause dramatically becomes coreferential with the newly relativized head noun *ki namca*. This fact corresponds to coreferentiality in the topicalized sentence:

(86) b. *ki namca*$_i$ nin *caki*$_i$ -lil po -n jəca -ka kkoch -lil cu -əss -ta
Top OM see Rel woman SM flower OM give Past Dec
'AS for the man, the woman who saw him gave a flower.'



Then, how shall we state the condition for coreferentiality between *caki* and the relative head? The relation as it stands does not meet our reflexive conditions, since the relative head can function not only as subject as in (83a), but also as any case of the upper sentence as in (83b) (object here).

(87) a. *caki* -lil cusiha-tən jəca -ka ttayli -n *ki namca*-ka
OM watch Rel woman SM hit Rel the man SM
miin -lil cuki-əss -ta
beauty OM kill Past Dec
'The man whom the woman who was watching him hit, killed a beauty.'

(87) b. ai-ka *caki*$_i$-lil cusiha-tən jəca -ka ttayli -n
SM OM watch Rel woman SM hit Rel
ki namca$_i$-lil po -əss -ta
OM see Past Dec
'The child saw the man whom the woman who was watching him hit.'

(87a)



(87b)



In sentence (87b), the relative head is not a subject and it is on the right side of the reflexive *caki*. This is different from the reflexive behavior we have observed. Then, shall we have reflexivization at the stage where the noun identical with the relative head still remains in the object position of the immediately lower sentence? However, we have already observed that the head noun (*namca*) and the reflexive (*caki*) in the lower sentence cannot be coreferential and it does not meet the reflexivization conditions. Then we are forced to create a new rule for the relative clause reflexivization, which would cause the loss of a significant generalization about Korean reflexivization. On the other hand, it was noted that if the object noun in the relative clause is topicalized it becomes coreferential with the reflexive in the lowest sentence. Therefore, we can set up an intermediate stage of topicalization for relativization. Then, the topicalized NP becomes the antecedent of the following identical NP in the lowest clause to reflexivize it. This topicalized NP is obligatorily erased after reflexivization under identity with the relative head. This is strong

syntactic case which shows the necessity of providing a stage of topicalization before relativization to make a significant generalization about conditions on Korean reflexivization and at the same time about the relatedness between topicalization and relativization. Intuitively, unconsciously in our mind, we tend to put the relative head noun back in the topic position of the embedded relative clause when we want to make sure about the function of the relative head noun in the embedded clause.[14]

The interpretive semantics position cannot handle this situation since it does not permit expanding structures, and drawing the Topic from the Relative head interpretively is a repetition of Topicalization backward, complicating grammar unneces-

14. One difficulty in this approach of the intermediate Topic is that the subject *caki* in the relative clause can be coreferential with the Topic NP which moved out of the same clause but it can hardly be coreferential with its immediate relative head noun. Consider:

1. kɨ jəca$_i$ -nɨn caki$_i$-ka kkocip-əss -ta
   the woman Top SM pinch Past Dec
   'As for her, she pinched herself.'

2.?**caki$_i$*-ka kkocip-ɨn *kɨ jəca$_i$*
   SM pinch Rel the woman
   'The woman$_i$ whom she herself$_i$ pinched.'

However,

3. caki$_i$-ka *caki$_i$* -lɨl kkocip -ɨn *kɨ jəca$_i$*
   SM OM pinch Rel the woman
   'The woman$_i$ who self$_i$ pinched self$_i$.'

Here, *kɨ jəca* must be moved out from the subject position to be Chomsky-adjoined and to get a dislocation construction. Only the subject NP can be moved out to be dislocated. Observe:

4. **kɨ jəca$_i$*-nɨn kɨ namca-ka *caki$_i$*-lɨl kkocip-əss-ta

Cf. **caki$_i$*-ka *kɨ jəca$_i$* -lɨl kkocip -əss -ta
   SM the woman OM pinch Past Dec
   'Self$_i$ pinched her$_i$.'



sarily. Whether Topicalization consists of copying plus deletion or it is just a one--stage chopping the topicalized NP is deleted under identity with the Relative head noun.

5.5. *Shadow Pronoun Hypothesis*

Alternatively, we can think of having the relative head noun on the left of the clause that will be relativized so that reflexivization can apply in that position and the clause can be fronted obligatorily as suggested by Lakoff and Bach.[15] However, this obligatory S-preposing must be better motivated in the grammar of Korean. The relative head in its position cannot meet the subject condition of Korean Reflexivization. By topicalizing the NP that will be relativized in the S NP position, we can still have both reflexivization and pronominal deletion in the forward direction conforming to Postal's (1970) hypothesis on the pronominal character of coreferentiality deletion. Particularly, in connection with the pronominal character of coreferentiality deletion, we can consider the possibility of applying Perlmutter's (1972) Pronoun Deletion hypothesis to Korean relativization (indeed, he treated Japanese relativization), having a copying and a subsequent pronominalized form left behind and its deletion. However, his argument that the "apparent" violations of island constraints in surface structure as some general constraints on the Pronoun Drop phenomena (deleting any pronoun in a simple S) with no island constraints is simply incorrect and misleading. First of all, all his examples from Kuno of grammatical relative clauses in which a noun phrase inside a syntactic island has been relativized are a strictly definable set of clauses in terms of the relationship between the lower relative head noun and the higher relative head noun: namely inalienability; the higher head noun must inalienably (mentally or physically) possess the lower head noun. Therefore, the higher head noun, which is in the scope of the

---

This simply exceptional case (2) may have to be handled by an output condition. This phenomenon suggests that a left-to-right coreferentiality is better than a coreferentiality on the right-to-left output position, particularly when the subject *caki* is meant to be coreferential with its immediate relative head.

Kuno (1973) hints at a Topic-embedded Relativization in Japanese, with no movement involved.

15. This was proposed by Bach in his lecture on "Universals of Transformational Rules" before the Indiana University Linguistics Club (1971). He cited Lakoff as arguing that all languages have the NP S order of the relative head and the clause in the underlying structure.

upper clause, is not available to decide whether it is deletable or not by Pronoun Drop in the lower clause. The constraint on relativizability necessarily refers to the syntactic island plus whether or not there exists inalienability between the two heads. Consider the following minimal pair:

(88) a. ssitatim-tən kay-ka *cuk*-in ai
pet Rel dog SM die Rel child
'The child that the dog that was petting died.'
'The child such that the dog that he was petting died.'

b. *ssitatim-tən kay-ka *cic*-in ai
bark
'The child that the dog that was petting barked.'
'The child such that the dog that he was petting barked.'

When the inalienability is possible but not obvious, even the higher relative predicate contributes to its establishment, with verbs like 'appear', 'disppear', 'found', 'lost', 'die', etc. Hence, the grammaticality of (88a). With other verbs like 'big', 'bark', etc., which have nothing to do with alienability, the higher relativized head noun cannot establish the necessary inalienability relation with the lower head noun. Hence, the ungrammaticality of (88b). A topicalized *ai* 'child' in (88a) and (88b) produces the same parallel results. If *caki* is left behind, it is intelligible but hardly acceptable, and if the pronominal *ki* is left behind it is worse. To save the island constraint, therefore, we can have suppositional structure defining the inalienable relation and subsequent transderivational constraint.[16] This point is certainly related to why the reflexive *caki* rather than a pronominal form like *ki* occasionally occurs in an island. The reflexive form occurs only when the subject or topic is conscious of his act or state, which will be discussed later. In other words, the lower relative head related to the higher head's act or state represented by the lower relative clause is possessed by the higher head in his consciousness in the speaker's suppositions. The pronominal copy hypothesis advocated by Perlmutter (and hinted by Sanders and Tai, Hankamer, and Keenan) has certain advantages of explaining Shadow Pronoun in French, marginal 'returning pronouns' in English, and very limited marginal pronominal trace in Korean. However, its grammatical cost of the obligatoriness of deletion of the problems is unsurmountable. We can see that if Relativization is operated only through Topicalization, Topicalization in this case is obligatory. This is natural, since we are claiming that Relativization is necessarily related to Topicaliz-

16. One might posit an intermediate possessor NP node in front of the lower head noun phrase so that topicalization movement can be based on that NP, obeying the constraint. Cf. Choon Kyn Oh (1969). He handles the possessor NP transformationally.

ation.[17] Once Topicalization is chosen, the sentence which contains it is formally distinct from the sentence which has not undergone the operation. The above Relativization instance seems to suggest that in linguistic theory there might not be any case of absolutely optional rule and there must be some transformation conditioning mechanism in the underlying structure, even if different logical structures for the pair of sentences related by the rule are not postulated.

5.6. *Output Phenomena*

On the competence level, an indefinite length of repeated left branching relativization is possible. We can have from (87a), relativizing *miin*:

(87a')



(89) caki$_i$-lil cusiha tən jəca -ka ttaylin namca-ka cukin miin$_i$
OM watch Rel woman SM hit Rel man SM kill Rel beauty
'The beauty$_i$ whom the man such that the woman whom she herself$_i$ watched hit.'

The *caki* in the lowest S is supposed to be coreferential with the Relative head noun

17. In this sense, Sanders and Tai's (1972) formulation of Relativization as coming through an optional application of Topicalization seems inadequate; they argue that Topicalization and Relativization are crucially related on one hand, and they formally represent Relativization as being optionally related on the other. Once Relativization is chosen, it must be the case that it has already involved Topicalization.

miin. However, this coreferentiality between *caki* and *miin* on the surface is not optimal and we need some strain to get the coreferentiality. The optimal degree for coreferentiality decreases as the lineal distance between *caki* and the Relative head noun increases because of the intervening other Relative head nouns on the surface structure. In (87a′) the less distant Relative head *namca* is better coreferential with *caki* than *miin*, and the least distant *jəca* is still better coreferential with *caki*. However, when the *miin* is in the Topic position it is optimally coreferential with the *caki* which immediately follows the Topic. Therefore, even if we operate Reflexivization not on the surface but in the intermediate structures for generality and explanatory reasons, it is conceivable to have something similar to output conditions as follows:

> Other things including semantic factors being equal, the coreferentiality between the antecedent NP and the reflexive *caki* is better (1) when the former and the latter are located left-to-right, and (2) when the distance between them is smaller.

Let us now test a little further how our Reflexive approximation works in multiple constructions and moved positions. Consider *caki* in the following:

(90) *Sue*$_{i}$-nin, *Mary*-ka *caki*-ka mək-tən pap -lil, Jay-ka sakwa-lil,
Top SM eat Rel rice OM SM appled
caki$_{i}$-ka pay-lil mək-əss -ta -nin kəs -lil. palk-hi -əss -ta
SM OM eat Past Dec Rel Comp OM disclose Past Dec
'Sue disclosed that Mary ate the rice that she had left, Jay the apples, and she (Sue) the pears.'



In this gapping (or also in conjunction) situation, whatever the distance from he subject or Topic of the matrix S to *caki* might be, the latter does not fail to refer back to the former. In accordance with our rule the first *caki* may refer to either Mary or Sue and the second *caki* refers only to Sue.

Consider the following sentence:

(91) *Mary*$_{i}$-ka *caki*$_{i}$ phal -lil kɨlk -ko John-to kɨli ha-əss -ta
SM arm OM scratch and too so do Past Dec
'Mary scratched her own arm and John did too (scratched his own arm).'



In the above conjunction construction, the VP of the latter conjunct cannot mean '(John) scratched her arm'; the Pro VP stands for the VP of the first conjunct '*caki phal-lil kɨlk*', which in the second conjunct can mean only 'scratched (his) own arm', in other words, *caki* in this case can refer only to John not Mary. This is expected from our mechanism. Observe further:

(92) Mary-ka kɨ sinsa -ɨj phal-lil kɨlk -ko
SM the gentleman is arm OM scratch and
John-to kɨli ha -əss -ta
too so do Past Dec
'Mary scratched the gentleman's arm and John did too.'

This time, the Pro VP of the second conjunct S stands for 'kɨ sinsa-ɨj phal-lil kɨlk (scratched the gentleman's arm)', referring to the identical object as the first VP does.

Extraposition of the object complement clauses does not seem to change any S dominance relation and does not change the coreferentiality of the reflexive to the Subject or Topic involved. The only points to be taken into account are the output conditions already set up.

(93) *Jay*-ka [Mary-ka [*caki*-ka ttwi-nɨn kəs] -lil po -əss -ta] -ko
SM SM SM run OM Past Dec see Comp
malha - əss -ta
say Past Dec
'Jay said that Mary saw herself (him) running.'



Sentential extraposition causes stylistic variations and does not basically change meaning.

(93) b. Jay-ka [*caki*-ka ttwi-nin kəs]-lil [Mary-ka po -əss -ta]
SM SM see Past Dec
-ko malha-əss -ta
Comp say Past Dec



(93) c. [Mary-ka [caki-ka ttwi-nin kəs]-lil po -əss -ta]
SM see Past Dec
-ko Jay-ka malha-əss -ta
SM say Past Dec



(93) d. caki-ka ttwi-nin-kəs-lil Mary-ka po -əss -ta -ko
SM SM see Past Dec Comp
Jay-ka malha-əss -ta
SM say Past Dec



In a), b), d), *caki* may be coreferential with either Jay or Mary. In a) of the underlying order, *caki* can be coreferential with Jay, the main clause subject, or Mary, the complement subject. In all the cases of b), c), and d) of the moved order, *caki* can be coreferential with either subject. Self-embedding of one cmplement clause can be permitted as a) just in case the lowest complement subject is coreferential with one of the higher subjects. If the number of self-embedded clauses is more than one, the sentence is not acceptable. This must be a limitation of performance coming from difficulty in matching the subject and the verb as intended:

[Subj [Subj [Subj V]$_1$ V]$_2$ V]$_3$

However, in the complement extraposed order any length of repeated complement S's are possible. Therefore, in DS we must be able to generate an indefinite number of self-embedded constructions and then apply complement extraposition, matching

the subjects to their respective verbs. If the subjects of complement sentences are delated under identity with the higher lexical subject, the sentence can be indefinitely long (as far as memory does not fail) even in the unmoved order.

(94) Sue-nin *caki*-lil piphanha-nin kəs -lil kjesokha-əss -ta
Top OMcriticize Comp OMcontinue Past Dec
nin-kəs -lil incəngha-əss -ta -nin kəs -lil kongkayha-əss -ta
Comp OM admit Past Dec Comp OM disclose Past Dec
nin-kəs -lil huh ϕ ha -əss -ta
Comp OM regret Past Dec



'Sue regretted that she disclosed that she admitted that she continued to criticize herself.'

The presupposition of the main clause verb *huh ϕ ha* 'regret', 'repeat' makes the main clause subject obligatorily identical to the immediately lower complement S subject.

And, *kjesokha* 'continue' has an obligatory subject control (i.e., ϕ_3 is obligatorily identical to ϕ_4). If the main clause verb is *pulphjəngha* 'complain', for instance, the subject NP of S_4 could be someone else than Sue, in which case normally the subject is specified. The Topic marker *nin* also plays an important role as a disambiguator: it is matched to the main verb in a complex S, the main clause subject is normally topicalized. If it is Sue-ka (SM), it could be attached to ϕ_2 or ϕ_3 position, and make the main clause subject a dummy, in which case Sue cannot be coreferential with the higher dummy. In the linear utterance of a sentence, as the perceptual horizon widens with different presuppositions of verbs, multiply possible interpretations seem to be narrowed down or corrected to the minimally ambiguous situation. With no regard to presuppositions of verbs or different complement subjects, however, the possiblility of coreferentiality of *caki* in the deep-most S with the main clause subject is constant. We have already shown that the possiblility of ambiguous readings of *caki* in other complex sentences is a consequence of cyclical application of reflexivization.

5.7. *Subsidiary Condition on Reflexivization*

Let us conclude the present investigation by adding a subsidiary constraint to our Reflexive mechanism. When the Topic NP of a sentence is not coreferential with the subject of the sentence, any following *caki* dominated by the same sentence is coreferential with the subject but not the Topic:

(95) Sue-nin Jay-ka *caki*-lil yhajə teliə-ka-əss-ta
Top SM OM
'As for Sue, Jay brought her for himself.'



This shows significant distinction between Topic and Subject. Sue in this case has been topicalized out of an object of the sentence. We have already observed that a Topic coming from an object can be coreferential with the following subject *caki*.

Therefore, we need to further constrain our Reflexivization.

The Refleivization Rule can be stated transformationally as follows:

When the Subject or Topic NP [+Hum, +III] of a sentence is in command with an instance of a following coreferential NP [+Hum, +III], the former reflexivizes the latter. If the Topic is not coreferential with its immediately following Subject, only that subject but not the Topic can reflexivize a following coreferential NP with which the Subject is in command.

6. Higher Cognitive Verb Approach

We have observed and analyzed Korean reflexivization mostly in structural terms. Kuno recently noticed an important semantic constraint on reflexivization in Japanese which could be relevant to Korean reflexivization. He presented the following ungrammatical Japanese sentence:

(96) *John$_i$-wa zibun$_i$ ga sinda toki, issen mo motte-inakatta.
self died when a penny having was not
'John did not have a penny when he died.'

It is claimed to be ungrammatical because the antecedent subject, John, cannot be aware of what the *zibun* clause represents. Observe a similar semantic anomaly in the following Korean example:

(97) a. ?*honsusangthay -e ppaci -əss -nin chəlsu$_i$-nin Yənghi-ka
comma fall in Past Rel Top SM
[+Past]
caki$_i$-lil cikhiə-po-nin kaunte sumci-əss -ta
OM watch Rel while die Past Dec
'Cholsoo, who fell in a coma, died while Younghee was watching him.'

Compare the above with the following:

b. wiphung- tangtangha-n chəlsu$_i$-nin Yənghi-ka caki$_i$-lil
stately looking Top SM OM
cikhiə-po-nin kaunte ssikssikha-ke ipcangha-əss -ta
watch while vigorously enter Past Dec
'Cholosoo, who looks stately, entered the hall in a vigorous manner while Younghee was watching him.'

However, Kuno failed to incorporate the semantic constraint into syntactic structure, losing a generalization of the subject antecedent and forward conditions on reflexivization. Observe the following:

(98) *caki*$_i$-ka ci -əss -ta -nin kəs ka *Chəlsu*$_i$-eke ki njəsək-ka
SM lose Past Dec Comp N SM Dative the fellow SM
caki$_i$pota se -ta -nin kəs-lil kalichi-əss -ta
than strongDec Comp N OM teach Past Dec
'That he lost taught Cholsoo that the fellow was stronger than he.'

Kuno would say (interpretively) that the first *caki* in the subject constituent sentence is coreferential with the following Dative Cholsoo and the second *caki* is also coreferential with the preceding Cholsoo in the matrix sentence, Cholsoo being aware of states or actions involved.

However, it is conceivable to seek some congenial representation of the phenomenon and one possible way is to suppose that an abstract cognitive verb COGNIZE with an identical subject is underlying immediately above the abstract (Complement S) subject of a psychological predicate.[18] If this hypothesis is adopted, the subject complement sentence of sentence (98) must come from:

(99) [Chəlsu$_i$ [Chəlsu$_i$ ci-əss-ta]$_S$ COGNIZE]$_S$

the embedded subject being relfexivized. And the predicate part of sentence (98) is analyzed into something like:

(100) NP NP NP V KKAYTAT]$_S$ HA]$_S$
[S [Chəlsu$_i$ [ki njəsək Chəlsu$_i$ -pota realize cause cause
V V

the most deeply embedded S being immediately dominated by a cognitive verb (*kkaytat*=realize) clause, coming from the analysis of *kalichi*=KKAYTAT-ke HA (cause to realize).[19] The subject of the cognitive verb, KKAYTAT, is raised into the matrix sentence as a surface dative since the lowest S as a whole becomes the object of the matrix S. If the predicte sentence of (98) is something like:

(101) Chəlsu-eke chungkjək - lil cu -əss -ta
to shock OM give Past Dec
'... gave Cholsoo a shock.'

---

18. If the verb *kalichi* is used in a psychological (emotive or cognitive) predicate, with an abstract subject complement S, the causative is necessarily implicative. In other words, sentence (98) entails 'Cholsoo *realized* that the fellow is stronger than he.' It shows a little difference in cosequence from the physical action verb *kalichi*, of which the consequence of learing can be resisted by the person who is supposed to learn.

19. I suggested this psychological causative decomposition possibility to James McCawley at the Buffalo Linguistic Institute (1971).

it comes from: VP V

(102) NP NP V
[Chəlsu chungkjək pat]$_S$ - ke HA]$_S$
cause

If the predicate is:

(103) Chəlsu - lil cəlmang -e ppa-ttili-əss -ta
OM desperation to put in Past Dec

it comes from

(104) NP PP V
[Chəlsu chəlmang -e ppa-ci]-ke HA]
desperation to fall in cause

These are still psychological (emotive) causative predicates, not physical act predicates. After the reflexivization in the abstract subject of a psychological predicate, the subject of the abstract verb COGNIZE deletes under identity with the following Experiencer in the psychological predicate. Then, the deletion of COGNIZE occurs, in absence of lexical realization. This treatment can explain the following distinction:

(105) *caki*$_i$-lil cohaha-nin namca-ij kowu-n maimssi-ka
OM like Rel man of tender heart SM
Yənghi$_i$-lil kamtongsikhi-əss -ta
move Past Dec
'The tender heart of the man who likes self (her)$_i$ moved Younghee$_i$.'

(106) *caki$_i$-lil cohaha-nin namca-ka Yənghi$_i$-lil ttayli-əss -ta
OM like Rel man SM OM hit Past Dec
'The man who likes self hit Younghee.'

A higher COGNIZE sentence dominates the abstract subject in sentence (105) but not in sentence (106).

An analogous case can be found in English pronominalization. Kuno argues against Lakoff's treatment of the following examples:[20]

(107) a.?*The idea that John$_i$ was sick worried him$_i$.

b. The idea that he$_i$ was sick worried John$_i$.

In Lakoff's proposal, sentence (107) is derived from some structure like

(107) c. [John's$_i$ ideating that [John$_i$ was sick]$_S$]$_S$ worried John$_i$.

20. See Susumo Kuno (1972).

Kuno's objection is that the following example does not have any additional verb like *ideate* and still shows an unaccountable awkwardness:

(108) a.?That John$_i$ was secretly in love with Mary worried him$_i$.

b. That he$_i$ was secretly in love with Mary worried John$_i$.

However, we can resolve the problem by having a higher abstract cognitive verb as follows:

(108) c. [John$_i$ COGNIZE [John$_i$ be secretly in love with Mary]] worried John$_i$].

Then, the second John$_i$ necessarily becomes *he* and the first John$_i$ is deleted under identity with the third John$_i$ and COGNIZE deletion applies. Kuno's proposal of direct discourse analysis, i.e., the representation of internal feelings must originate from a direct discourse containing "I", not a full-fledged NP, which must be subsequently changed to *he*, is intuitively plausible. But it involves the problem of recoverability. Postal's device of specifying such NP as [+1st Person] in the underlying structure could be an alternative without having to fully specify an often unreachable direct discourse situation.

Now, how can we block such an anomalous sentence as (107)? The only possible way is to posit a higher abstract cognitive verb for any felicitous occurrence of a *caki* clause. If this abstract verb occurs, we know that the subject (or sometimes Topic) of its immediately higher sentence is able to cognize the action or state of the *caki*-inclusive (after Reflexivization) clause. The subject of this intervening abstract verb will reflexivize its coreferential NP in the immediately lower S, and the subject will delete under identity with its higher subject (or Topic). Examine the following example:

(109) *ki miin*$_i$ -nin caki$_i$-lil cusiha-tən namca-ka teliə-ka -əss -ta
the beauty Top OM watch Rel man SM took away Past Dec
'The beauty$_i$, the man who was watching her$_i$ took away.'

Here, the beauty was conscious of the woman's watching her. The first relative clause must come from something like:

[[*ki miin*$_i$-[namca *ki miin*$_i$ cusiha]$_S$ COGNIZE]$_S$ namca]$_{NP}$

On the other hand, if we have a pronoun *kinjə* [-Masc, +III] in place of *caki* in (109), the beauty's being conscious of such action is not relevant. Pronominalization is not conditioned by a higher cognitive verb. Even though the factuality of the subject's internal awareness of his action or state is not a necessary condition for reflexivization, the existence of a higher cognitive verb (or verb of saying) is a necessary condition. Observe the following:

(110) Chəlsu$_i$-nin *caki*$_i$-ka puca-ka tϕ-n kəs -lil moliko cuk -əss -ta

Top SM rich man SM become N Compl OM know not conj die Past Dec

'Cholsoo died not knowing that he became a rich man.

Here, a negated cognitive state can be equally good for reflexivization as an affirmative cognitive state; negation is a higher predicate than the cognitive predicate. Cf.:

[[Chəlsu$_i$-[Chəlsu$_i$ puca rich man tϕ]$_S$ become al]$_S$ know mot]$_S$ not

The awareness condition is in the speaker's suppositions, not requiring any empirical correspondence. So with no regards to factuality, reflexivization can occur in a speaker-imagined cognitive state such as:

(111) Chəlsu$_i$-nin cuk-in hu-e-ja caki$_i$-ka calmot-ha-n kəs -lil
Top die Rel after only SM wrongdo Past Compl OM N

kkaytat-lil kəs -i - ta
realize Fut Compl be Dec N

'Cholsoo will realize that he did wrong only after he died.'

The incorporation of this higher verb into the relevant structure is not contradictory to the Reflexivization Rule we set up already, and it can be regarded simply as a necessary additional condition.

An interesting point to note is that *caki* reflexivization with the first person is impossible in korean whereas *zibun* with the first person is possible in Japanese.[21]

(112)a.*na$_i$-nin caki$_i$-ka olh -ta -ko sayngkakha-nin -ta
I Top SM right Dec Quot think Pres Dec

b. na$_i$-nin na$_i$-ka olh -ta -ko sayngkakha-nin -ta
I Top I SM right Dec Quot think Pres Dec
'I think I am right.'

(113)a. watash$_i$-wa zibun$_i$-ga tadashii-to omou (Japanese)
I Top self SM right Quot think

21. A consequence is that a sentence-initial subject *caki* or *zibun* which does not have a surface antecedent indicates the third person in Korean and the first person (speaker) in Japanese, respectively.

b. watashi$_{I}$-wa watashi$_{I}$ -ga tadashii-to omou [22]
I Top I SM right Quot think
'I think I am right.'

In korean, the antecedent is a third person and coreferentiality is not sufficient for reflexivization.

We have observed the necessity of a higher abstract cognitive verb for the abstract subject of a psychological causative predicate. However, we have treated transitive verbs which can explicitly be decomposed into a causative and a psychological verb. A question that remains is whether the Flip psychological verbs that we treated before can receive the same analysis; for, these verbs do not contain any causative elements in themselves, and an important generality about the group of Flip psychological verbs is that they have a surface subject as the emotion-causing object, whereas the psychological causative predicates necessarily contain a surface object. This must be further considered.

Another question about the cognitive predicate as the subject of a psychological causative predicate is whether the higher abstract cognitive predicate in this construction can be handled as part of a presuppositional structure. If this is the case, it means that presupposition has a function of determining syntactic transformations.

22. (a) is more emphatic than (b).

CHAPTER Ⅲ

CAUSATIVE-PASSIVE-INCHOATIVE

1. Causative

This part will examine causative constructions in Korean and argue for complex propositional analysis of causative on conceptual and partly syntactic grounds, and further consider its universal implications. The implicational relation between the causal and resultative predicates will be elaborated.

1.1. *Two types of Causatives*

A large group of causative verbs in Korean are regularly formed by attaching the causative formative I to a certain class of verbs,[1] e.g.,

nok- (to melt vi) *nok*-I-(to melt vt)

(1) a. nun -ka nok -əss -ta
snow SM melt Past Dec
'The snow melted.'

b. ai -ka nun -lil nok -I -əss -ta
child SM snow OM melt Caus Past Dec
'The child melted the snow.'

Sentence (1b) is a simplex sentence on the surface. On the other hand, there is a causative complement construction as follows:

(2) a. ai - ka nun -lil nok -ke ha -əss -ta
child SM snow OM melt CMP cause Past Dec
'The child caused the snow to melt.'

It is easy to see how this sentence comes from a complex underlying structure. Consider:

(2) b. [ai -ka [nun -ka nok] -ke ha -əss -ta]
child SM snow SM melt CMP cause Past Dec
'The child caused the snow to melt.'

1. Its morphophonemic or suppletive variations are [i], [hi], [li], [ki], [u], etc.

The acceptability of the sentence with the subject marker in the embedded sentence and the synonymy between (2a) and (2b) show that the object marker in (2a) is a surface realization of the underlying subject of the embedded sentence by way of subject-raising. Compare (2b) with the following totally ungrammatical sentence replacing the OM with the SM form (1b):

(1) b'.*ai -ka nun -ka nok -I - əss - ta
child SM snow SM melt Caus Past Dec

Now the implication relation between (1b) and (2a) is not readily definable. They appear to be cognitively synonymous. It appears that at least in one sense of *ha* (1b) logically implies (2a) and (2a) logically implies (1b) and therefore they are equivalent. However, in these two sentences the act of (1b) is felt to be done in a more direct way than the act of (2a) in most cases. Sentence (1b) entails the resultant state represented by (1a), though the latter is not exactly the case as will be seen later. Sentence (1b) contains the propositional content of sentence (1a). Selectionally, an NP can become the object of the (1b) construction if and only if it can be the subject of the (1a) construction. Therefore, we come to the idea of positing in the underlying structure an abstract proverb HA which has all and only properties of senses and logical consequences identical to those of the causative morpheme I for all causative verbs.

1.2. *Lexical Decomposability Does Not Depend on Phonological Relatedness*

Let us consider how causative verbs are formed. The regular I causative verbs like *mək-i-* 'to feed', *nup-hi-* 'to lay down, etc., are formed from the respective cognate verb stems; i.e., *mək-* 'to eat', *nup-* 'to lie down', etc. But there can be another set of verbs which are causatively related without sharing any phonologically identical stems just as in English eat-feed. Consider the following interesting case:

a. cala- 'to grow' (vi)
b. kiɨ- 'to grow' (vt)
c. cala-ke HA- 'to CAUSE to grow'

(3) a. sujəm-ka cala -nɨn -ta
beard SM grow Pres Dec 'The beard grows.'

b. kɨ-ka sujəm -lɨl kiɨ -nɨn -ta
he SM beard OM grow Pres Dec 'He grows the beard.'

c. (kɨ (sujəm cala) HA)
he beard grow CAUSE
kɨ-ka sujəm-lɨl cala-ke HA-nɨn-ta

'He CAUSES the beard to grow.'

(3a) and (3b) are exactly related in such a way as (3b) is a result of embedding (3a) in a causative predicate as shown in (3c). Thus, we can substitute the subject of (3a) and the object of (3b) at the same time with any selectionally possible noun, e.g., *khongnamul* 'beansprout', *so* 'cow', *pieng* 'disease'.[2] From this analysis we can see that lexical decomposability does not require phonological relatedness. It is not the case that *kill* and *die* in English are not related on the ground that they do not share phonologically identical elements. It is not accidental to find many language in which 'to kill' consists of a word equivalent to 'to die' and a causative element.

It is plausible to try to find semantically primitive elements to represent ultimate underlying structures which can be universal.[3] The manner of the pair-wise relation, e.g., suppletion, verb plus auxiliary morpheme, verb plus auxiliary verb, or verb plus verb is language-specific. A large set of causative verbs in Korean, e.g., *cəp* 'to fold', have the lexical gap of pre-causativization element. In such a case, the underlying decomposed structure must be -ke HA-, the blank containing the features of the

---

2. Consider:

(1) a. ai -ka cala -nɨn -ta
child SM grow Pres Dec
'The chld grows.'

b. əməni -ka ai -lɨl kilɨ -nɨn -ta
mother SM child OM grow Pres Dec
'The mother grows the child.'

However,

(2) a. ai -ɨj khi -ka cala -nɨn -ta
child of height SM grow Pres Dec
'The child's height increases.'
*'The child's height grows.'

b.*?əməni -ka ai -ɨj khi -lɨl kilɨ-nɨn-ta
mother SM childof height OMgrow
*'The mother grows the child's height.'

From the above discrepancy in grammaticality between (2a) and (2b) we can easily see that the latter *cala* is different in meaning from the former (Cf., the English glosses).

3. I will exclude a further analysis of the causative construction into causative [+Inchoative], which is necessary as I will argue later, from the present development simply for convenience.

verb *cəp* except the causative element.[4]

1.3. *Generativity of Causative Constructions*

It is interesting to observe that more I-regular causatives are formed from the one-place predicate than from the two-place predicate (the ratio 115:92). Since the very simplest sort of sentence is the one-place predicate consisting of two parts—a name (onoma) and a predicative element (rhema), as Aristotle said,[5] and a two-place predication is sometimes assumed to be a "prototype" of the predication (with a formula a.r.b, *a* bearing the relation *r* to *b*), as Leech argues,[6] it is rather an expected tendency. We can form the *ha*-complex causative construction (which is possible with an open-ended set of verbs) but not the I-causative form a three-place (I-causative) construction (see Sentence 6, below). However, we cannot form any more *ha*-construction upon this recursively, since it would constitute self-embedding and generate unacceptable sentences. This point is different from the English 'make' construction, which can be indefinitely recursive, right-branching. From a two-place predicate (4), we get a three-place causative construction (5), as follows:

(4) so -ka jəmul - lil mək-əss -ta
cow SM forage OM eat Past Dec
'The horse ate forage.'

(5) ai - ka so -eke jəmul- lil mək-I -əss -ta
child SM cow IO forage OM eat Caus Past Dec
'The child fed the cow forage.'

(6) ai - ka hjəng - eke so-eke jəmul-lil mək-I - ke
child SM brother IO IO forage OMeat Caus CMP

---

4. Cf. F. W. Householder, Jr., "On Linguistic Terms," in Saporta (ed.), *Psycho-linguistics*, New York (1961), p.18, "... everyone agrees that in any science there must be (to avoid infinite regress or vicious circularity) some minimum number of primitives or terms undefined, except implicitly..."

5. Cf. P.T. Geach, "A Program for Syntax" in *Semantics of Natural Language*, Dordrecht (1972), p.483.

6. Cf. G. Leech, *Towards a Semantic Description of English*, Bloomington (1969), p.22 and p.272 fn. 8, "Notable attempts to deal with the semantics of natural languages by extending formalized predicate logic are Reichenbach (1947: 251-354) and Weinreich (1963: 130-142). Perhaps the gravest drawback of this approach within an integrated theory is the lack of systematic correspondence between the logical notation and the grammatical structure and the language—and hence the difficulty of formulating rules of expression."

ha-əss -ta
do Past Dec
'The child had the brother feed the cow forage.'

It is noted that the double object causative takes the -eke NP. Sentence (5) in Korean normally represents a singularly action of feeding, whereas the following single object construction with the OM represents the meaning of 'raising'. Consider:

(7) uli-ka so-lil mək-I -əss -ta[7]
we SM cow OM eat Caus Past Dec

On the other hand,

(8)??ai - ka so - eke mək- I -əss -ta
child SM cow to eat Caus Past Dec

is incomplete, and in case this sentence is uttered, the direct object of eating must be understood directly through a preceding context. It cannot be said to come directly from

(9)??so -ka mək-nin -ta
cow SM eat Pres Dec

which does not sound complete; in Korean the object of *mək-* is required or a deleted specific object must be understood. This *məki*, behaves differently from *mək-I*, taking a single object restricted to [+Animate, −Human] in selectional features, and its meaning is different from the derived *mək-I-*. Observe the following:

(10) *uli-ka ttal - lil məki -əss -ta
we SM daughter OM raise Past Dec
'We raised the daughter.'(Intended)

Therefore, it must be treated as a separate lexical item from the derived *mək-I*. The phonological identity brings about only associational, not categorical, relation between the two. The relation is rather historical and not synchronic. Note the professional sense in the verb of the second sentence as in English:

(11) a. na-ka ai -til-eke jəngə - lil kalichi-əss -ta
I SM child Pl to English OM teach Past Dec
'I taught English to the children.'

b. na-ka ai - til-lil kalichi-əss -ta
I SM child Pl OM teach Past Dec
'I taught the children.'

---

7. For this example see H.B. Choi, *uli malbon*, Seoul (1965), p.427.

A similar example is the relation between *pat-* (to get, to receive) and *pathi-*. Etymologically, the latter is *pat-hi* (I (Caus)). Its meaning is roughly 'to devote, to offer or give (to God or seniors)'. Its object selection is extremely limited, whereas the object selection of *pat-*(to receive) is unlimited. Observe the following possible objects and recipients for *pathi*:

sangkwan	'senior officer'-eke (IO)	
hananim	'God'-eke	
namca	'man'-eke	
kongpu	'study'-e	
n ϕ mul	'bribery'-lil (OM)	
jənpo	'offer'-lil	
mom	'body'-lil	*pathi*-nin -ta
sikan	'time'-lil	Pres Dec

Native speakers are not conscious of the relation between the two, even though they say 'aha', realizing a possible relation, when it is explained with the aid of *pat-ke* HA (to cause to receive). Gruber tried to set up transformational relationships between pairs of transference verbs such as *buy-sell*, *get-give*, etc., on the ground of co-occurrence relations.[8] In his treatment, they are related not causatively but in terms of source (from) and goal (to) with the Flip operation. It is desirable to show their relatedness, but the notion of Agent and its associated adverbial modification in a possibly related pair of sentences creates certain problems. On the other hand, a possible causative relationship between *pat* and *pathi* in Korean cannot hold because of selectional discrepancy: certain nouns can become the object of *pathi-* but not of *pat*.

(12) a. Mary-ka John-eke cəngco - lil pathi -əss -ta
SM to virginity OM devote Past Dec
'Mary gave John her virginity.'

b. *John-ka Mary-ekesə cəngco-lil pat -əss -ta
SM from OM get Past Dec
'John got her virginity from Mary.'

And, in the complex causative structure, the Agent of the matrix sentence is not necessarily the Source of the Theme; the Source can be someone else. Consider:

(13)

Agent	Recipient	Source	Theme		
əməni -ka	apəci - eke	(acuməni-ekesə)	panci-lil	pat	-ke
mother SM	father to	aunt from	ring OM	receive	CMP

8. J. Gruber, *Functions of the Lexicon in Formal Descriptive Grammars*, Santa Monica (1967), p.14.

ha -əss -ta
cause Past Dec
'Mother had father receive the ring (from the aunt).'

Therefore, *pathi* can be treated as an independent lexical item, without being transformationally derived from *pat-ke HA-*. The general meaning of 'to give' is covered by another verb *cu-* (when given to a junior), *tili-* [+Honorific] (When given to a senior). Thus, phonological relatedness does not guarantee grammatical relatedness. It is an ad hoc treatment to set up a grammatical relationship between these pairs and assign change in meaning and selectional restriction to the derived items. Similar cases can be found in English. For example, many senses of 'to lay' do not have any regular connection with *to lie* (e.g., to lay eggs), except an historical association. However, the causative relation such as *cu* (to give)=*pat-ke HA-* (to CAUSE to get), or *kalichi* (to teach)=*payu-ke HA-* (to CAUSE to learn) is at least plausible semantically.

1.4. *Syntactic Evidence for Complex Proposition*

Let us consider certain syntactic consequences of the causative element in sentences. In the following English sentence:

(14) Peter killed the cat painlessly.[9]

painlessly does not modify Peter's act of causing. The sentence does not either mean that the cat has no pain as a result of Peter's killing it. It modifies the cat's dying. Therefore, it is inevitable to have a lower constituent sentence to explain the situation. The abstract underlying postulate must be following McCawley's analysis, something like

(DO, X (CAUSE, X (PAINLESSLY (BECOME (NOT (ALIVE, Y)))))).

Some other attempts to account for the fact, for instance, in terms of psychological reflex, are not explicit. This is an explicit and linguistically significant account.

A similar instance can be found in Korean:

(15) a. apəci -ka sonnim-lil jəkwan-e *olaytongan* muk-I -əss -ta
Father SM guest OM hotel at for a long time stay Caus Past Dec
'Father had the guest stay at the hotel for a long time.'

b. əməni -ka ai -lil *olaytongan* ca -I -əss -ta
mother SM child OM for a long time sleep Caus Past Dec
'Mother had the child sleep for a long time.'

9. See op. cit., p.13, for the example.

The adverbial *olaytongan* (for a long time) modifies *muk* (stay) or *ca* (sleep) rather than the act of causing it. The sentence does not mean that it took long in having the guest stay or in having the child sleep. The latter causation is possible just by giving a sleeping-pill in a moment. Fillmore has a similar argument in saying that sentence (16a) is analysable as sentence (16b) below:

(16) a. Peter put the beer in the icebox for three hours.
b. Peter CAUSE (the beer BE in the icebox for three hours).

Then, one might argue that the following kind of intransitive sentence shows the same effect:[10]

(17) I went to Chicago *for three days.*

This sentence has a durational time adverbial which does not modify the action of going. What the sentence means is 'I went to Chicago and was there for three days.' However, this involves deletion of BE. In Korean, we have the same situation:

(18) na-ka Chicago-e sahil kan ka-əss -ta
I SM at three days for go Past Dec
'I went to Chicago for three days.'

The sentence does not mean that it took three days for me to go to Chicago. What it means is:

(19) na-ka Chicago-e sahil kan ka-sə iss-əss -ta
I SM at three days for go and be Past Dec
'I went of Chicago and was there for three days.'

Again, this involves deletion of BE (*iss*). This way, the occurrence of the durational time adverbial can be accounted for in both cases.

However, in many cases of the adverbial phrase, it is predominantly associated with the subject of the underlying matrix sentence. Consider the following:

(20) nuna - ka ai-eke *sutkalak-ilo* pap -lil mək-I -əss -ta
sister SM child spoon with rice OM eat Caus Past Dec
(i) 'Sister fed the child rice with a spoon.'
(ii) 'Sister let the child eat with a spoon.' (marginally)

In the sense of permissive causation in -I- the instrumental can be (marginally)

10. Since the subject is an Agent, we can say there is a causation involved; the effect of causation is reflected to the Agent. Therefore, it is a reasonable approach to have an underlying reflexive construction for such a sentence as shown in J.M. Anderson, *The Grammar of Case*, Cambridge (1971), p.71.

associated with *ai* (child), the underlying inner sentence subject. On the other hand, in a sentence containing the lexical *ha* (to do, cause):

(21) nuna -ka ai-eke ɨn -sutkalak-ɨlo pap-lɨl mək-ke ha -əss -ta
sister SM child silver spoon with rice OM eat CMP do Past Dec
'Sister had the child eat rice with a silver spoon.'

The instrumental adverbial phrase is associated with the child's eating. If we are forced to associate it with the matrix sentence subject, it comes to modify the act of the sister's causing, largely by threatening with the spoon, or, very marginally, making the child eat, with the spoon in her hand. However, observe the following example in contrast with (20):

(22) nuna -ka haksayng eke jənphil-ɨlo kɨl -lɨl ssɨ -I -əss -ta
sister SM student pencil with letters OM write Caus Past Dec
'Sister had the student write letters with a pencil.'

This time, the instrumental adverbial is normally associated with the underlying inner sentence subject. The student writes with a pencil, and it is obvious that the student is an Agent and that is why it can be associated with the instrumental. Let us suppose the Agent in the sentence is only *nuna* (sister) and *ssɨI-* can be substituted by a verb of giving as follows:

(23) nuna -ka haksayng-eke jənphil-ɨlo panci-lɨl cu -əss - ta
sister SM student pencil with ring OM give Past Dec
'Sister gave the ring to the student with (using) a pencil.'

In sentence (23), *jənphil-ɨlo* (with a pencil) can never be associated with the Goal *haksayng* (student), no matter whether marginally or predominantly. Thus, any attempt to characterize sentences (18) and (20) merely as the frame of [Agent Goal (Instr) Theme V] is wrong. Let us observe further examples:

(24) a. Jean fait lire le livre a Marie.
b. John-ka Mary-eke chayk-lɨl ilk -I -əss -ta
SM IO book OM read Caus Past Dec
'John made Mary read the book.'

In (24a), the proposition [Marie lit le livre] is contained, the one who reads the book being Marie. Therefore, when a Marie is a real Goal, a separate Agent is expressed with 'par', e.g.,

(25) Jean fait lire le livre a Marie par Richard.
'John had Richard read the book to Mary.'

What is clear is that *a Marie*, when used in the first sense of Agentive function, is

not a Goal in the real sense of the term. It shows an abstract direction of causation but, ultimately, causation is related to an event, which is manifested in a proposition. That is why, in certain languages, the subject of the embedded two-place predicate clause is realized as a direct object rather than as an indirect object on the surface. In any language, the embedded clause subject is realized as an accusative, whether it is animate or inanimate, if the embedded sentence is a one-place predicate, e.g., Jean *fait venir* le docteur.

Consider further:

(26) Jean fait manger les pommes aux enfants avec un couteau.
'John made the children eat apples with a knife.'

In (26), the instrumental adverbial is associated with *les enfants*, (not with Jean), proving the former to be an Agent. Thus, this sentence contains two Agents showing a complex construction. Therefore, Lyons' use of the term "three-place construction" [11] for this is merely a surface characterization, and it is clear that the sentence must come out through transformational operations from a complex underlying structure. Any attempt to have this as a simplex construction in deep structure is conceptually and grammatically wrong; it does not show why *Jean* is not the one who eats when *fait* is an auxiliary, and fails to explain why the instrumental adverbial can be associated with the surface indirect object NP. Furthermore, every two-place predicate verb must have the lexical specification of the possiblility of making a three-place predicate by adding the auxiliary 'faire.' And this is an unnecessary burden to the lexicon, missing generality. The Agentive function of the indirect object is clearly seen also in:

(27) Jean fait manger les enfants au lion.[12]
'John gets the lion to eat the children.'
'John gets the children eaten by the lion.'

and *au lion* can be substituted by *par le lion* (by the lion). Likewise, the verbal element *CAUSE* can be manifested as a main verb, an auxiliary verb (French) or a suffix (Korean I), language specifically or within one language.

Let us consider the derivation of the causative construction in Korean.

(28) nuna -ka ai- eke kɨl -lɨl ssɨ -I -əss -ta
sister SM child letters OM write Caus Past Dec

11. J. Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*, Cambridge (1968), p.368.
12. Ibid, p.371.

a.



subject -raising
predicate- raising

b.



I-substitution:

HA is simply replaced by the causative morpheme I in the above construction. If in tree (a), a lexical *ha* replaces the abstract HA, the derived structure would look like the following after the complementizer placement and case marker placement:



From our analysis, we can state that, firstly, there must be a pre-causativization constituent sentence for a causative sentence in order to account for the various adverbial modifications such as painlessly (associated with die), durational or instrumental adverbials. Secondly, the same adverbial can be associated with the matrix sentence subject or constituent sentence subject of the underlying structure depending on the kinds of the I causative verb. If the former (matrix S subject association) is the case, the causativization must be so constrained that the constituent S cannot have the adverbial modification. This problem would be resolved by taking the hypothesis of pre-lexical transformation of predicate-raising, which is a cyclical rule, and by imposing certain constraints on lexical insertion. The French *faire* construction reveals the intermediate stage of predicate-raising just before lexicalization. And there is no compelling reason for the transformational rule to be in the lexical component rather than in the transformational component.

1.5. *Causative as Implicative*

Let us observe the logical and syntactic consequences that the lexical causative verb *ha-* brings about and see what properties of the verb the abstract causative verb *HA-* should abstract. We have already observed that sentence (2b) has the property of bringing about the resultant state without fail. In other words, sentence (1b) entails sentence (1a). However, we have to further consider sentence (2a):

(2) a. ai -ka nun -lil nok -ke ha -əss -ta
child SM snow OM melt CMP do Past Dec
'The child did it so that the snow would melt.'

With the lexical *ha*, the sentence does not guarantee the resultant state of the snow's melting. Suppose the child has turned on a heating device to melt the snow. Then the following is possible if the snow is just starting to melt:

(29) ai -ka (kajəlcangchi -lɨl thɨl-ə) nun - lɨl nok -ke ha -əss -ɨna
child SM heating device OM turn by on snow OM melt CMP do Past but

nun -ka acik ani nok -əss -ta
snow SM yet not melt Past Dec
'The child did it so that the snow would melt, but the snow has not melted yet.'

In the extreme case, let us suppose the deivce was not effective, then the following is also *marginally* possible:

(30) ?ai -ka (kajəlcangchi -lɨl thɨl -ə) nun -lɨl nok -ke *ha* -əss -ɨna
child SM heating device OM turn by on snow OM melt CMP do Past but

nun -ka ani nok -əss -ta
snow SM not melt Past Dec

Cf. If we use the suffixal causative and negate the resultative, logical oddity arises:

(31) *ai - ka nun - lɨl nok -I - əss - ɨna
child SM snow OM melt Caus Past but

nun -ka ani nok -əss -ta
snow SM not melt Past Dec
'The child melted the snow, but it did not melt.'

In this respect, the lexical causative verb *ha-* is a little different from the verb *cause* in English; i.e., *ha* is hardly an implicative, whereas *cause* is an implicative (Cf. Karttunen, 1971). Sentence (A) entails Sentence (B):

(A) The child caused the snow to melt.
(B) The snow melted.

The above case is about a non-human natural phenomenon as the object, but if the one that is affected by the causing action is human, the situation becomes more complicated. Observe:

(32) na-ka ai - lɨl malu- esə ca -ke ha-əss -ta
I SM child OM floor on sleep CMP do Past Dec
'I had (or let) the child sleep on the floor.'

This lexical *ha* can mean *to cause* variously by letting (permitting), having, making, or forcing, depending on the volition of the object or the intensity of the causal Agent's intention. If the object is positively willing and the causal Agent is in the position or has the authority of giving permission, *ha* indicates permission. Otherwise, it indicates providing circumstances (for the result) or 'to make.' The complementizer *-ke*, with the verb *ha*, indicates the sense of 'so that...' 'in the direction of...'

'for the result of...' Its original function is an adverbializer. Therefore, when *ha* has the meaning of 'to permit,' (32) can be followed by the following sentence without any logical inconsistence:

(33) kɨləna ani ca - əss -ta
but not sleep Past Dec
'But (he) did not sleep.'

On the other hand, the above sentence cannot follow sentence (32) if *ca-ke ha* is replaced by the causative suffix expression *ca-I-* in it.[13)]

However, if the *ha-* (causative) is reinforced with a modification for the sense of necessary accomplishment such as *kiəi* (by all means) *kjəlkuk* (eventually), the rusult is implemented. In other words, these adverbs are implicative. Consider:

(34) kɨ-ka ai -lɨl kiəi nup-ke ha -əss -ta
he SM child OM by all means lie CMPdo Past Dec
'He made the child lie down by all means.'

Sentence (34) entails:

(35) ai - ka nup-əss -ta
child SM lie down Past Dec
'The child lay down.'

And consequently the following cannot follow (34):

(36)*?kɨləna ai - ka ani nup-əss -ta
but child SM not lie down Past Dec
'But the child did not lie down.'

The same consequence arises with sentence (2a) when modified with the above adverbials:

(2) a´.ai - ka nun - lɨl kiəi nok - ke ha -əss -ta
child SM snow OM by all means melt do Past Dec
'The child caused the snow to melt by all means.'

---

13. This replacement accompanies change in the locatives from-*esə* to -*e*:

na-ka ai -lɨl malu -e ca -I -əss -ta
I SM child OM floor at sleep Caus Past Dec

After '-e', a verb like 'nəh-ə' (by putting) seems to have been deleted.

Therefore, the abstract causative verb *HA-* must have the implicative property. In English, verbs like *let*, *get*, *have*, *cause*, *make*, and *force* have implicative force as opposed to verbs like *allow*, and *permit*. The regular I-causative verbs in Korean can be used in the sense of permission as follows, guaranteeing implementation:

(37) əməni - ka kəci -eke pap - lil mək-I -əss -ta
Mother SM beggar IO rice OM eat Caus Past Dec
'Mother let the beggar eat the rice.'

(38) kəci -ka pap -lil mək-əss -ta
beggar SM rice OM eat Past Dec
'The beggar ate the rice.'

The abstract verb HA- is normally conflated with the pre-causativization verb in terms of time and place of the occurrence of cause and effect for the majority of causative verbs as observed by Fillmore.[14] Consider the following extremely marginally intelligible sentence even with the lexical *ha-*:

(39)???na-ka cinan sujoil -e Ohio-esə holangi-lil cinan
I SM last Wednes- day on in tiger OM last
kimjoil-e Illinois-esə cuk -ke ha-əss -ta[15]
Friday on in die CMP do Past Dec
In Meaning: 'I did in Ohio last Wednesday in such a way that the tiger died in Illinois last Friday.'

Even in case the above sentence is asserted to be grammatical, it does not affect the character of the abstract HA-, which undergoes a prelexical transformation. As Fillmore explains, the cause could be by shooting the tiger in Ohio last Wednesday. And the tiger could have gone to Illinois and died last Friday. Then, one has to conceptualize and express causing and dying occurring at one stretch of time at one area. This event can be represented in the following way:

(40) na-ka cinan cu - e cungsəpu-esə holangi-lil {cuk-ke HA / cuk-I-} -əss -ta
I SM last week in Midwest in OM {die Caus} Past Dec
'I {CAUSED a tiger to die / killed a tiger} in the Midwest last week.'

14. See C.J. Fillmore, "Some Problems for Case Grammar," *Report of the Twenty-second Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies*, Georgeetown University Press L 1971), p.50.

15. Particularly, in Korean, *esə* can be analyzed as *-e, issə-sə* 'by being at', an instrumental adverbial clause.

1.6. *Necessity of Decomposition*

A single surface lexical item can be decomposed into the complex underlying structure, of which a representative case is the verb *sikhi-* 'to cause to do'. I posit the underlying form *ha-ke ha-* 'to cause to do' for the verb. It is interesting to observe that an old form of *ha-ke HA-* was *ha-i-* which exactly reflects the *I* regular causative structure. When an instrumental adverbial is attached, it modifies the lower predicate, which is available only by decomposition. Observe the following:

(41) na-ka ai -eke homi-lo il -lil sikhi-əss -ta
I SM child to hoe with work OM Past Dec
'I made the child work with a hoe.'

[sna[sai homi-lo il ha]ha]
underlying structure

(41′) na-ka ai -eke kongpu-lil *sikhi* -əss -ta
I SM child to study OM cause-to-do Past Dec
'I made the child study.'

The object noun *kongpu* 'study' can be replaced by any verbal nominative like *simpulim* 'errand', *totukcil* 'theft', *soce* 'cleaning", *sanjang* 'hunting' *il* 'work', etc. All these abstract verbal nominatives can regularly become the object of the verb *ha* 'do' or, by a grammatical transformation become verbalized like:

Group I: *simpulim-ha* 'to go on an errand'
kongpu-ha 'to study'
totukcil-ha 'to steal'
soce-ha 'to clean'
sanjang-ha 'to hunt'
il-ha 'to work', etc.

respecitively. By Causativization, *ha* becomes *sikhi-* and it can occur with any of the *ha*-taking verbal nominatives. These activity nouns take an Agent as subject, when they become the object of *ha* or verbalized. The causal action of *sikhi* is done normally by telling or ordering and is directed to the potential Agent, taking it as an indirect object. Therefore, we can assume that there is the Goal NP in the underlying structure for the higher verb *ha*. The underlying structure for (41) must be something like the following:

(41′) a.



b. na-ka ai -eke kongpu-lil ha-ke ha-əss -ta
I SM child IO study OM do Comp do Past Dec



c. predicate-raising
(verb-incorporation)



d.



On the other hand, there is a group of verbal nominatives which occur with *ha-*, indicating an inchoative or spontaneous sense rather than any activity sense and undergo the same process of grammatical transformations. For example:

Group II:	*chwicik*-ha	'to get a job'
	singcin-ha-	'to be promoted'
	palcən-ha-	'to develop'
	hapkjək-ha-	'to pass'
	iphak-ha-	'to enter school'

These verbs normally do not take the Goal NP, when transformed to *sikhi-* with a higher *ha-*. Therefore, we can simply have an embedded complement sentence in the higher abstract *HA-* clause as follows:

(42) chongli -ka chakwan -lil singcin- sikhi-əss -ta
Premier SM Vice-minister OM promote Past Dec
'The Premier promoted the Vice-minister.'

(42) a.



b. Subject-raising
Verb-incorporation
(S_2 Cycle)



c. Verb-incorporation
(S_3 Cycle)



(42) d.



chongli	-ka	chakwan-lil	singcin	-sikhi-	əss	-ta
Premier	SM	Vice-minister	OM promotion	cause to do	Past	Dec

All the Group II verbs undergo the above derivation. The higher abstract HA for

these verbs is well-motivated since sentence (42) necessarily entails

(43) chakwan -ka singcin -ha -əss -ta
Vice minister SM promotion do Past Dec

whereas sentence (41) with the higher lexical *ha* does not entail

(44) ai - ka il -lil ha-əss -ta
child SM work OM do Past Dec

Likewise, if we use the lexical *ha* for sentence (42)

(45) chongli -ka chakwan-lil singcin - ha-ke ha-əss -ta
Premier SM Vice- minister OM promotion do CMP do Past Dec

'The Premier acted so that the Vice-minister would be promoted.'

Sentence (45) hardly entails sentence (43). The role of *chakwan* in sentence (43) is a Theme and its will is not considered.

An important fact is that even with the same Group I verbs, if some of them undergo the second derivation, they have the implicative sense. Consider:

(46) a. əməni- ka nuna -eke il - lil sikhi -əss -ta
mother SM sister to work OM cause Past Dec to do
'Mother ordered the sister (to) do some work.'

b. nuna -ka il -lil ha-əss -ta
sister SM work OM do Past Dec
'Sister did some work.'

(46a) does not entail (46b). However,

(47) a. əməni -ka nuna - lil il- sikhi-əss -ta
mother SM sister OM work Past Dec
'Mother made the sister work (like a slave, for instance).'

b. nuna -ka il -ha -əss -ta
sister SM work do Past Dec
'Sister worked.'

(47a) entails (47b). A similar situation arises with *kongpu* (study). Compare the following with sentence (41):

(48) na-ka ai - lil kongpu- sikhi-əss -ta
I SM child OM study Past Dec
'I caused the child to study.' (literal)
'I sent the child to school to be educated.' (meaning)

This sentence entails

(49) ai -ka kongpu-ha- əss - ta
child SM study do Past Dec
'The child studied' in the sense that he went to school.

Therefore, we can argue that these verbs which take only the Direct Object person in the *sikhi* construction with the implication consequence come from lexical items separate from their respective homonymous words. The Indirect Object person is assumed to have the will to resist causation, whereas the Direct Object person is not.

There are quite a few cases in which a monosyllabic verbal morpheme cannot function as an independent (free) noun and must be combined with *-ha* to function only as a verb. These are of Chinese origin. A regularity about these verbs is that they cannot be combined with *sikhi* to form a unit verb, e.g.

A.	tho-ha- (To vomit)	B.	*tho-sikhi-
	pəm-ha- (To commit)		*pəm-sikhi-
	ku-ha- (To save)		*ku-sikhi-

For these bound verbal morphemes, the *-ha* verbalizing process is obligatory with the [+bound] feature in the lexical specification, starting out of the same position as other verbal nominatives in the underlying structure. One reason is that their respective possibly synonymous disyllabic morphemes can be free: *kutho* (vomiting), *pəmhayng* (committing), *kuco*(saving). The monosyllabic *bound* verbs are systematically blocked from undergoing the *ha-ke-ha-sikhi*-process (See (B)).

By thus decomposing an apparently single lexical item below the level of lexicalization, we can account for certain semantic and syntactic regularities and logical consequences.

2. Passive

2.1. *Regular Passive*

We have observed different possible forces of causation contained in a lexical item *ha-*. And we have set up an abstract proverb *HA-*. Now one fact about the Korean I-causative morpheme is that in quite a few cases it is regularly used as a passive morpheme at the same time. Consider:

(50) nuna - ka əməni -eke ai -lil an -ki -(I)əss -ta
sister SM mother IO child OM embrace Caus Past Dec

'Sister had Mother embrace the child.'

(51) ai -ka əməni -eke an -ki -əss -ta
child SM mother IO embrace Pass Past Dec
'The child was embraced by Mother.'

Compare this passive sentence, (51), with the following causative sentence:

(52) ai -ka əməni -eke caki mom -lil an {-(I) / *ki-* / Caus / Ke HA / CMP do} -əss -ta
child SM mother IO his body OM embrace Past Dec
'The child had Mother embrace him.'

The same auxiliary stem is used for both passive and causative of the verb *an-* 'to embrace.' And the only difference between (51) and (52) is that in (51) the child is normally involuntary whereas in (52) the child appears to be voluntary in having Mother embrace him. However, even for (52) we can imagine a situation in which the child almost involuntarily lets Mother embrace him. Particularly, if we do not have *caki* in (52) replaced by ϕ under identity with the subject *ai*, sentence (52) is not cognitively distinct from (51). Then, the meaning of the whole sentence comes close to (51), which does not have the reflexive element. The sense of 'letting (involuntarily)' can be said to be contained in the verb HA-. Let us take a German example of 'letting' which indicates the passive:

(53) Seine erste Frau lieβ sich von ihm schneiden.
'His first wife let herself be divorced by him.'

Thus viewed, the same *HA-* can be assumed to mean variously a causative, permissive, or even passive sense. Consider the ambiguity in the following sentences:

(54) a. əməin -ka ai -eke cəc -lil mul -li(I) -əss -ta
mother SM child IO breast OM bite Caus Past Dec
(Causative) 1. 'Mother had the child hold the nipple between his teeth.'
(Passive) 2. 'Mother had the nipple bitten by the child.'

b. əməni -ka ai -eke cəc -lil ppal-li (I)- əss-ta
mother SM child IO milk OM suck Caus Past Dec
Pass
(Causative) 1. 'Mother had the child suck the breast.'
(Passive) 2. 'Mother had her breast sucked by the child.'

A diagnostic analysis shows that when the subject of the whole sentence is an Agent, the Causative auxiliary stem indicates a causative, and if it is a Patient, the same stem indicates a passive. In both sentences, when they are causative, the first NP (əməni) and the second NP (ai) are Agents, whereas when they are passive, only the second NP is an Agent. Thus, the presence of the Causative morpheme (I) normally indicates the presence of some cause.[16] The passive is formed only from a verb which has at least two arguments, since a causative verb must have at least two places. However, the orders of the Agent NP(s) and the Theme NP in the active and passive constructions are systematically distinct and accordingly the interpretation of the same morpheme I becomes distinct. As a result, some causative morphemes which had identical sounds both in the causative and passive sentence have diverged in pronounciation,

e.g., mək-*i*- (to CAUSE to eat) causative
mək-*hi* (to be eaten) passive

Even with the same segmental sounds, there arises some difference in stress and length of the elements;

e.g., mul-li-	[mú̀lli]	(to CAUSE to have between ones teeth)	causative
mul-li-	[mullí]	(to be bitten)	passive
ppal-li-	[pá̀lli]	(to CAUSE to suck)	causative
ppal-li-	[pallí]	(to be sucked)	passive

And in a remote area where slight residual tones exist, there is a tone distinction between the causative and passive uses of the same segmental I causative morpheme.[17] There are many verbs which allow only the I-passive construction, not the I-causative. Therefore, even in case both are assumed to come from the same source they must be distinguished at a certain point of derivation. Let us examine a passive sentence, (54), further. It can be assumed to derive from an underlying structure analogous to the causative counterpart:

16. Korean is analogous to Sonrai in this respect, as pointed out by Getatchew Haile when Shipen (1970) was pressented. Cf. T. Shopen and M. Konare, 'Sonrai Causatives and Passives: Transformational versus Lexical Derivations for Propositional Heads; in *Studies in African Linguistics*, 1:2 (1970).

17. Byunggun Lee, a speaker of Kyungsang-Do dialect, reports this fact.



The difference lies in that the matrix S subject of the passive construction is tentatively assumed to contain the feature complex of [+responsibiliy, -cause, -act], whereas a permissive Agent contains [+responsibility, +cause, -act] and a causative Agent contains the properties of [+responsibility, +cause, +act]. The [+responsibility] feature of animate beings is responsible for the surface occurrence of the OM for the object noun in the underlying structure. Consider the ungrammaticality of the following sentence which has an inanimate subject:

(55) a. *ki cip -ka kunin -til -eke piək- lil həl -li -əss -ta
the house SM soldier Pl IO wall OM demolish Pass Past Dec

b. ?ki cip -ka kunin-til - eke piək-ka həl-li-əss-ta
'The wall of the house was demolished by soldiers.'

c. ki cip piək-ka kunin -til -eke həl -li -əss -ta
the soldier Pl IO demolish Pass Past Dec

d. kunin -til-ka ki cip piək-lil həl -əss -ta
soldier Pl SM the house wall OM demolish Past Dec
'Soldiers demolished the wall of the house.'

An animate being can not have its inalienable part as an object on the surface of the passive construction; the speaker cannot attribute the responsibility of being affected to an inanimate being.[18] Therefore, normally the inalienable part appears as the subject of the passive construction (55c). And its possessor can be topicalized and (optionally) the Agent can move to the left of the inalienable part. (55c) is related to (55d) in an objective manner. However, a nation functions just as an

18. The Latin origin of 'passive', 'passivum', means 'experiencing', 'having something happen', 'undergoing', according to Householder.

animate being. Consider the following:

(56) pullansə-ka tokil -eke jəngtho -lil ppayas-ki -əss -ta
France SM Germany IO territory OM take Pass Past Dec
'France had its territory taken by Germany.'

The underlying structure for sentence (51), which does not have the inalienable part, might also be assumed to be something like the following:



1. Subject-raising
2. Equi-NP deletion
3. Verb-raising

Rules 1 and 2 are ordered as given so that the raised NP 'əməni' could be assigned an IO marker. This passive treatment for responsible subjects could be motivated since *HA* can be assigned the sense of 'undergo'. However, Hasegawa's (1968) hypothesis on the passive *BE* as the predicate verb of the passive subject for the English passive construction does not seem to be as well motivated as the Lakoff--Ross-Postal hypothesis on *BE* as the one-place predicate of the sentential subject which is active (Cf. R. Lakoff 1971); the sense of being affected is not conceived in English passive.

Would it be an accidental parallelism between Korean and genetically unrelated Indo-European languages to find both senses of 'causation' and 'being affected' in the verbs of causation?[19] The French 'faire' (see the ambiguity in (27)), the German 'lassen' (see (53)), and the English 'have' (see the parallelism in the English translations of (54b)) are used for both causative active and passive. In earlier Korean, *ha-i-* (CAUSE to do) itself was used for both cusative active and passive, even though it disappeared in the present korean except in a certain dialect. All these facts seem to be natural since a single action can be viewed either from the point of its causation or from the point of its effect. It must be a matter of difference in orientation.

19. Householder tells me the same phenomenon is found in Old Greek. It would be interesting to observe the phenomenon in different language families from the historical perspective.

2.2. *'Irregular' Passives*

There are certain classes of verbs which do not take the I-regular passive but other types of passive. They are mostly *ha*-taking verbs. Observe the following examples:

1. *tangha* 'be subjected to'

(57) pholo-ka hənpjəng-eke kutha-tangha-əss -ta
POW SM MP Agt beat Pass Past Dec
'The prisoner of war was beaten (subjected to beating) by and MP.'
Ex. ningjok-tangha- ningjok-ha- 'to outrage'
kamkim-tangha kamkim-ha- 'to imprison'
hayko-tangha- hayko-ha- 'to dismiss'

2. *pat* 'receive'

(58) ki sənsayng-nin haksayng-til-eke conkjəng-pat -nin -ta
the teacher Top student Pl Agt respect Pass Pres Dec
'The teacher is respected by students.'
Ex. hwanjəng-pat- hwanjəng-ha- 'to welcome'
chingchan-pat- chingchan-ha- 'to praise'
chukpok-pat- chukpok-ha 'to bless'

3. *mac* 'encounter'

(59) cə jəca - ka namphjən- eke sopak -mac -əss -ta
that woman SM husband Agt abandon Pass Past Dec
'That woman was abandoned by her husband.'
Ex. tocək-mac tocək (cil)-ha- 'to steal'
thɸcca-mac thɸcca-noh- 'to reject'
kupak -mac kupak-ha- 'to maltreat'

4. *tit* 'catch'

(60) ai -ka acəssi-eke kkucung-tit -əss -ta
child SM uncle Agt scold Pass Past Dec
'The child was scolded by the uncle.'
Ex. [mal(ssim) / kəkcəng / chaykmang] -tit- [mal(ssim) / kəkcəng / chaykmang] -ha- (to scold)

These apparently irregular data reveal a certain regularity; when the action of the verb is regarded to be unfavorable to the Patient and the Patient is affected, it is expressed with the *tangha* (be subjected to) passive. If it is not adverse (or even if adverse, when the speaker does not show it as such in rare cases) it takes the *pat* (receive) passive. Mostly the action is rather benefactive to the Patient in this cate-

gory of verbs. The rest are rare. What is important is how to handle these in a sensible manner. It has already been shown how to treat the I-regular passive in a possible way and basically there is no difference between the regular passive and the so-called irregular passives. In the tree for sentence (51) (p.150), we can replace the passive subject *ai* (child), -eke Agent *əməni* (mother), and the verb *an* (to embrace), with *pholo* (POW), *hənpjəng* (MP), and the verb *kutha-ha* (to beat) from sentence (57), respectively. Then, the same operations apply, the only difference being the lexicalization of *ha-ke HA*-intro *-tangha-*. Since the verb *kutha-ha* (to beat) is understood to be adverse to the Patient, the only passive form it can take is *tangha*. The *-ha-ke HA-* in the causative sense is *sikhi-*, whereas its passive sense is *tangha-*. Therefore, if we decide to set up the same structures for both causative and passive, we cannot but recognize two different HA's in the underlying structure from the beginning, one in the CAUSE sense, the other in the UNDERGO (nonagentively) sense. How to explicitly account for this curious homonymous situation (general in many languages) is still an open question. In sentence (58), *conkjəng-ha* (to respect) is a favorable action and takes the *pat-* passive. In other words, for *ha-* verbs, which passive form to take is rather predictable from the inherent feature of the verbs and not really irregular.

On the other hand, there seem to be a small set of people who feel that other non-*ha* transitive verbs can take the following kind of *pat* (receive) passive construction. Consider:

(61) Chəlsu-ka Yənghi-eke chayk-lil ilk -e pat -əss -ta
SM Agt book OM read CMP recieve Past Dec
'Cholsoo had a book read by Younghee.'

In the above sentence, *pat* does mean any physical act of receiving, but merely a flavor of abstract benefactive sense, benefactive to the subject. This is a different kind of passive construction from the previous *pat* passive; in the second *pat* construction the subject can be either weakly causative or non-causative with a two-place predicate construction embedded. In the first *pat* passive (which is only for *ha*-taking verbs), the subject has no causative force whatsoever, being the underlying object without any separate object. The second *pat* construction can take not only non-*ha* transitive verbs but also *ha*-taking transitive verbs, and we can replace *ilk* (to read) in (61) with a *ha*-verb *nangtok-ha* (to recite). For the second *pat* passive construction, the verb *pat* is in the underlying structure, representing the abstract benefactive sense. However, when the object is something that is normally supposed to be transferred and the active action is normally done benefactively, the verb *pat* normally contains the physical sense of receiving. Consider:

(62) Chəlsu-ka Yənghi-eke phiənci-lil ssi -ə pat -əss -ta
SM Agt letter OM write CMP receive Past Dec

1. Cholsoo had Younghee write a letter and got it.
2. Cholsoo had a letter written by Younghee and got it.

Sentence (62), therefore, is synonymous at least in one sense with the following:

(63) Chəlsu-ka Yenghi-eke phiənci-lɨl ssɨ -I -ə pat -əss -ta
SM Agt letter OM write Caus CMP receive Past Dec

ssi-I-ə coming from *ssɨ-ke HA-*. More specifically:

(64) Chəlsu-ka Yənghi$_{i}$-eke phiənci$_{ii}$-lɨl ssɨke HA-ə
SM Agt letter OM write CMP do CMP
Yənghi$_{i}$-ekes -phiənci-lɨl pat -əss -ta
from letter OM receive Past Dec
'Cholsoo, by having Younghee write a letter, received it from her.'

All the second coreferential elements in (64) delete. Because of the physical sense of receiving, the preceding sentence cannot be followed by sentence (65):

(65) kɨləna Chəlsu-ka kɨ phiənci-lɨl kaci -n cək -ka əps -ta
but SM the letter OM have Rel time SM not be Dec
'But Cholsoo hs never had the letter.'

whereas the sentence replacing 'letter' with 'book' can be preceded by sentence (6 1). Its benefactive active sentence:

(66) Yənghi-ka Chəlsu-eke phiənci-lɨl ssɨ -ə cu -əss -ta
SM IO letter OM write CMP give Past Dec
'Younghee wrote a letter (for Cholsoo) and gave it to him.'

cannot contain the sense of causing her to write a letter and can be a paraphrase of the passive only in one sense. In sentence (66), *-eke* is a Goal, whereas in sentence (62), *-eke* is an Agent (there is no Benefactive case in Korean, as is proved at the end of this chapter).

The idiosyncratically marked *mac* passive has the same sense as the *tangha* passive, and *mac* can be replaced by *tangha* (sopak-mac=sopak-*tangha-* 'to be rejected'). This *mac* is different from the unbound verb *mac*. Consider (67):

(67) kɨ cip -ka kϕhan -eke cənchuk-lɨl tocək-mac -əss -ta
the house SM stranger Agt stereo OM theft Pass Past Dec
'The house (family) had the stereo stolen by a stranger.'

As observed, the *ha*-taking verbal nominative comes out of an object position of the verb *ha*, and it can take the object marker if there is no other object NP in the same surface clause,[20] and we can have the following sentence:

(68) kɨ cip -ka tocək-lɨl mac -əss -ta[21]
the house SM theft OM Pass Past Dec
'The family got (something) stolen.'

Compare the sentence with the following sentence which contains the independent verb *mac*:

(69) kɨ cip -ka sonnim-lɨl *mac* -əss -ta
the house SM guest OM receive Past Dec
'The family received a guest.'

One readily responds with the following rejoinders to sentence (68), but never to sentence (69):

(70) a.1. muəs-lɨl? 2. nuku-eke?
what OM who Agt (by)

It is simply because sentence (69) comes through the following:

b. kɨ cip - ka [+N, +Pro, +Hum, −Definite] -eke
the house SM Agt
[+N, +Pro, −Hum, −Definite]-lɨl tocək-mac -əss -ta
OM theft Pass Past Dec
'The family had something stolen by someone.'

The surface similarity between sentence (68) and sentence (69) cannot explain anything about the different consequences. The *tɨt* passive is restricted to a few verbs of scolding, which is done with words (the original sense of *tɨt* is 'to hear'). The related embedded active proposition for sentence (71) is:

(71) acəssi-ka ai -lɨl (or ai-eke) kkucung-ha-əss -ta
uncle SM child OM scold Past Dec
'The uncle scolded the child.'

and the *ai* NP deletes.

As we have observed, there is not much irregular about the so-called irregular passive. Their relatedness to the active proposition is all the same as the regular

---

20.a. kɨ cənchuk-nɨn kɨ cip -ka kϕhan-eke tocək-lɨl mac -əss -ta
the stereo Top the house SM stranger OM Pass Past Dec
'AS for the stereo, the family got it stolen by a stranger.'

b. kɨ cip -ka køhan -eke tocək-lɨl mac -ɨn cənchuk
the house SM strangerAgt OM Pass Rel (Past) stereo
'The stereo that the family got stolen by a stranger.'

21. From *tocəkcil* (theft), which forms *tocəkcil-ha* (to steal), *cil* optionally deletes and it becomes homonymous with a concrete noun *tocek*(thief).

passive construction.

2.3. *Passives Abound in Korean*

The passive phenomenon is universal, and no one can deny that some passive constructions exist in Korean. And the term "passive" cannot be conceived without any association with the term "active." How to show their relatedness or "unrelatedness" is another matter. Furthermore, there is not a priori reason why a passive construction should be treated exactly like Chomsky's English passive rule in every language. On the other hand, it is a fact as universal as the existence of vowels in any language that the object (mostly direct, and sometimes indirect) of the verbal action or process takes the subject position in a "passive" construction in any conceivable language. The notion of passive is always tied up with this syntactic phenomenon. It is conceivable, therefore, that one can handle the construction syntactically. The above passive treatment was such an attempt and it is also semantically enticing. However, we can find another possible alternative. Observe the following pair of sentences:

(72) a. kojangi-ka cwi-lil mək-ko iss-ta
cat SM ratOM eat Prog Dec
'The cat is eating the rat.'

b. cwi-ka kojangi-eke mək-hi -ko iss-ta
rat SM cat Agt eat Pass Prog Dec
'The rat is being eaten by the cat.'

Excepting the slight sense of being affected on the part of the passive subject in the passive (72b), as we have previously observed, (a) and (b) might be stated to be cognitively synonymous, and might be transformationally related as alternatives. It is reversing the order of the subject and object of the active sentence and case marking, assigning the passive feature to the verb. The possibility of the progressive aspect in the above passive shows its rather pure action sense. This simplex sentence transformational treatment of the passive might be supported by some reflexive instance. Whether a rule exists or not cannot be judged on statistical grounds; even though this pure passive transformation would be restricted to the cases of the pure action passive consisting mostly of the passive which has the animate passive subject derived from the direct object of the active, being affected by the action (e.g., *cap* (to catch), *an* (to embrace), *mul*(to bite)) and some other verbs which also show the clear passive Agent (e.g., *həl*(to demolish) *ccic* (to tear)), the structural description can be so constrained, in order to derive the proper passive sentence.

2.4. *Psychological Potentiality*

On the other hand, even with the same verb carrying the sense of being affected in the passive, if the Theme (object) is other than an animate being, the sentence carries different senses; its passive form carries dominantly in the present the meaning of potentiality rather than pure action passive, as the ungrammaticality of (7 3b) and the grammaticality of (74) show:

(73) a. na-ka pap -lil mək-ko iss-ta
I SM rice OM eat Prog Dec
'I am eating the rice.'

b.*pap -ka na-eke mək-hi -ko iss-ta
rice SM I Agt eat Pass Prog Dec
'The rice is being eaten by me.' (Intended)

(74) pap -ka na-eke (cal) mək-hi -nin -ta
rice SM I Exp well eat Pass Pres Dec
'The rice is eatable to me.'

For the latter kind of structure, we can posit a higher predicate of potentiality, with a proposition which will undergo the subject-object switching (passive) being embedded in it. Since the potentiality involved here consists of the eater's appetite, the passability of the food, and the digestability, etc., it can be sensed only by the person involved. Therefore, it is a psychological potentiality in the verb. The English gloss 'eatable' is gross, since it characterizes the subject. Let us elaborate the structure further. Consider the following paraphrasability:

(75)a. Active: na-nin tomuci pap -lil mos mək-kess -ta
I Top by any means rice OM not possible eat Modal (sense) Dec
'I sense that it is not possible that I eat the rice by any means.'

b. Passive: na-nin tomuci pap -ka ani mək-hi - nin ta
I Top by any means rice SM not eat Pass Pres Dec
'I sense that it is not possible that the rice be eaten by me by any means.'

When the active sentence contains the modal morpheme *kess* which expresses the speaker's PERCEPTION and the negative POTENTIAL morpheme *mos* it becomes synonymous (at least in one sense) with the negative passive version. In other words, what the second construction contains is the basic proposition (which undergoes subject-object inversion) embedded in the POTENTIALITY predicate, which is embedded in the PERCEPTION predicate. Both sentences must derive from an underlying structure looking like the following:



When the passive switching applies to the most deeply embedded S, getting the [+ Pass] feature to be raised into POSS, SENSE, it is realized as *hi*. this semantic structure is supported also by the following syntactic consequences. Since the passive version contains the potentiality sense already, if the negative potentiality morpheme *mos* 'not potential' is associated, the sentence becomes ungrammatical. Consider:

(76) *pap-ka na-eke *mos* mək-hi-nin-ta[22]

It must be replaced by the pure negative *ani* (not) to be grammatical. In the active sentence, NOT POSS are lexicalized into *mos*. If we replace the first person Experiencer by a non-first person in the above active version, the expected unnaturalness arises just as in the passive version. Consider:

(77)a. ??ki-nin tomuci pap -lil mos mək-kess - ta
he Top by any means rice OM not possible eat Modal Dec

b. ?ki-nin tomuci pap -ka an mək-hi -nin -ta
he Top by any means rice SM not eat Pass Pres Dec

This construction is awkward with the second third person in the present tense, although it is not aukward in the past tense. Consider the following in contrast with (74):

---

22. The negative potential *mos* is not necessarily restricted to an animate being. Consider the grammaticality of the following:

pap -ka ce ttaye-e mos na -o -ko iss-ta
rice SM right time at not posible come out Prog Dec
'The rice cannot come out at the right time.'

(78) a. ??pap -ka ki- eke mək-hi -nin -ta
rice SM [+Pro, +III, +Hum] Agt eat Pass Pres Dec
'The rice is eatable to him.'

b. pap-ka ki-eke mək-hi-əss -ta
Past
'The rice was eatable to him.'

Therefore, this construction is different from the simple passive in that it involves a psychological (subjective) predicate which requires an Experiencer. A crucial syntactic consequence of such difference is that this Experiencer can be topicalized (or relativized) whereas the passive Agent cannot, as follows:

from (74) a. na-nin pap -ka cal mək-hi -nin -ta
I Top rice SM well eat Pass Pres Dec
'As for me, the rice is eatable to me.'

b. pap - ka cal mək-hi -nin na
rice SM well eat Pass Rel I
'I, to whom the rice is eatable.'

from (72b) a. *kojangi-nin cwi -ka mək-hi -ko iss-ta
cat Top rat SM eat Pass Prog Dec
'As for the cat, the rat is being eaten by it.' (Intended)

b. *cwi-ka mək-hi - ko iss-nin kojangi
rat SM eat Prog Rel cat
'The cat, by whom the rat is being eaten.' (Intended)

Consider the following grammaticality in contrast with (78a):

(79) cwi-ka kojangi-eke mək -hi -nin -ta
rat SM cat Agt eat Pass Pres Dec
a. A rat *can* be eaten by a cat.
b. A rat is in the process of being eaten.
c. A rat is eaten by a cat.
d. ??A rat is eatable to a cat.

The above sentence is ambiguous: (a) it represents a non-psychological (objective) potentiality with the passive meaning, (b) a passive process, (c) a general truth with the passive meaning. In the senses of (a), (b), and (c) *kojangi* 'cat' is neither an Experiencer nor a Goal, but it is an Agent, with animacy. In this sense of *mək* 'to eat', the associated meaning of *cap* 'to catch' is stronger. Therefore, in its metaphorical sense, if we say

(80) jəca -ka namca-eke mək-hi - nin -ta
woman SM man Agt eat Pass Pres Dec

'A woman is eaten by a man.'

there is no psychological potentiality involved because of the [+Animate] feature of *jəca* 'woman'.[23] If we take the cat in (79) as an Experiencer, the sentence sounds very awkward in the present tense. If in the past (mək-hi-əss-ta), no sense of (a) objective potentiality, (b) sense of process, or (c) general truth, is possible, but it is a pure passive ('was eaten'). With the adverbial *cal* (well) or negative *ani* (not) added (cal (ani) mək-hi-əss-ta), however, the past could mean the psychological potentiality, in which case the animacy of the rat is completely ignored. But a cat does not speak and even in the past it makes sense only when we imagine a fictitious situation like a fairy tale. The objective potentiality sense is not unique to the passive construction, but it is possible with the active sentence in the present tense as in English. Consider the following:

(81) ki -nin uncən -lil ha -nin -ta
he Top driving OM do Pres Dec
'He does driving.'
'He can drive.'

The 'pseudo-intransitive'[24] construction in English is also "especially frequent in simple present tense (*this material washes*)"[25], as in the Korean passive-psychological potentiality construction. Thus observed, what is clear is that whenever the subject and the object of the activetransitive sentence are switched the passive marker is assigned in Korean, and that there exists the psychological potentiality construction which has the passive force but distinct semantic representation from the pure action passive which could be only transformationally derived. And the syntactic evidence for the distinction has been shown through the topicalizability of the Agent and the Experiencer.

2.5. *Agentless Passive and Spontaneity*

In any language, it is possible to have an agentless sentential construction: the reflexive-passive as in Spanish, French, Russian, etc., or the pseudo-intransitive as in English, or the ergative system as in Bamhara. The Korean passive does not keep the Agent as freely as the English passive. The agentless passive sentence in English

23. This [+Animate] feature is redundantly [+Responsiblility]. A situation in which the subject, a woman, is a corpse and the Agent, a man, is carnivorous might be imagined in order to get the psychological potentiality sense, which is extremely deviant and trivial.

24. I owe this term to Lyons (1968), p.366.

25. Halliday, quoted by Lyons (1968), p.366.

such as *Mary was kissed* would not have an independent underlying structure from an active sentence. It must have an underlying form which is something like:

PRO kissed Mary.

Here the proform is not to be lexically realized. It must delete after the Passive rule. Because of the deleted Agent the hearer of the sentence can readily ask, 'By whom?' However, English does not permit a subjectless sentence in surface structure, calling for a constraint like Perlmutter's.[26] In Korean, subjectless sentences exist in surface. The associated verb does not show any agreement elements (except the honorific) which will give a clue for the recovery of the subject pronoun. The situation must be handled on the discourse level. Observe the following:

(82) a. kangto-lil cap -əss - ta
robber OM catch Past Dec
'(Someone) caught a robber.'

b. kangto- ka sunkjəng -eke cap - hi -əss - ta
robber SM policeman Agt catch Pass Past Dec
'The robber was caught by the policeman.'

c. kangto- ka cap -hi -əss -ta
robber SM catch Pass Past Dec
'The robber was caught.'

Sentence (82c) misses the Agent. However, this agentless passive is related to its corresponding active sentence with the one-place predicate. Sentence (82a) is not a one-place predicate even if it has no surface subject. If it can be argued that there are no passives in Korean for the reason that there are many passive sentences in which the Agent is not expressed, then it must be the case that there are no active sentences in Korean since there are so many active sentences with the Agent unexpressed in surface structure. Contrarily it is quite possible to have a passive with an Agent only implied (therefore, existing in the underlying structure) or even totally unexpressible as in Sonrai. E.g.,

(83) Tasu di na- *ndi*
rice the eat been
'The rice was eaten (by someone).[27]

In Korean, even in the case of a "passive" form of a verb which is predominantly used in the spontaneity[28] sense the sentence sometimes can express the notion of the Agent anyway. Consider the following:

---

26. Perlmutter (1971), p.100.
27. Shopen and Konare (1970), p.212.
28. I owe this term to Choi (1965).

(84) a. Marijuana-ka cal phal-I nɨn -ta
SM well sell Pass Pres Dec
'Marijuana sells well.'

b. Marijuana-ka sangin -tɨl-e ɨjha-əsə[29] haksayng-tɨl-eke
SM merchant Pl by student Pl to
(manhi) phal-I ko iss-ta
much sell Pass Prog Dec
'Marijuana is being sold to students by the merchants (in a large amount).'

This is different from the psychological potentiality construction which cannot form the progressive (Cf. 73b). It has the characteristics of spontaneous process and passive; the Agentive force is represented even if it is not the same form as the *-eke* Agent NP. Consider the following English sentences:

(85) a. Marijuana is selling well to students.
b. *Marijuana is selling well to students by the merchants.
c.??? Marijuana is selling well to students through the merchants.

This pesudo-intransitive construction normally incorporates the notion of repeated or plural process ('habitual' aspect, particularly with the adverbial modification ' well'). Consider, therefore, the following:

(86) a. * The book was the only possession I had, and it sold(well).
b. The book *sold* well.

Sentence (86b) implies there were many copies of the book. Consider the following:

(87) Gipsy Rose Lee sold well.

Even though the subject is a single person, the sentence shows repeated processes. The Korean counterpart *phal-li*-covers not only the spontaneity case which shows the habitual aspect but also the passive situation which is expressed by the passive form in English. A similar instance is *jəl* 'to open'. Its 'passive' form, *jəl-li* could mean spontaneity without any Experiencer or Agent, psychological potentiality with an Experiencer, or passitivity with or without an Agent. All these senses are subtly

---

29. The postpositional phrase *-eɨjha-əsə* (by the direct agency of) could have a sentential source, but the point made here is that it shows agency. And we rarely use *ɨjha-* as a predicate verb. Consider:

?Marijuana-ka haksayng-tɨl-eke phal-I-nɨn kəs-nɨn sangin-tɨl-e ɨjha-nɨn-ta.
'It is because of the merchants that marijuana is being sold to students (in a large amount).'

Here even the meaning seems to be different from the postpositional form.

interwoven in the same form. In quite a few cases the English pseudo-intransitive has a psychological potentiality sense analogous to the Korean counterpart. Observe the following sentence:

(88) ?The paper reads well.

The Experiencer of the sentence as well as the suppressed Agent of 'reading' is the speaker of the sentence. Compare it with the following psychological potentiality construction in Korean:

(89) pap -ka jəki-esə cal mək-hi - nin - ta
rice SM hereat well eat Pass Pres Dec
'Rice is eatable to me here.'

Sentence (89) has the first person Experiencer implied. It has nothing to do with many people eating rice just as (88) has nothing to do with many people reading the paper.

Let us try to see the relative weight between the spontaneous sense and the passive force in the pseudo-intransitive construction in English. Compare the degree of grammaticality in the following sentences:

(90) a. What the Earth does is (to) rotate.
b.*?What happens to the Earth is that it rotates.

(91) a.*?What the books did was (to) sell well.
b.(?)What happened to the books was that they sold well.
c. What happened to the books was that they were sold.

What we can see is that the pseudo-intransitive construction does not show any real spontaneous action, and it is not the real passive event as such, either. It is conceptualizing the passive process as a spontaneous process, with the passive Agentive force merely assumed and suppressed. Therefore, with the underlying potentiality meaning representation, moving the underlying Object (Theme) to the (empty) subject position could be one possible way of handling the situation. Thus, the possible manner or Instrumental adverbial modification is associated with the underlying action (Cf. The door opens *with* a key), and certain adverbials are associated *with* the conceptualized spontaneous process (Cf. The book sells *well.*).

In the following case, the *I* form represents virtually the sense of change of state. Consider:

(92) nalssi -ka phul -li - əss - ta
weather SM thaw Pass Past Dec
'It thawed.'

Cf. nalssi - ka kay -əss - ta
weather SM clear up Past Dec
'The weather cleared up.' (The weather BECAME clear.)

We normally do not use the corresponding transitive sentence. Observe:

(93) ??(hananim-ka) nalssi -lil phul -əss - ta
God SM weather OM thaw Past Dec
'God thawed the weather.'

If we want to relate *phul-li* to *phul* (Vt. to resolve, to thaw, to solve), the subject-object switching (passive) operation must apply to an empty subject sentence embedded in the Inchoative predicate in the particular reference to the weather. Or alternatively, we can view the situation as an underlying inchoative structure without showing the syntactic operation of *phul-li-* coming from *phul* (Vt). In other words, *phul-li-* (GET thawed) is basic and, if necessary (as in a fiction), the causative higher predicate plus *phul-li-* would derive *phul*, the transitive counterpart (*phul-li-ke HA⇒* phul). Because of the change of state sense in *phul-li-*, it is virtually synonymous with *phulə-ci* (BECOME thawed), an inchoative passive structure. It is an important decision to make between the two alternatives. It is a matter of decision between action first or state first. Since the verb involves change of state, theoretically the state predicate must be available. For the moment, however, let us take the first alternative so that the subject-object switch (passive) could be consistent. A definable set of verbs undergo this process with the inchoative sense. A common lexicographical practice is to take *phul li* as a whole as an intransitive (spontaneity) verb. However, it does not explain how the transitive form *phul* is available in the inchoative-passive *phul ə-ci* (to become thawed) construction. Incidentally, the lexical item *phul* (to solve), when used in reference to a problem as the Theme, may have a psychological potentiality sense. Consider:

(94) a.??munce -ka ki -eke phul -li -nin - ta
problem SM Pron III Exp solve Pass Pres Dec
'The problem is solvable to him.' (Intended)

b. munce -ka na-eke phul -li -nin -ta
problem SM I Exp solve Pass Pres Dec
'The problem is solvalbe to me.'

A resulting state of some causation involving change of state is expressed with the aid of the verb *iss* (to exist, remain). For example:

(95) a. namu-kaci -ka kkək -I -ə iss -ta
tree branch SM break Pass CMP exist Dec
'The tree is broken.'

b. namu-kaci -ka kkək -I -əss -ta
tree branch SM break Pass Past Dec
'The tree branch was broken.'

(95a) is state-oriented and expresses the present state of result of a past action and (95b) is action-oriented. (95a) contains an embedded passive proposition as follows (with an empty Agent):

(96) a. (namu-kaci (△ namu-kaci kkəkk) iss)
Subj Subj Obj V V
b. namu-kaci-ka (namu-kaci-ka △ -eke kkəkk-I)ə iss- ta
c. namu-kaci-ka kkəkk-I-ə iss-ta (95a)

Therefore, the Agentive is expressible:

(97) ai -ka əməni -eke an -ki -ə iss -ta
child SM mother Agt embrace Pass CMP exist Dec
'The child remains embraced by Mother.'

Thus, the resultative state is expressed with a complex sentence in Korean, with the passivized sentence embedded. On the other hand, a predicative adjective does not accompany any copulative or existential element in Korean.

2.6. *'Look and See' in Korean*

When the passive form (|I|) is associated with certain sensory verbs like *po-* (to see) there does not exist any causation of physical force or strain. And its potentiality sense in the passive form can be easily captured from the following paraphrase relation:

(98) a. cangnim -ka kul sok *-lil tiljəta po-* əss - ina
blindman SM cave inside OM inward Past but
amu kəs -to mos po -əss - ta
any thing unable see Past Dec
'The blind man looked into the cave, but could not see anything.'

b. cangnim -ka kul sok -lil *tiljəta po* -əss - ina amu kəs-to
blindman SM cave inside OM inward lookPast but anything
ani po- I -əss -ta
not see Pass Past Dec
'The blind man looked into the cave, but nothing could be seen.'

In the active form, *po* can mean either action which needs an Agent as *look* in English or perception which needs an Experiencer as *see*. That is why a blind man

can *look into* the cave as in (98a or b, the first *po*), even though he cannot see anything. In that sense of *po*, it normally takes the direction indicating auxiliaries like *tiliəta* (intro), *chiəta* (at), *nayta*(outward), *nayliəta*(downward), *olliəta* (upward), etc.,[30] or manner adverbials like *ttulhə-ci-ke* (piercingly), *noliə* (staringly), *casehi*(carefully). The following example is in the sense of *see*:

(99) kɨ-ka na-lɨl po -camaca talana -əss -ta
he SM I OM see as soon as run away Past Dec
'As soon as he saw me, he ran away.'

In the sense of *look*, *po* can have the progressive aspect as follows:

(100) kɨ-ka namu-lɨl po -ko iss- ta
he SM OM look Prog Dec
'He is looking at the tree.'

The verb *po* can take only the psychological potentiality passive construction. Because of the perception sense, a non-first person present use creates unnaturalness:

(101) a. ?namu-ka kɨ-eke po -I - nɨn - ta
tree SM he Exp see Pass Pres Dec
'The tree is visible to him.' (Intended)

b. namu-ka na-eke po -I -nɨn - ta
tree SM I Exp see Pass Pres Dec
'The tree is visible to me.'

c. namu-ka po- I- nɨn- ta
'The tree is visible (to me).'

d. namu-ka kɨ-eke po - I -əss -ta
tree SM he Exp see Pass Past Dec
'The tree was visible to him.'

Sentence (101a) is unnatural because the speaker cannot know whether the other person perceives the object through his optic nerves or not at the moment of speech, and (101b) is natural since the speaker knows his own perception at the moment of speech. Notice that the third person use is perfect in the past tense (101d), since the third person could communicate to the speaker about his perception before the moment of speech. This is also the case with a group of adjectives of feeling or

30. Cf. Gruber, 'Look and See,' Language 43:4, p.944. Gruber, in his intuitive analysis, posits the prepositional complements of *TO* and *TOWARD* for 'see' and 'look,' respectively.

sensation in Korean.[31] However, the /I/ psychological potentiality construction is not adjectival syntactically, even if it might be stative. Now it must be very clear that the reason why (101a) is unnatural is not because of presence of the Experiencer. The correct reason for unnaturalness in connection with the psychological potentiality passive has never been previously captured in any Korean grammar. Rather, the Experiencer is required, even though a presupposed Experiencer could be deleted. Therefore, the only possible deleted Experiencer for sentence (101c), which is grammatical in the present tense, is the first person. Thus (101b) and (101c) are synonymous. This is the way language reveals clues for a systematic explanation.

3. Inchoative

There are a few ways of forming change of state constructions in Korean. The most productive construction is adding the inchoative auxiliary formative *-ci* to any adjective. Consider the following:

(102) a. kongki-ka malk -əss -ta
air SM clean Past Dec
'The air was clean.'

b. kongki- ka malk-ə-ci -əss -ta
air SM clean get Past Dec
'The air got clean.'

c. kongki-ka malk -ke tϕ -əss - ta
air SM clean CMP become Past Dec
'The air became clean.'

(102b) implies (102a) as a consequence of change of state from the presupposed negative state of (102a), the air being not (or less) clean, to the positive state. No

31. A parallelism is observed in psychological adjectives as follows:

a.?ai -ka colliəw-ta
child SM sleepy Dec
'The child is sleepy.'

b. na-ka colliəw-ta
I SM sleepy Dec
'I am sleepy.'

c. ai -ka colliəw-əss -ta
child SM sleepy Past Dec
'The child was sleepy.'

causation is involved in the above examples. The verb *tφ* is an independent verb as opposed to *ci* which is an auxiliary. (102c) is similar to (102b) in meaning. The *ci* inchoative construction (102b) is possible with an open-ended set of adjectives. And since a pure state is described always by an adjective, it can be resonably contended that all the change of state verbs, whether or not causation involved, have the following most deeply embedded construction:



The intransitive change of state verb, with no causation implied, can be decomposed into BECOME plus Adjective. For example, the intransitive verb *ripen* means 'BECOME RIPE,' and *melt* (Vi) signifies BECOME plus something like LIQUID (from a solid state), their causative counterparts being *ripen* (Vt)=CAUSE (BECOME(RIPE X)), *melt* (Vt=CAUSE (BECOME (LIQUID X)), respectively. The Korean intransitive verbs *ik* (to ripen, Vi), and *nok*(to melt, Vi) have no cognate adjectives, whereas the English *ripen* does. However, the lexical entries must show their primitive elements. Their corresponding causative forms *ik-hi-* and *nok-i-* are systematically formed by attaching the causative formative *I* (CAUSE) to the respective intransitive forms. The universal atomic conceptual elements are manifested language-specifically, with certain language-specific regularities and irregularities.

In English, the intrnsitive change of state verb and its corresponding transitive causative verb show the same phonological shape as *melt* (Vi)-*melt*(Vt), *grow*(Vi)-*grow* (Vt), etc., in many cases. In Korean, it is very hard to find such pairs except a few cases of motion verbs like *umciki* (move, Vi)-*umciki*(move, Vt). On the other hand, a set of quite a few adjectives constitute state of change verbs without change in form. For example:

(103)	*Adjective*	*Change of State*(Vi)	*Causative* (Vt)
	kut (hard)	kut (to harden)	kut-hi (to harden)
	ətuw (dark)	ətuw (to darken)	—
	palk (bright)	palk (to brighten)	palk-hi (to brighten)
	khɨ (tall)	khɨ (to become tall)	khi-u (to cause to become tall)

nic	(late)	nic	(to become late)	nic-hu	(to cause to become late)
kup	(bent)	kup	(to bend)	kup-hi	(to bend)
kuc	(foul)	kuc	(to become foul)	kuc-hi	(to cause to becme foul)

Therefore, the intransitive change of state verbs in the second column are synonymous with the *ci* inchoative construction, respectively: *kut=kut'ə-ci* (to get dark), *ətuw=ətuw'ə-ci*(to get dark), *palk=palk'ə-ci*(to get bright), *khi=khi'ə-ci*(to get tall), *nic=nic'ə-ci* (to get late), *kup=kup'ə-ci*(to get bent), *kuc=kuc'ə-ci* (to get foul).[32] In

32. *Kil* (long) shows a defective development of verbalizing; it does not have the present tense use of its inchoative but only the past tense use:

a. *məli-ka kil -nin - ta
hair SMlengthen Pres Dec
'Hair grows long.'

However,

b. ?ne məli- ka cal kil -nin -kuna
your hair SM well lengthen Pres Excl
'Your hair grows long!'

c. ne məli-ka kil -əss -ta
your hair SM lengthen Past Dec
'Your hair has lengthened.'

On the other hand, consider:

a. *ai -ka kil -əss - ta
child SM lengthen Past Dec
'The child has lengthened.'

as opposed to:

b. ai -ka cala -əss - ta
child SM grow Past Dec
'The child has grown.'

c. məli- ka cala -əss - ta
hair SM grow Past Dec
'The hair has grown.'

Therefore, *kili* (to grow, to raise, Vt) can in no way be related to its diachronically original *kil* (long), but to *cala* (to grow, Vi) from a synchronic point of view. A diachronic fact and an intuitive synchronic judgment should not be confused.

the above paradigm, we do not have a lexical causative form for *ətup*(dark). This is an accidental lexical gap. Conceptually **ətup-hi* is a possible form and some idiolect or dialect might have the form. The adjective *cop* 'narrow' has the gap of its inchoative form (**cop*-nin-ta 'becomes narrow'), though its causative form *cop-hi* occurs. The adjective *silphi* 'sad' has neither its inchoative nor its causative form. However, a poet might use the causative form **silpi-i* 'sadden', without failing to be aesthetically understood. The distribution of wide lexical gaps, however, does not seem to be in any systematic sense, phonologically constrained as are English suffixal inchoatives and causatives.

A crucial clue for distinguishing between the adjectival verb and the non-adjectival verb is absence of the present tense (processive) marker *nin* in the former and its presence in the latter. Observe:

(104) a. nal- ka palk -ta
day SM bright Dec
'The day is bright.'

b. nal- ka palk -nin -ta
day SM brighten Pres Dec
'The day brightens.'

Adverbial modification also makes distinction:

(105) a. *nal- ka cal palk -ta
day SM well bright Dec
'The day is well bright.'

b. nal- ka mayu palk -ta
day SM very bright Dec

c. ?nal -ka mayu palk -nin - ta
day SM very brighten Pres Dec
'The day gets very bright.'

On the other hand, consider:

(105′) a. *ai - ka kil -əss - ta
child SM lengthen Past Dec
'The child has lengthened.'

as opposed to:

b. ai - ka cala -əss - ta
child SM grow Past Dec
'The child has grown.'

c. məli- ka cala- -əss -ta
hair SM grow Past Dec

'The hair has grown.'
'Your hair has lengthened.'

Therefore, *kili* (to grow, to raise, Vt) can in no way be related to its diachronically original *kil* (long), but to *cala* (to grow, Vi) from a synchronic point of view. A diachronic fact and an intuitive synchronic judgment should not be confused.

(1)



Predicate-Raising

(2)



Inchoativization[33]

33. Essentially, I have followed Lakoff's analysis of change of state structure.

(3)



(3′)



(106) a. from (3) ?nal-ka *chənchənhi* *mayu* palk -əss - ta
day SM slowly very brighten Past Dec

b. from (3′) nal-ka *chənchənni* *mayu* balk'ə -ci -əss -ta
day SM slowly very bright get Past Dec

a and b. 'Slowly the day became very bright.'

c. *nal -ka *chənchənhi* palk -ta
day SM slowly bright Dec
'The day is slowly bright.'

Cf. nal-ka *mayu* palk-ə-ci- nin-ta
bright become
'The day becomes very bright.'

d. nal- ka *mayu* palk - əss - ta
day SM very brighten Past Dec
'The day has got very bright.'
'The day was very bright.'

The ambiguity in (d) is natural since *palk* could be either: 1) change of state verb, in which case its past shows the present resultative state of the past change (with deletion of *iss* (to exist, remain), sometimes) or 2) an adjective, in which case its past indicates a past state. The adverb *mayu* (very) modifies the adjectival part of *palk* (bright) in either sense.

In (106a) and (106b), the manner adverb *chənchənhi* 'slowly' and *mayu* 'very' are associated with the inchoative verbal element and the adjectival element, respectively, in the underlying structure, requiring a complex propositional analysis. The slight

unnaturalness of (106a) is due to the dominant verbal force of the inchoativized single item *palk* 'to brighten'. When the verb of the matrix sentence in (1) is not a pro-verb but a lexicl auxiliary verb of change *ci*, it is realized as (3') in the derivation. A set of verbs like *nilk-* 'to BECOME old', *talm-* 'to BECOME like', are change of state verbs in Korean, without cognate adjectival forms. And the only way of expressing the present state is by using the past tense. Consider:

(107) nə -ka nilk *əss* -ta
you SM get old Past Dec
'You have BECOME OLD.' ('You are old,' 'you have aged.')

The sentence indicates the resultative state. Since people get old naturally as time passes, this seems to be a possible way of viewing the phenomenon. As a consequence, the past state of being old is expressed with the past perfect tense (nə-ka nilk- əss- əss- ta 'You were old'). Semantically, it can be decomposed into BECOME plus Adjective. However, practically no cognate or equivalent adjective is available and there is no adjectival past participial form to indicate a state. Even the prenominal form necessarily shows the past tense indicated in the relative marker (e.g., nilk- əss- nin salam 'an aged man', (əss-nin⇒in) and the same form cannot be used as a predicate. The verb *talm* 'to BECOME SIMILAR to' behaves in the same way.

nə -ka apəci- lil talm -əss - ta
you SM father OM become Past Dec
similar
'You resemble Father.'

When used in the present tense, the change of state verb form represents (1) general truth or (2) present process of change. For instance:

1. (108) a. ttal -nin əməni -lil talm -nin - ta
daughter Top mother OM resemble Pres Dec
'As a general truth Daughter resembles Mother.'

b. salam-nin nilk -nin - ta
man Top get old Pres Dec
'Man grows old.'

2. (109) a. ai -ka cəmcəm əməni- lil talm -nin -ta
child SM gradually mother OM become Pres Dec
similar
'The child gradually BECOMES SIMILAR to the mother.'

b. nə- to cəmcəm nilk-nin - kuna!
you also gradually age Pres Exclaim
'You are growing old, too.'

Naturally, the last two sentences can take the progressive aspect (talmko iss), and to make the manner of gradual change more explicit, the auxiliary *ka* (to go) is attached to the verb:

(110) ai -ka cəmcəm əməni - lil talm · ə *ka*-nin -ta
child SM gradually mother OM resemble go Pres Dec
'The child is coming to be like mother.'

Normally, *o* 'to come' is more often used with other inchoative verbs for the purpose:

(111) nalk-ka palk'ə o -nin - ta
day SM brighten come Pres Dec
'The day is coming to be bright.'

On the other hand, the English verb 'to resemble' does not have any change of state sense. As a stative verb, it has a certain adjectival character.

(112) a. *The child gradually resembles the mother.
a'. The snow gradually melts.
b. The child gradually came to resemble the mother.
c. *The child came to become similar to the mother.
d.(?) The child gradually resembled the mother.
e.(?) The child will gradually resemble the mother.
f. *The child is resembling the mother.
f'. The snow is melting.
g. *Resemble the mother.

The above data shows that the verb *resemble* does not contain the inchoative sense nor any action sense. In the non-present tense stretch of time, however, it tends to be able to show the inchoative sense without any surface element for that, if the adverbial of time lapse is present.

A large number of adjectives can form a causative verb by adding the causative element *I* to the adjectival stem: e.g., cop-*hi*-(to narrow), nop-*hi*-(to heighten) etc. (Cf., the third column of Table (103)). These causative transitive verbs come through the underlying constructions of the inchoative and the causative. Observe:

(113) chəlsu-ka kil -lil cop -*hi* -əss -ta
SM road OM narrow Caus Past Dec
'Cholsoo narrowed the road.'



The intermediate structure is something like:

Chəlsu-ka kil - lil cop · ə CI- ke HA -əss -ta
SM road OM narrow become cause Past Dec
'Cholsoo CAUSED the road to BECOME narrow.'

When the verb-raising *I* causativization occurs the element BECOME is not phonologically realized. A crucial fact to be noted is that sentence (113) presupposes but does not assert the existence of a road or at least a blue-print of a road to become narrow. Therefore, up to the point of change of state a relevant logical form could be.

(114) ∃ x [(kil x) · (BECOME (cop x))]
road narrow

the presuppostional structure must be (1) the existential statement and (2) the negative state of the changed state before the change (the BECOME predicate) for every change of state proposition with or without causation. Therefore, these presuppositions do not change under negation of sentnence (113) (Chəlsu-ka kil-lil cop-hi-ci ani ha-əss-ta 'Cholsoo did not narrow the road').

In opposition to the above inchoative-causative construction, if we just say

(115) Cholsoo-ka kil - lil cop -ke *ha* -əss -ta
SM road OM narrow CMP do Past Dec
'Cholsoo caused the road to be narrow.'

Without the intervening inchoative construction, the consequence is that the causation can occur at the time of creation or building of the road (or even before that). This is possible because *ha* can include various meanings of causation like *make*,

create, etc., which do not presuppose the existence of the Theme. This is the case also in English; in (116), (a) logically implies (b) but not (c):

(116) a. We made (or built) the road narrow.
b. We caused the road to be narrow.
c. We caused the road to become narrow.

Sentence (116c), which presupposes the existence of the road, underlies 'We narrowed the road.' Rather, all the creation verbs like 'make,' 'create', 'build,' 'compose,' etc., entail the Theme's coming into being, but do not presuppose its existence. Therefore, these verbs contain the elements of CAUSE and most deeply embedded (BECOME (EXISTENT Y)).The annihilation causative verbs like 'destory', 'annihilate', etc., have the same elements, this time with the negative existential (BECOME (NOT (EXISTENT Y))). These verbs, as opposed to creation verbs, have the presupposition of the existence of the Theme. In the sentence, 'We painted the house white,' the verb does not have any creation sense and presupposes the existence of the Theme. The above analysis clearly shows the English verb 'to narrow' must be decomposed into 'CAUSE to *BECOME* narrow,' not 'CAUSE to be narrow,' just as in Korean. This is a strong evidence showing the presence of the associated inchoative element for every occurrence of CAUSE. This inchoative element distinguishes between the presupposition and the entailment of existence of the Theme that undergoes change of state.

Let us examine a clear case where only existence is involved in a causative verb. The verb *əpsay* has the following semantic representation:

(1)



Predicate-raising applies in turn to each of the predicates, and what results is:

(2)



(3)



(4)



(117)a. X-ka Y-lil (SM OM) i) *ani iss* · ə ci-ke *ha*-əss-ta[34]

b. ii) *əps* · ə *ci*-ke *ha*-əss-ta

c. iii) *əps*-i *ha*-əss-ta

d. iv) *əpsay* -əss-ta

All the four different optional choices of lexicalization mean the same semantic elements posited in the underlying representation: x caused y to become not existent. An important fact about its presuppositional structure is that the existence of the Theme is presupposed; until S_3 the negative state of the state described by the structure below S_2 is presupposed. In other words, a double negation

34. With *ci*, *ani iss*=*əps* is almost obligatory, because of the scope of negation. However, if another change of state verb *t* ϕ (become) is used, *ani iss*-ke *t* ϕ -ke *ha* (cause to become not existent) is all right. And, if we apply the *ha* negation, again the lexicalization is optional. Consider: *iss*-ci *ani* ha- *ci*-ke *ha* (cause to become not existent).

~(ANI (ISS)) =ISS
not existent existent

is presupposed. In this particular case of pure existential change, two presuppositional steps we distinguished merge into one single presupposition naturally. The presuppositions of 'x killed y' are: (1) y exists and (2) y is~ (not (alive)). What sentence (117d) entails is the changed state *ani iss* (not existent), and what the latter entails is *not alive*.

The above analysis well accounts for the situation where even an imaginary being obtains presupposition of existence as soon as it is used as the object of the verb *əpsay*. Consider the following:

(118) na-nin ilkaksu -lil əpsay-əss -ta
I Topunicorn OM Past Dec
'I caused a unicorn to become not existent.'(by killing or in some other way)

Therefore, the presupposition cannot be denied by the same speaker in the same context; it causes logical oddity. The above sentence cannot be immediately followed by the following sentence by the same speaker:

(119) kilənа ilkaksu- ka ani iss -əss -ta
but unicorn SM not exist Past Dec
'But there was no unicorn.'

The same holds in English; the existence of the Theme of the (causative)—change of state verb except creation verbs is presupposed and the existence is not restricted to existence 'in the real world.' Consider the logical oddity in the following:

(120) He annihilated (or removed) unicorns, but there were no unicorns.

Clearly, [X cause Y to be Adj] can be interpreted ambiguously either as [X CAUSE Y to BECOME Adj] or as [X CAUSE Y to BECOME EXISTENT in such a way that Y be Adj]. By making the underlying BECOME available for every change of state causative we can see explicitly whether the existence of the Theme is presupposed or not at the time of change.

As a footnote, the above decomposition of the verb *əpsay* is also supported by the systematically identical selectional restriction for the subject of *iss* (existent) and the object of *əpsay* (to cause to become but existent). The consequence is that in terms of selection an open-ended set of nouns can be the object of the verb *əpsay*, with no regards to whether it is [+animate] or [−animate], [+concrete] or [−concrete]. Because of this situation there is no corresponding English word; *annihilate* has the animate object, *destory* the inanimate, and so no. The only possible way of putting it correctly is the word-for-word glosses from the underlying representa-

tion ('cause to become not existent'). If *əpsay* takes a human object it means removing him by killing. Therefore, by having the decomposed elements and showing the selectional restriction only for the lexical item *iss* (existent) we can gain simplicity and generality. Its subject noun must be specified simply as [+N] in selectional feature.

Appendix to Chapter III

Why No Benefactive Case in Korean?

Examine the following sentences:

(1)a. na-nin akassi-eke kkoch-lil sa cu -əss -ta
I Top girl to flower OM buy give Past Dec
'I bought a flower and gave it to the girl.'

b. *na-nin akassi-eke kkoch-lil sa -əss -ta
I Top girl to flower OM buy Past Dec
'I bought a flower to a girl.'

c. na-nin akassi-eke kkoch -lil cu -əss -ta
I Top girl to flower OM give Past Dec
'I gave a flower to the girl.'

Sentence (1a) consists of complex sentences—a sentence meaning 'I bought a flower' (A. na-nin kkoch-lil sa-əss-ta) and a sentence meaning 'I gave a flower to the girl' (1c). And because of the ungrammaticality of (1b) and the grammaticality of (1c), it is easy to see that the surface case *eke* is the dative associated with the verb *cu* (to give) in sentence (1a). Because of the implicative meaning of giving in sentence (1a), the sentence is quite different from the English benefactive sentence, 'I bought a flower for her' or 'I bought her a flower', which does not imply giving the flower to her.

Furthermore, even in English by positing an abstract complex structure of 'I GAVE (OFFERED) her (I bought a flower)' to derive 'I bought a flower for her', we can do without the unnecessary Benefactive case as suggested by Fillmore.[1] In Korean, the abstract benefactive sense is expressed as follows:

(2)a. Sooni-ka aki -hako nol · ə cu -əss -ta
SM baby *with* play give Past Dec
'Sooni played with the baby for it.'

b. *Sooni-ka aki-eke nol · ə cu-ess-ta

c. na-ka Sooni-ij cim -lil olmki · ə cu -əss -ta
I SM of luggage OM carry give Past Dec
'I carried Sooni's luggage for her.'

---

1. Fillmore (1971), p.53.

d. na-ka Sooni-eke cim -lɨl olmki · ə cu -əss -ta
I SM Goal luggage OM carry give Past Dec
'I carried the luggage to Sooni (for someone).'

e. na-ka Sooni-*eke* cim -lɨl olmki-əss -ta
I SM Goal luggage OMcarry Past Dec
'I carried the luggage to Sooni.'

In the benefactive sentence (2a), *eke* does not occur on the surface even if the benefactive verb *cu* regularly occurs; the case marker or postposition that occurs with the non-subject NP is determined by its relation to the verb of the embedded clause. In a predominant reading of (2a), the beneficiary is *aki*. In (2c), it is the possessor of the luggage, without specification of any concrete Goal for luggage. On the other hand, *eke* in (2d) is a concrete Goal for the luggage, associated with the verb *olmki* 'to carry', and the abstract goal of benefaction could be anyone; Sooni or a possessor of the luggage, or someone who wants the luggage to be carried. The abstract Goal NP associated with the benefactive verb *cu* postulated in the underlying structure must be deleted obligatorily under identity with, in most cases, a non-subject NP in the lower sentence. Therefore, it has become very clear that not a single case of surface occurrence of *eke* is a Benefactive Case. There is no Benefactive Case in Korean.

REFERENCES

Austin, J. L. (1962). *How to Do Things with Words*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chang, Suk-Jin (1972). "Some Remarks on 'Mixed' Modality and Sentence Types", *English Language and Literature,* Seoul.

Chomsky, Noam (1972). "Some Empirical Issues in the Theory of Transformational Grammar," Peters, Paul S. ed., *Goals in Linguistics Theory*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Davidson, D. and Harman, G., eds. (1972). *Semantics of Natural Language,* Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Fillmore, Charles J. (1968). "Case for Case" in Bach, E. and R. Harms, eds., (196 8). *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

————(1971). "Some Problems for Case Grammar," *Report of the Twenty-second Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies,* Georgetown University Press.

————(1972). "Subjects, Speakers, and Roles," Davidson and Harman, eds.

Geach, P. T. (1972). "A Program for Syntax," Davidson and Harman, eds.

Gordon, David and Lakoff, George (1971). "conversational Postulates," *Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting of Chicago Linguistic Society*, Chicago Linguistic Society.

Greenbaum, Sidney (1969). *Studies in English Adverbial Usage*, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press.

Grice, H. P. (1968). "Utterer's Meaning. Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," *Foundations of Language* 4: 225~242.

————(1968). *Logic and Conversation* (Unpublished William James Lectures at Harrard).

————(1973). "Probability, Desirability, and Mood Operators," Presented at the Texas Conference on Performatives, Implicatures, and Presupposition, University of Texas.

Grinder, John and Postal, Paul (1972). "Missing Antecedents," *Linguistic Inquiry* 3:2.

Gruber, J.(1967). *Functions of the Lexicon in Formal Descriptive Grammars,* Santa Monica: Systems Development Corporation.

Gruber, J. (1967). "Look and See," *Language* 43:4.

Heringer, James (1972). *Some Grammatical Correlates of Felicity Conditions and Presuppositions,* the Ohio State University Dissertation.

Householder, Fred W. (1961). "On Linguistic Terms," in Saporta ed., *Psycholinguistics*, New York.

———(1971). *Linguistic Speculations*, London: Cambridge University Press.

Jackendoff, Ray S. (1972). *Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar*, Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Jenkins, Lyle (1972). *Modality in English Syntax*, MIT Dissertation.

Karttunen, Lauri (1971). "Implicative Verbs, *Language* 47:2 340-358.

Keenan, Edward (1972). "The Logical Status of Deep Structures," Presented at XIth International Congress of Linguists, Bologna, Italy.

———(1972). "On Semantically Based Grammar," *Linguistic Inquiry* 3:413~461.

——— and Hull, Robert D. (1973). "The Logical Presuppositions of Questions and Answers," *Praesuppositionen in der Philosophie und der Linguistik* (forthcoming).

Kiparsky, Paul and Carol Kiparsky (1971). "Fact," in Steinberg and Jakobovits, eds.

Kuno, Susumu (1970). *Notes on Japanese Grammar*, NSF Report No. 27, Harvard University.

Kuroda, Sige-Yuki (1965). *Generative Grammatical Studies in the Japanese Language*, MIT Dissertation.

Lakoff, George (1968). "Pronouns and Reference," Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.

———(1971). "On Generative Semantics," in Steinberg and Jakobovits, eds.

———(1971). "The Role of Deduction in Grammar," Fillmore, C.J. and Langendoen, D.T. eds., *Studies in Linguistic Semantics*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.

———(1972). "Linguistics and Natural Logic," Davidson and Harman, eds.

Lakoff, George (1972). "Performative Antinomies," *Foundations of Language*.

———(1973). "Pragmatics in Natural Logic," Presented at the Texas Conference on Performatives, Implicatures, and Presupposition.

Lakoff, Robin (1972). "Language in Context," *Language* 48:4 907-927.

Lee, Chung-Min (1973a). "Presupposition of Existence of Theme for Verbs of change (in Korean and English), *Foundations of Language* 9:3 384-388.

———(1973b). "The Performative Analysis of 'Why not V?', *Language Sciences* 25:39-41.

Lee, Hong Bae (1970). *A Study of Korean Syntax*, Brown University Dissertation.

Leech, G. (1969). *Towards a Semantic Description of English*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lyons, J. (1968). *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*, London: Cambridge University Press.

McCawley, James (1970). "Semantic Representation," Garvin, P. ed., *Cognition: A Multiple View,* New York.

———(1972). "Verbs of bitching," Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.

———(1972). "Japanese Relative Clauses," in Peranteau et. al, eds.

McCawley, N. (1972). *Reflexivization in Japanese,* University of Illinois Dissertation.

Morgan, J.L. (1969). "On Arguing About Semantics," *Papers in Linguistics* 1:1.

Muraki, Masatake (1970). *Presupposition, Pseudo-Clefting and Thematization,* University of Texas Dissertation.

Oh, Choon-Kyu (1971). "Spurious Counterexamples to the Complex NP Constraint including a 'Variably Crazy Rule' in Korean Syntax," *Working papers in Linguistics,* University of Hawaii, 2:9 105-24.

Peranteau, P., J. Levi and G. Phares, eds., (1972). *The Chicago Which Hunt,* Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.

Perlmutter, David (1972). "Evidence for Shadow Pronouns in French Relativiztion" in Peranteau et. al, eds.

Postal, Paul (1969). "On the Surface Verb 'Remind'", *Linguistic Inquiry* 1:1.

Postal, Paul (1970). "On Cereferential complement Deletion." *Linguistic Inquiry* 1: 439-500.

———(1971). *Cross-Over Phenomena,* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Prideaux, Gary D. (1970). *The Syntax of Japanese Honorifics,* Hague: Mouton and Co.

Ross, John Robert (1967). *Constraints on Variables in Syntax,* MIT Dissertation.

———(1970). "Gapping and the Order of Constituents," Bierwisch, M. and Heidolph, K.E. eds. (1970). *Progress in Linguistics,* The Hague: Mouton and Co.

Ross, John Robert (1970). "On Declarative Sentences," Jacobs, R.A. and Rosenbaum, P.S. eds., *Readings in English Transformational* Grammar, Waltham: Ginn nd Company.

Sadock, Jerrold M. (1971). "Queclaratives," *Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting,* Chicago Linguistic Society.

Sanders, Gerald A. and Tai, James H. T. (1972). "Immediate Dominance and Identity Deletion," *Foundations of Language* 8:2 161-198.

Schachter, Paul (1973). "Focus and Relativization," *Language* 49:1.

Schreiber, Peter A. (1972). "Style Disjuncts and the Performative Analysis," *Linguistic Inquiry* 3:3 321-347.

Searle, John R. (1970). *Speech Acts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Song, Seok Choong (1967). *Some Transformational Rules in Korean,* Indiana University Dissertation.

Steinberg, Danny and Leon Jakobovits, eds., (1971). *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zwicky, Arnold M. (1975). "Linguistics as Chemistry: The Substance Theory of Semantic Primes," Anderson, S. R. and Kiparsky, P., eds., *A Festschrift for Morris Halle*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Abstract Syntax and Korean with Reference to English

1994년 8월 15일 인쇄
1994년 8월 20일 발행

지은이 **이 정 민**
발행인 **지 현 구**
발행처 **태 학 사**
서울·성동구 행당동 28-7
정우빌딩 303호
전화 (02) 299~6211-2
팩스 (02) 299~6213
등 록 제2-284호(1980.1.25)

값 6,000 원